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ABSTRACT
Flight Safety Assessment and Management
by
Sweewarman Balachandran
Chair: Ella M. Atkins
This dissertation develops a Flight Safety Assessment and Management
(FSAM) system to mitigate aircraft loss of control risk. FSAM enables switch-
ing between the pilot/nominal autopilot system and a complex flight control
system that can potentially recover from high risk situations but can be hard
to certify. FSAM monitors flight conditions for high risk situations and selects
the appropriate control authority to prevent or recover from loss of control.
The pilot/nominal autopilot system is overridden only when necessary to avoid
loss of control. FSAM development is pursued using two approaches. First,
finite state machines are manually prescribed to manage control mode switch-
ing. Constructing finite state machines for FSAM requires careful considera-
tion of possible exception events, but provides a computationally-tractable and
verifiable means of realizing FSAM. The second approach poses FSAM as an
uncertain reasoning based decision theoretic problem using Markov Decision
Processes (MDP), offering a less tedious knowledge engineering process at the
cost of computational overhead. Traditional and constrained MDP formula-
tions are presented. Sparse sampling approaches are also explored to obtain
suboptimal solutions to FSAM MDPs. MDPs for takeoff and icing-related
loss of control events are developed and evaluated. Finally, this dissertation
applies verification techniques to ensure that finite state machine or MDP poli-
cies satisfy system requirements. Counterexamples obtained from verification
techniques aid in FSAM refinement. Real world aviation accidents are used
as case studies to evaluate FSAM formulations. This thesis contributes de-
cision making and verification frameworks to realize flight safety assessment
xiv
and management capabilities. Novel flight envelopes and state abstractions are
prescribed to aid decision making.
xv
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Advancements in digital computers have revolutionized the flight deck in commercial air-
craft. Fly-By-Wire (FBW) technology has facilitated the use of advanced flight control,
guidance and navigation algorithms which reliably maintain a trimmed flight condition and
autonomously follow a desired flight plan. Triple redundancy further ensures the flight soft-
ware can reliably fly the airplane in the event of any single component failure. Though these
improvements have dramatically reduced the number of aviation accidents over time [1],
Loss of Control (LOC) remains a primary contributing factor to commercial and general
aviation accidents. Over 4000 fatalities have been attributed to LOC in the past decade
alone [7,8]. Fig 1.1 illustrates the accident rate per million departures of commercial trans-
port category aircraft. According to the past two decades’ statistics [1], an average rate
of 0.3 accidents per million departures and 20 million departures per year result in 6 fa-
tal commercial transport aircraft accidents per year. This overall crash figure is likely to
worsen with the increase in the size of aircraft fleets and number of flight hours. Table 1.1
summarizes recent fatal commercial aviation accidents that occurred due to LOC.
LOC is a condition where an unusual attitude, rate of change of attitude, aerodynamic
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Figure 1.1: Statistical summary of commercial aircraft accident rates, 1959-2014 [1]
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state or aircraft position violates normal operating constraints causing deviations outside
the normal flight envelope [9]. LOC often results from a chain of events initiated by adverse
environmental conditions and on-board anomalies/failures followed by inappropriate crew
inputs and vehicle upset. The complex dependencies between LOC factors make it difficult
to construct a single intervention strategy for LOC prevention.
Aircraft manufacturers use different strategies to deal with specific LOC situations.
For example, flight envelope protection systems in Airbus commercial transport aircraft
ensure safe flight envelopes cannot be violated by the flight crew [10]. The flight control
computer overrides pilot commands that could result in flight envelope constraint violation.
Boeing commercial transport aircraft use flight envelope limiting systems to alert the flight
crew as envelope limits are reached or violated. However, the flight crew can override the
envelope limits by using excessive force on the flight controls [11]. Systems such as Ground
Proximity Warning System (GPWS) [12] and Runway Overrun Protection System (ROPS)
[13] provide specific advisories to the flight crew to avoid certain LOC situations. Though
these systems have significantly reduced aviation accident rates over the past decade, they
disengage or even misinform the crew under off-nominal conditions such as sensor system
failures, actuator failures and airframe icing. During such off-nominal conditions, flight
crews must rely on past experience, air traffic controllers, and ground crews to make safety
critical decisions, and an inappropriate decision can jeopardize safety of flight.
The current automation features available on-board airliners are not sufficiently “in-
telligent” to compute the risk level associated with a given flight condition. They do not
understand and adapt to changes in the environment that can affect the aircraft dynamics.
They also cannot assess the situational awareness level and intentions of the flight crew.
More generally, current on-board automation features do not effectively utilize all available
information to make decisions that can prevent or at least recover from LOC situations.
Consider the crash of Asiana Airlines Flight 214 [14]. The Boeing 777 was being
manually flown by the flight crew during final approach into San Francisco International
Airport (KSFO). The aircraft violated the safe operating envelope constraints with respect
to both the airspeed and flight path angle. An autonomous flight envelope protection system
would have recognized the risk associated with such flight conditions, overridden the flight
crew and triggered a go-around flight mode thus mitigating the LOC risk. Similarly, for the
accident cases summarized in Table 1.1 plus numerous others, LOC risk information could
have enabled autonomy or a better informed crew to avert catastrophe.
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Airline Flight
No.
Aircraft
Type
Location Date Cause
Colgan Air 3407 DHC-8 Clarence
Center,NY
02/01/09 Poor airspeed manage-
ment, stall
Air France 447 A330 Atlantic
Ocean
06/01/09 Blocked pitot probes,
stall
Asiana
Airlines
214 B777 San Fran-
cisco,CA
07/06/13 Poor approach speed
management, stall
Malaysian
Airlines
370 B777 Indian
Ocean
03/08/14 Unknown
Air Asia 8501 A320 Java Sea 12/28/14 Rudder limiter failure,
inappropriate pilot in-
puts, stall
Germanwings 9525 A320 Alpes-de-
Haute-
Provence,
France
03/24/15 Suicide by pilot
Table 1.1: Fatal commercial aviation accidents from 2009-2015
1.1 Related Work
This section describes work related to loss of control prevention. Loss of control prevention
architectures and sub-systems applying to specific LOC situations are discussed.
Belcastro et al [9] proposed the concept of Aircraft Integrated Resilient Safety Assur-
ance and Fail-safe Enhancement (AIRSAFE). AIRSAFE takes a holistic approach to pre-
vent LOC. The core features of AIRSAFE are vehicle health management, vehicle safety
management, resilient control and flight crew interfaces. It proposes using online modeling
and databases to predict impact of upset conditions on airplane dynamics, health assess-
ment to continuously assess the state of aircraft, power plant and avionics health, support
the flight crew by assisting with recoveries using resilient guidance and control module
overrides. It emphasizes the use of efficient interfaces to improve situational awareness
of the flight crew and enable efficient control mode transfer between the crew and re-
silient control laws. This thesis proposes the Envelope-Aware Flight Management System
(EAFMS) which is conceptually similar to the ideals of AIRSAFE. This thesis focuses
on the Flight Safety Assessment and Management (FSAM) module in EAFMS, a specific
instantiation of the Vehicle Safety Management concept proposed in AIRSAFE.
Hovakimyan et al. [15–17] introduced the Integrated Reconfigurable Control for Vehi-
cle Resilience (iReCoVeR). iReCoVeR, also conceptually similar to AIRSAFE and EAFMS,
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integrates resilient flight control, flight envelope protection, LOC prediction, fault detec-
tion, and flight envelope determination. It focuses on providing L1 adaptive control aug-
mentation to the nominal baseline controller. In contrast to the EAFMS, the iReCoVeR
doesn’t assist the flight crew with flight planning capabilities and lacks the decision-making
capabilities to automatically switch to a resilient controller in cases more general than en-
velope protection.
The sandbox control architecture was introduced by Bak et al. [18] and proposes using
an unverifiable or potentially difficult to verify control law in a sandbox environment. Con-
trol is transferred to a nominal/verifiable control law if the sandboxed control law behaves
inappropriately. Control transfer is determined by a decision-making module that relies
on manually defined rules based on reachability analysis of hybrid systems. The sand-
box control architecture incorporates the control authority switching feature described by
AIRSAFE. However, since the sandbox architecture was not intended for aerospace LOC
applications, it doesn’t facilitate the use of modules such as system identification and flight
envelope estimation.
Borst et al. [19] introduced the aircraft Safety Augmentation System (SafAS). SafAS
is an automated pilot support system that prevents aircraft from veering off course into
hazards such as terrain, severe weather, and restricted airspace. One of SafASs objectives
is to efficiently integrate aural, visual and haptic warnings issued to the flight crew before
taking full control of the aircraft. Control transfer to a fail-safe controller is governed by
user defined rules. Several tests with pilots in the loop were conducted to evaluate the
performance and pilot acceptance of the SafAS system.
Gingras et al. [20] developed the Icing Contamination Envelope Protection (ICEPro)
system. ICEPro helps identify degradations in airplane performance and flying qualities
resulting from ice contamination by measuring aircraft state and control inputs, estimating
aerodynamic parameters in real time and combining knowledge from databases. ICEPro
also provides pilots with envelope limiting cues.
The Smart Icing System (SIS) was developed by Bragg et al. [21]. SIS senses the
presence of icing, characterizes its effect on airplane performance, automatically activates
the ice protection system and adapts the flight control system in response to the degraded
flight envelopes due to icing. SIS also notifies the flight crew about the implications of a
degraded flight envelope. The SIS was meant as an augmentation to existing icing related
safety procedures. IcePro and SIS focus only on providing cues to the pilot and do not
override the flight crew to mitigate risk.
Calise et al. [22, 23] proposed a non-linear adaptive control architecture that utilized
neural networks and is capable of online learning of the network parameters and actuator
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reallocation strategies. The proposed control scheme blends aerodynamic and propulsion
actuation limits for safe operation. Napolitano et al. [24] proposed a flight control archi-
tecture that would be resilient to actuator and sensor failures. Resiliency is achieved by
integrating sensor and actuator failure detection, identification and accommodation with
the help of neural networks. Intelligent control schemes like those summarized above are
suitable to achieve resiliency under LOC situations involving failed actuators or sensors.
The prompt activation of these schemes can in turn be accomplished by FSAM.
Wensley et al. [25] proposed Software Implemented Fault Tolerance (SIFT), a highly
reliable computer system for safety critical aircraft control applications. Unlike the above
architectures and systems, SIFT reasons about critical failures at the computing layer and
achieves fault tolerance by isolating the fault then reconfigures the system by replicating
critical control tasks on different processing units.
The Flight Envelope Protection system on Airbus aircraft [10] and Flight Envelope
Limiting systems on Boeing aircraft [11] are examples of subsystems designed to prevent
LOC due to unusual attitudes. Flight Envelope Protection overrides the flight crew to pre-
vent flight envelope violations while the Flight Envelope Limiting system makes it harder
for the crew to violate envelope constraints. However, these systems are automatically
disengaged under off-nominal conditions.
The Runway Overrun Prevention System (ROPS) was introduced by Airbus to warn
flight crews about degraded landing conditions during final approach [13]. During ap-
proach, ROPS informs the flight crew via an intuitive interface whether to execute a go
around or not. It also warns and assists the flight crew after touch down with the necessary
actions to reduce the risk of a runway overrun.
The Automatic Ground Collision Avoidance System (Auto-GCAS) developed by the
US Air Force Research Laboratories prevents Controlled Flight Into Terrain (CFIT) sit-
uations [26]. Using prior maps, a trajectory prediction routine and a collision avoidance
routine the Auto-GCAS system overrides the pilot with a recovery autopilot to prevent
imminent CFIT.
1.2 Problem Statement
Recent advancements in computation power, algorithms and sensors have made possible
autonomous control, guidance and planning functions that can together mitigate LOC risk.
However, except for the Airbus flight envelope protection and Auto-GCAS systems, LOC
prevention systems devleoped rely on the flight crew to make task level and guidance deci-
sions to mitigate LOC risk. The ability of a human pilot to comprehend available informa-
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tion and make appropriate and timely decisions to mitigate risk is severely degraded under
high stress conditions. Furthermore, the proprietary nature of systems designed to mitigate
risk, lack of adequate training to understand system algorithms, and the limited human ca-
pacity to process high bandwidth data from the relevant sensor suite challenge flight crews
in recognizing the need to configure (as needed) and promptly activate emerging LOC pre-
vention modules.
The main focus of this dissertation is to formulate a decision-making system that con-
tinuously analyzes risk with respect to LOC and manages the transfer of control authority
between the pilot/nominal automation and a sophisticated flight control system that can po-
tentially prevent/recover from LOC situations but can be hard to certify. In this work, LOC
is presumed to occur when either the aircraft violates flight envelope constraints or when the
aircraft impacts off-runway terrain. Pilot/nominal automation override is performed only
when necessary to avoid LOC. Though systems such as the Airbus flight envelope pro-
tection system and the Auto-GCAS system override the flight crew to mitigate imminent
LOC risk, they apply only to specific loss of control situations and are not generalizable or
applicable when multiple LOC risk factors are present.
The Envelope Aware Flight Management System (EAFMS) architecture (Figure 1.2)
has been proposed to augment the conventional flight management system with system
identification, envelope estimation, adaptive flight planning, adaptive control and control
authority monitoring and management modules that collectively mitigate LOC risk. More
generally, the EAFMS provides the intelligence required to make safe decisions in high
risk LOC situations. The system identification module identifies changes to aircraft dy-
namics. Envelope Estimation uses information about the updated aircraft dynamics to es-
timate changes in aircraft flight envelopes. Information about updated aircraft dynamics
and flight envelopes are used by the adaptive flight planner to construct [optimal] trajec-
tories that satisfy degraded constraints. Adaptive control allows the new flight plan to be
followed without violating degraded constraints. The decision-making module known as
Flight Safety Assessment and Management (FSAM) is responsible for assessing the current
risk conditions and selecting the appropriate control authority that will ensure LOC risk is
mitigated.
This dissertation introduces the Flight Safety Assessment and Management (FSAM)
system. FSAM is a “watchdog” designed to constantly monitor flight conditions for anoma-
lies. If the aircraft encounters high risk flight conditions, FSAM warns the flight crew. If
the flight crew fails to appropriately and rapidly respond, FSAM will override the current
control authority with an Envelope Aware (EA) controller designed to handle the identified
off-nominal condition. When LOC risk is mitigated, control is transferred back to the flight
6
Controller
Adaptive planning 
and guidance
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Flight Safety 
Assessment and 
Management
Pilot/Autopilot
Aircraft
System Identification
EA-FMS
Figure 1.2: Envelope-Aware Flight Management System Architecture
crew.
1.3 Research Objectives
Flight Safety Assessment and Management is developed to be applicable to manned and
unmanned aircraft. Two main design strategies for FSAM are investigated. First, con-
trol authority switching strategies are manually engineered using deterministic finite state
machines. These deterministic graphical models are intuitive, easy to implement, and
straightforward to verify thus certify using existing practices. Second, an uncertain rea-
soning approach is used to generate control authority switching rules. A Markov Decision
Process (MDP) balances LOC risk with a penalty on FSAM intervention to assure FSAM
overrides only as necessary. Finally, verification methods are developed to ensure FSAM
interventions do not violate critical safety requirements.
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1.4 Contributions
This dissertation offers a variety of contributions. The following subsections categorize
contributions with respect to methods or algorithms and FSAM-related applications or case
studies.
1.4.1 Methods and Algorithms
• This work presents a method to generate envelopes distinguishing safe and unsafe
states with respect to translational, rotational and directional dynamics for an aircraft
during takeoff. Knowledge of takeoff envelopes aids the construction of FSAM finite
state machines and simplifies the state representation for FSAM MDPs.
• A holistic MDP formulation that can address several LOC contributing factors is
provided in this work. The MDP formulation is used to generate policies used by
FSAM to mitigate LOC risk during takeoff.
• An MDP formulation to address icing-related loss of control situations is developed
in this work. The icing MDP formulation defines state features that utilize infor-
mation from the envelope estimation and flight planning modules thus considering
the changes to aircraft envelopes and the capabilities of the flight planner during
decision-making.
• A sparse sampling approach is proposed to enable online or real-time decision-
making for the MDP FSAM formulation. Trade-offs associated with parameter
choices in the sparse sampling algorithm are also evaluated.
• A model checking approach to formally verify a takeoff FSAM system using Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) is presented in this work. Takeoff equations of motion are
simplified to exploit existing reachability analysis algorithms and build discrete tran-
sition models that can be verified using off the shelf model checking tools.
• A method to check requirement violation using a cross-entropy Monte-Carlo search
is established in this work and applied to FSAM.
1.4.2 Applications
• This work presents several real world aviation accident case studies that illustrate the
applications and benefits of the FSAM finite state machines and MDP policies for the
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takeoff phase of flight. FSAM formulations are developed to prevent lateral runway
excursion, longitudinal runway overrun, and tail strike. Black box data available in
NTSB accident dockets is utilized to show when and how FSAM with EAFMS could
have intervened to prevent a series of real LOC incidents and accidents.
• FSAM is integrated with Envelope Estimation and Flight Planning capabilities of the
EAFMS to address an in-flight rudder jam situation. FSAM in this case must react
quickly to prevent an initial upset from which even an adaptive controller might not
be able to recover.
1.5 Innovations
• This work introduces the Flight Safety Assessment and Management system. FSAM
is an LOC “watchdog” that issues override decisions as needed, generalizing previous
work to develop case-specific LOC prevention modules that function independently.
• Automation aids to warn the flight crew regarding specific takeoff loss of control
situations are currently available. Application of automation override to avoid loss
of control on takeoff is novel.
• The abstraction of takeoff envelopes to compactly represent states for the FSAM
MDP formulation is necessary for efficiency and is new.
• The general MDP formulation presented in this work incorporates features that en-
able reasoning over aircraft health, flight crew and environment characteristics in ad-
dition to aircraft dynamics. So far, aircraft safety systems described in the literature
have limited their focus to features related to aircraft dynamics.
• The Constrained Markov Decision Process (CMDP) formulation presented in this
work eliminates the need to manually tune reward function weight parameters to
obtain MDP policies that reliably meet system constraints as well as minimizing
EAFMS intervention.
• In this work, a finite state machine defining FSAM switching logic is composed with
a discrete transition system representing aircraft dynamics under different control
laws. This composition yields an over-approximation of reachable states and is novel.
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1.6 Dissertation Outline
Chapter 1 concludes below with a list of publications. Chapter 2 introduces the flight safety
assessment and management system for LOC risk mitigation. Developing a system to
comprehensively mitigate LOC risk factors that might occur from takeoff through landing is
computationally intractable. Thus, the problem of flight safety assessment and management
is decomposed based on flight phases. Chapter 2 then develops an FSAM formulation for
takeoff. Control authority switching decisions are manually engineered and encoded using
deterministic graphical models or state machines.
Chapter 3 presents a decision-theoretic formulation of FSAM. An MDP is used to con-
struct LOC mitigation strategies automatically. Emphasis is placed on developing MDP
formulations for FSAM. This chapter explores the use of state-space abstractions to miti-
gate the computational overhead associated with large scale MDP formulations. An MDP
formulation that can handle constraints and reduce parameter tuning overhead is presented.
Chapter 4 develops an MDP formulation to address loss of control scenarios related
to in-flight icing. The MDP states are parameterized by key envelope parameters such as
stall speed, maximum airspeed and maximum/minimum attitude angles. The MDP state
representation also captures the risk associated with a given flight plan with respect to ice
accumulation.
Chapter 5 uses a sparse sampling algorithm as an online MDP solver to mitigate risk
due to loss of control. Results illustrating the tradeoffs associated with parameter choices
for the sparse sampling algorithm are also presented.
Chapter 6 and 7 consider the verification of the FSAM system. Chapter 6 presents a
framework to verify the finite state machine formulations against FAR requirements ex-
pressed in Linear Temporal Logic. Chapter 7 explores methods to quantitatively analyze
the robustness of the FSAM finite state machines and MDP policies to critical safety re-
quirements. Specifically, a cross-entropy based method is used to determine the robustness
of the FSAM formulation.
Chapter 8 provides conclusions and discusses future work. Fig 1.3 graphically illus-
trates the organization of this dissertation.
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Figure 1.3: Thesis organization
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CHAPTER 2
Flight Safety Assessment and Management using
Manually Constructed Finite State Machines
2.1 Introduction
Flight Safety Assessment and Management (FSAM) is the decision-making component of
the Envelope-Aware Flight Management System (EAFMS). FSAM is designed to con-
stantly monitor flight conditions for anomalies and to assess risks associated with the cur-
rent flight conditions. FSAM warns the flight crew when risk is present, and if the flight
crew does not respond with appropriate control actions in time to assure recovery, FSAM
overrides with EAFMS until LOC risk is mitigated. FSAM is effectively a “watchdog” sys-
tem with LOC avoidance override capabilities such as flight envelope protection [10,11] in
a more general context.
This chapter focuses on formulating FSAM using graphical models. Specifically, a hi-
erarchical formulation is specified by a timed automaton framework. The logic governing
the control authority switching imposed by FSAM is represented as a Deterministic Moore
Machine (DMM). Timed automata and DMMs are finite state machine formulations de-
fined by states, actions and transitions triggered by timers/events. Thus, these tools form a
suitable framework to model a control mode override strategy for FSAM.
Developing an FSAM system to address all possible LOC events across the entire flight
regime can become cumbersome given that one has to reason over possible input sequences
Figure 2.1: Flight Safety Assessment and Management
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that could result in high risk conditions. To maintain tractability of the formulation and to
enhance readability, a decomposition based on the phases of flight is considered. Deter-
ministic logic models applicable to a suite of LOC precursor scenarios are developed. The
phases of flight ultimately to be considered in logic models include takeoff, climb, cruise,
loiter, approach, and landing. These will be further divided to manage complexity of each
machine. We seek readability of the state machine logic not just for software validation
purposes but also to enhance flight crew understanding of the underlying system function-
ality.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the relevant tools
that will be used in this chapter to construct FSAM. Section 2.3 illustrates the hierarchical
decomposition of FSAM. This chapter focuses on the FSAM formulation for takeoff and
hence, Section 2.4 surveys literature related to takeoff safety. Section 2.5 provides a discus-
sion of takeoff and factors that contribute to LOC during takeoff. Section 2.6 discusses the
development of flight envelopes to efficiently and intuitively identify risk during takeoff.
Section 2.7 presents the FSAM formulation used to avoid LOC during takeoff. Section 2.8
presents case studies illustrating the application of FSAM to a real world accident scenario
while Section 2.9 discusses results and their implications. Section 2.10 presents conclu-
sions.
2.2 Background
A Deterministic Finite State Automaton (DFSA) or simply Finite State Automaton or Finite
State Machine is an abstract mathematical model of computation. The machine consists
of a finite number of states. It can only exist in one state at any given instant of time.
The DFSA starts from an initial state and receives as input, a sequence or string of input
symbols taken from a specified alphabet. These strings can have different interpretations
based on the application of the DFSA. Each alphabet symbol indicates a unique transition
from the current state to the next state, defining the discrete dynamics of the system. Each
input string is either accepted or rejected. The set of all accepted input strings defines the
language of the DFSA.
2.2.1 Timed Automaton
The timed automaton [27] is an extension of the DFSA for which transitions between states
are governed by timers along with alphabet symbols. These timers serve as guards on the
transitions to ensure system timing constraints are satisfied. Timed automata can be repre-
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sented with a timed transition table [27]. A time transition table is a tuple (Σ,S ,S 0,C¯, E¯)
where
• Σ is a finite alphabet.
• S is a finite set of states.
• S 0 ⊆ S is a set of initial states.
• C¯ is a finite set of clocks.
• E¯ ⊆ S ×S ×Σ×2C¯ ×Φ(C¯) gives the set of transitions. An edge < s, s′,a,λ,δ > repre-
sents a transition from state s to state s′ on input symbol a. The set λ ⊆ C¯ gives the
clocks to be reset with the transition, and δ ∈ Φ(C¯) is a clock constraint over C¯.
2.2.2 Deterministic Moore Machines
Deterministic Moore Machines (DMM) [28–30] are also extensions of the DFSA where
each state is associated with an output or control action. DMMs are formally defined by
the tuple (S,S0,Σ,Λ,T ,G), where
• S represents a discrete set of states.
• S0 ⊂ S represents an initial state.
• Σ is a finite set of input alphabet.
• Λ is a finite set of output alphabet.
• T ⊆ S ×Σ×S represents the set of state transitions.
• G : S ×Λ is the output function mapping each state to a unique output character
(control action).
2.3 Hierarchical Decomposition of Flight Safety Assess-
ment and Management
The motivation to hierarchically decompose FSAM is twofold. First, a decomposition aims
to break down FSAMs decision-making process according to the phase of flight, taking
into account the various changes in flight plan that could occur during a typical flight leg.
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This helps to reduce the complexity of the logic modules. Second, it introduces FSAMs
architecture intuitively to both the Pilot and Engineering community. Fig 2.2 shows a timed
automaton that depicts the progression of flight phases from takeoff through landing. Each
state represents a particular phase of flight. Marked in grey are the nominal phases of
flight. A nominal progression from takeoff to landing does not deviate from the original
flight plan. Marked in yellow are the off-nominal states. The off-nominal states arise due
to various reasons such as bad weather, air traffic conflicts and emergencies on board. The
symbols used by the automaton are described in Table 2.1. A timer (t) is initiated at the
beginning of the takeoff phase to keep track of the elapsed time of flight. From takeoff to
landing, the aircraft is in transit from one phase to another. In each state, the automaton
receives an alphabet symbol that reminds it about the current phase of flight (i.e Mclimb ,
Mcruise , Mdescent , etc...). This can be viewed as a reflexive transition which is implicit in
each state of the automaton and thus it is not explicitly marked in the state diagram in Fig
2.2.
Each state in Fig 2.2 has its own subset of deterministic finite state machines with goals
specific to the corresponding phase of flight. A transition from the current state to the next
state (i.e. the next phase of flight) occurs when the aircraft arrives at the next phase of flight
before/at the estimated time of arrival (e.g: Mclimb , t ≤ ETA1 ). The ETAs at each phase are
calculated prior to departure as per the original flight plan then updated en-route according
to changes in flight conditions (e.g. wind, detours due to weather, air traffic). An off-
nominal condition is flagged by the symbol O. Few examples of off-nominal conditions
are: failing to reach the next phase before/at the estimated time of arrival (i.e slow with
respect to original flight plan, e.g: Mtakeo f f , t > ETA1 ), veering off course with respect to
the original flight plan and discrepancies in fuel available vs fuel required for the remainder
of the flight as per regulations.
On receiving the symbol O, the automaton transitions to the corresponding alert state.
This is a warning state where the crew is made aware of the off-nominal conditions. If the
flight crew doesn’t take the appropriate actions to mitigate risk, control will be transferred
to the envelope-aware control law to ensure LOC risk is mitigated. The symbol O′ marks
the return to the nominal flight conditions. Under certain circumstances, the flight crew may
be required to follow an alternate flight plan. For example, the flight crew may be asked
by air traffic controllers to climb to a different flight level to avoid other air traffic. Such
changes are identified by comparing the original flight plan with the flight plan changes
made to the navigation computers of the Flight Management System (FMS) en-route and
flagged by the symbol C. It is worth noting that the state machine is able to distinguish
between intentional (flagged by C) and unintentional (flagged by O) deviations from the
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Symbols Description
ETA1 Estimated time of arrival at climb phase
ETA2 Estimated time of arrival at cruise phase
ETA3 Estimated time of arrival at descent phase
ETA4 Estimated time of arrival at approach phase
C Change in flight plan / emergency flight plan
Mphase Current phase of flight
O Flight plan fault (delay in flight leg/off course/fuel warnings ...)
O′ Return to nominal flight plan
RTO Rejected takeoff
t Elapsed time
Table 2.1: Symbols used in top-level timed automaton
nominal flight plan. The top level automaton in Fig 2.2 tracks elapsed time of flight, inertial
position, and fuel consumption. The crew is warned if any discrepancies arise. This in turn
helps avoid inadvertent excursions from the original flight plan due to factors such as lack
of situational awareness, distraction in the cockpit, and mode confusion. This bookkeeping
strategy is consistent with current practices where pilots use flight plan sheets to manage
the flight plan en-route by manually recording elapsed time of flight versus estimated time
of flight to keep track of the inertial position and fuel consumption. 1
This chapter focuses on developing an FSAM formulation for the takeoff phase. For
takeoff, LOC translates to a situation in which the aircraft veers off the side of the runway,
overshoots the runway, or leaves the ground in a condition (e.g., insufficient speed/inappropriate
rotation attitude) that introduces substantial risk in the subsequent departure climb. This
work contributes a deterministic decision-making framework that addresses the above LOC
factors in a holistic manner with an approach that can be certified using existing processes
in DO-178B or DO-178C [31]. The DMM [28] for takeoff FSAM characterizes the evolu-
tion of aircraft states to support safe takeoff decisions with FSAM warning or override to
avoid LOC risk. The DMMs are formulated based on analysis of aviation accident surveys,
accident/incident reports, flight data obtained from the NTSB accident database, aircraft
operating manuals, pilot handbooks, checklist procedures and flight control laws from the
literature [10, 11, 32–34]. This chapter introduces envelopes for the takeoff phase that en-
able the identification of safe and unsafe states. These envelopes guide the design of the
DMMs.
1On modern commercial airliners, this bookkeeping is done by the on-board flight management systems.
However, general aviation pilots still use navigation logs to record progress of each flight plan.
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Figure 2.2: Top level timed automaton
2.4 Related Work: Takeoff Safety
Despite the safety-critical nature of takeoff, limited previous work has been devoted to-
wards LOC risk mitigation specifically for takeoff. Srivatsan et al [35], Milligan et al [36]
and Zammit-Mangion et al [37] proposed systems that constantly monitor takeoff ground
roll performance parameters and detect anomalies by comparing the current performance
with a precomputed nominal performance profile. Verspay et al [38] evaluated the merits
of various types of Takeoff Performance Monitoring Systems (TOPM) as well as charac-
teristics of a TOPM that improved pilot decision-making during takeoff. It was found that
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a system with the ability to predict continued takeoff status and stopping performance has
the potential to improve safety. Inagaki et al [39] investigated automating GO/NO-GO
decisions using a situation adaptive autonomy framework [40]. These publications focus
only on aiding the flight crew in making safe GO/NO-GO decisions during takeoff and do
not consider other LOC risks such as loss of directional control or inappropriate rotation.
Furthermore, these publications only provide cues to the flight crew and rely on the flight
crew to make risk mitigating decisions.
2.5 Takeoff
The causal factors for takeoff-related accidents were first examined to aid the construction
of an FSAM system for the takeoff phase of flight. Ninety-seven Rejected Takeoff (RTO)
runway overrun accidents and incidents have been reported from 1960-2000 resulting in
more than 400 fatalities [1,7,8]. Takeoff accident causal factors are summarized in Fig 2.4.
Takeoff is one of the most hazardous phases of flight, second only to final approach and
landing. Current takeoff regulations require that the flight crew follow standard operating
procedures to configure the aircraft appropriately, obtain clearances, and manually fly the
aircraft through initial departure climb [34]. In a commercial transport aircraft, a typical
takeoff ground roll lasts 20 - 35 seconds. The Federal Aviation Regulations (FARs) define
several airspeed checkpoints called V-speeds [34, 41] to guide the flight crew in making
appropriate decisions during takeoff. The most important V-speed is V1, the decision speed
by which the flight crew must decide to continue or reject a takeoff, i.e., make a GO/NO-
GO decision with sufficient remaining runway to safely reject the takeoff. The flight crew
may need to reject a takeoff due to several factors such as engine failure(s), tire burst(s)
and runway incursion. A rejected takeoff initiated after V1 will leave insufficient runway
length to stop safely. Rotation initiated before the appropriate V-speed can result in an
early departure stall [32]. Figure 2.3 graphically represents takeoff V-speeds. A listing of
V-speeds is provided in Section 2.7 (Table 2.2).
The goal of FSAM is to identify LOC risk and assure its mitigation. To simplify the
construction of FSAM, the following assumptions are made:
• The aircraft is cleared for takeoff and faces no risk due to obstacles or other aircraft.
• The aircraft flight envelopes are nominal and remain unchanged.
• There are no electro-mechanical or structural failures.
• All systems and sub-systems are functioning according to specification.
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Figure 2.3: Takeoff phase of flight
Rejected takeoff initiated after V1
Pilot directional control
Non-compliance: standard procedure
Rotation: No attempt
Crew resource management
Degraded engine performance
Tire failure
Unable to rotate
Weight calculation error
Sudden engine power loss
No time for rejected takeoff
Thrust asymmetry
Rotation: Above VR
Rejected takeoff not considered
Pilot Technique: Cross wind
Pilot in command supervision
Improper checklist use
Rotation: Below VR
0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%
Figure 2.4: LOC contributing factors for takeoff [2]
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• The EAFMS has sufficient situational awareness to recover for takeoff related LOC
hazards.
These assumptions would be relaxed in a comprehensive takeoff FSAM beyond the scope
of this work.
2.6 Takeoff Flight Envelopes
To achieve an effective FSAM capability, safe flight envelopes for takeoff must first be
defined. For a given takeoff configuration (weight, thrust and flap/slat settings), safe ver-
sus unsafe partitions for translational, rotational and directional dynamics can be identified
based on aircraft equations of motion for takeoff. Below, we present envelopes for the
takeoff phase that are essential to prevent factors such as improper rejected takeoff de-
cisions, degraded acceleration performance (due to reduced engine performance or other
factors such as weight calculation errors), tail strikes, poor rotation procedures and di-
rectional control issues. Appendices A-C provide details on the non-linear aircraft takeoff
dynamics model and simplifications performed to construct the translational, rotational and
directional envelopes.
2.6.1 Translational dynamics
The maximum airspeed at which a rejected takeoff must be initiated to stop safely within
the available runway space can be estimated as illustrated in Appendix C.1. The phase
portrait in Fig 2.5 illustrates how airspeed (V) and longitudinal position (x) evolve after a
rejected takeoff is initiated. The solid blue curve in Fig 2.5 defines the partition of the V− x
space for which a rejected takeoff will enable the aircraft to stop safely at or before the end
of the runway.
Analogously, one can estimate the minimum airspeed beyond which a One Engine In-
operative (OEI) takeoff can be safely continued (see Fig 2.6). All trajectories to the left of
this envelope will overshoot the runway before attaining airspeed V2.
Fig 2.7 combines the constraints in Fig 2.5 and Fig 2.6 to partition safe regions in
V − x space with respect to RTO and OEI conditions. The intersection of the two curves
represents V-speed V1.
When operating with All Engines Operational (AEO), the aircraft must always stay in
an envelope where at least one safe action can be executed. Fig 2.8 defines a minimum
thrust boundary assuming AEO to avoid the zone that is unsafe with respect to RTO and
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Figure 2.5: Rejected Takeoff (RTO) Envelope
OEI. If the aircraft deviates outside this minimum thrust boundary under the AEO condition
before V1, takeoff must be rejected.
2.6.2 Rotational dynamics
Fig 2.9 illustrates the constraint on pitch during rotation. Over-rotation leads to tail strikes,
imposing a maximum pitch attitude constraint. The set of all initial conditions that can
result in a tail strike scenario is estimated via a reachable set analysis [42] to identify safe
versus unsafe operating regions (See Appendix C.1.1). For an aircraft with a tail strike
constraint of 11◦ and other characteristics listed in Table A.1, Fig 2.10 illustrates the safe
versus unsafe sets at different airspeeds. Note that the unsafe set becomes smaller at higher
airspeeds. This is because the elevator effectiveness increases with airspeed and is effective
in reducing the pitch rate quickly to prevent a tail strike.
2.6.3 Directional dynamics
Lateral runway excursions due to poor directional control can be managed by enforcing
constraints on lateral motion. Fig 2.11 illustrates safety constraints on cross track position
(y) and heading (ψ). Bounds | y | ≤ | y1 | and | ψ | ≤ | ψ1 | represent transitions to moderate
risk states for FSAM, while either | y | > | y2 | or | ψ | > | ψ2 | represent unacceptable lateral
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Figure 2.6: Takeoff with one engine inoperative
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Figure 2.11: Lateral takeoff constraints to avoid runway excursion
traversal condition. Similar to the rotational dynamics, the set of all initial conditions that
lead to constraint violation can be estimated to identify the safe versus unsafe operating
regions. Fig 2.12 illustrates a critical surface below which, all initial conditions can result
in violation of | y | ≤ | y2 | where y2 = 25m. Note that Fig 2.12 only illustrates the surface
with respect to the constraint y ≥ −y2. A similar surface can be defined for y ≤ y2 (See
Appendix C.1.2).
The following section provides DMM formulations that utilize the knowledge of safe
versus unsafe states illustrated in Fig 2.8-2.12 to trigger transitions to the Envelope-Aware
controller and mitigate risk.
2.7 DMM formulation of FSAM
The decision-making logic to prevent takeoff LOC is modeled as a Deterministic Moore
Machine (DMM). DMMs are modular and composable [43, 44] and use of a deterministic
specification for FSAM will facilitate its verification and certification using well established
tools in model checking, a topic studied in Chapter 5. The DMM formulation for takeoff
is decomposed into a longitudinal DMM and lateral DMM mirroring how control laws are
typically designed for fixed wing aircraft. The two DMM formulations are specified below.
2.7.1 Longitudinal Deterministic Moore Machine
The longitudinal takeoff FSAM DMM identifies LOC risk with respect to the longitudinal
aircraft state variables. Takeoff stages are correlated with V-speeds as shown in Fig 2.3.
We represent the longitudinal Moore machine (Alg) by the tuple (Slg,Slg0,Σlg,Λlg,Tlg,Glg)
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Figure 2.12: Surface representing the boundary of the unsafe set
where
Slg = {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s9, s10, s11, s12, s13, s14, s15} (2.1)
Slg0 = {s1} (2.2)
Σlg = {Vmcg,V1,VR,Vlo f ,V2,V f p,Tidle,Tmax,c,c′,e,e′, f , θ, θ¯} (2.3)
Λlg = {P,EA} (2.4)
Glg =
P i f si ∈ {s1, s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s14}EA otherwise (2.5)
Transitions Tlg represent edges in a directed state transition graph (Fig 2.13). The def-
inition of each alphabet symbol in the set Σlg is listed in Table 2.2. Table 2.3 provides
descriptions of each state. A state s ∈ Slg is defined by the triplet [V¯ ,P ,R]. V¯ represents
an airspeed range with values shown in Eqn (2.6)-(2.14). Here P ∈ {0,1} is a flag set to
true when continuing the takeoff is no longer safe because of inappropriate aircraft config-
uration. R ∈{ε, low, med, high} represents the risk level associated with the current state,
where ε denotes a zero risk state.
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V¯ ∈ {v¯i}, i = 1, ..,8 (2.6)
v¯1 = {V ∈ R | V = 0} (2.7)
v¯2 = {V ∈ R | 0 < V ≤ Vmcg} (2.8)
v¯3 = {V ∈ R | Vmcg < V ≤ V1} (2.9)
v¯4 = {V ∈ R | V1 < V ≤ VR} (2.10)
v¯5 = {V ∈ R | VR < V ≤ Vlo f } (2.11)
v¯6 = {V ∈ R | Vlo f < V ≤ V2} (2.12)
v¯7 = {V ∈ R | V2 < V ≤ V f p} (2.13)
v¯8 = {V ∈ R | V > V f p} (2.14)
Each state s ∈ S is mapped to an output by function Glg. P represents the “pilot in
control” command and EA represents the “envelope aware autopilot” command output.
The output of each state is indicated on the lower half of each state depicted in Fig 2.13.
This work assumes the envelope aware controller has sufficient situational awareness to
recover from the LOC triggers/hazards.
As shown in Fig 2.13, the aircraft starts from an initial state of rest (s1) at (x,y) =
(0,0). If the aircraft is configured for takeoff (flagged by c) and takeoff thrust is established
(flagged by Tmax), the aircraft accelerates down the runway and the DMM state transitions
through the nominal V-speed state progression. The top row of states in Fig 2.13 represents
the nominal V-speed sequence. The additional states represent off-nominal conditions with
LOC risk. If the aircraft is inappropriately configured for takeoff (c′ ∧ Tmax), the DMM
enters a configuration warning state (s8) inducing a corresponding alert to the crew. If
the configuration problem persists, the DMM transitions into the abort state (s13) where
it overrides and rejects the takeoff. During the initial ground roll (Vmcg < V ≤ V1), if the
aircraft has inadequate acceleration ( f ), FSAM rejects the takeoff to prevent entry into
the zone that is unsafe with respect to RTO and OEI (see Fig 2.8). At higher speeds, the
DMM monitors crew inputs to avoid premature rotation and tail strike (s4 and s5). After
liftoff, conventional envelope protection features such as angle of attack (stall) and over-
speed become active. Pushing the aircraft to the stall boundary during the climb (s6,s7)
results in override with envelope aware (EA) control (s11,s12) analogous to stall or envelope
protection modules found on existing Airbus aircraft. FSAM reverts control to the flight
crew after the aircraft is stabilized on climbout.
The DMM models presented here are a sub-component of the FSAM system covering
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Table 2.2: Input alphabet symbols for the takeoff Moore machine
Alphabet (Σ) Description
Vmcg Minimum controllable ground speed with one engine inoperative
V1 Takeoff decision speed (Go-No Go speed)
VR Rotation speed
Vlo f Liftoff speed
V2 Takeoff safety speed
V f p Minimum flap retraction speed
Tmax Takeoff thrust setting
Tidle Idle thrust setting
c Aircraft configured for takeoff
c′ Improper takeoff configuration
d Crossing 1st directional threshold
d′ Crossing 2nd directional threshold
e Envelope protection de-activated
e′ Envelope protection activated
f Inadequate acceleration performance
o′ Stall
θ Positive pitch attitude
θ¯ Maximum allowable pitch attitude reached during rotation
θ′ Safe rotation attitude
all phases of flight. Consequently, after takeoff, FSAM switches to a climb DMM that is
beyond the scope of this work.
2.7.2 Lateral Deterministic Moore Machine
The lateral FSAM DMM ensures directional control is sufficient to prevent crosstrack run-
way excursions. Directional control loss can result from high crosswinds or gusty winds,
engine thrust asymmetry, and inappropriate rudder inputs.
The lateral DMM Alt is represented by the tuple (Slt,Slt0,Σlt,Λlt,Tlt,Glt), where:
S lt = {s′1, s′2, s′3, s′4, s′5, s′6, s′7, s′8, s′9, s′10, s′11, s′12, s′13, s′14, s′15} (2.15)
S lt0 = {s′1} (2.16)
Σlt = {Vmcg,V1,VR,Vlo f ,V2,V f p,Tidle,Tmax,c,c′,e,e′,d′, d¯} (2.17)
Λlt = {P,EA} (2.18)
Glt =
P i f s
′
i ∈ {s′1, . . . , s′7}
EA otherwise
(2.19)
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Table 2.3: Examples of state representations
Alg States Representation Alt States Representation
s1 [v¯1,0, ε] s′1 [v¯1, y¯1, ψ¯1, g¯1, ε]
s2 [v¯2,0, ε] s′2 [v¯2, y¯1, ψ¯1, g¯1, ε]
s3 [v¯3,0, ε] s′3 [v¯3, y¯1, ψ¯1, g¯1, ε]
s4 [v¯4,0, ε] s′4 [v¯4, y¯1, ψ¯1, g¯1, ε]
s5 [v¯5,0, ε] s′5 [v¯5, y¯1, ψ¯1, g¯1, ε]
s6 [v¯6,0, ε] s′6 [v¯6, y¯1, ψ¯1, g¯1, ε]
s7 [v¯7,0, ε] s′7 [v¯7, y¯1, ψ¯1, g¯1, ε]
s8 [v¯2,0,med] s′8 [v¯2, y¯2, ψ¯2, g¯2,med]
s9 [v¯4,0, low] s′9 [v¯3, y¯2, ψ¯2, g¯2,med]
s10 [v¯5,0, low] s′10 [v¯4, y¯2, ψ¯2, g¯2,med]
s11 [v¯6,0, low] s′11 [v¯5, y¯2, ψ¯1, g¯2,med]
s12 [v¯7,0, low] s′12 [v¯6, y¯2, ψ¯2, g¯2,med]
s13 [v¯3,1,med] s′13 [v¯7, y¯2, ψ¯2, g¯2,med]
s14 [v¯3,1, ε] s′14 [v¯2,3, y¯3, ψ¯3, g¯1,med]
s15 [v¯8,0, ε] s′15 [v¯8, y¯1, ψ¯1, g¯1, ε]
Rest Grnd roll - 1 Grnd roll - 2 Grnd roll - 3 Rotate 1
st
Seg Climb 2
nd
Seg Climb
1
st
Seg Climb 2
nd
Seg Climb
pilot pilot pilot pilot pilot pilot pilot
Abort
EA EA
Abort
EA
c  Tmax Vmcg V1 VR VLOF V2
V2
pilot
Configuration
warning
s8
pilot
Tidle
c
Vmcg
Over-Rotation
EA
VLO
F
e
’
Pre-Rotation
VR
EA
c ’  Tmax
(Airspeed) V=0 0<V<=Vmcg Vmcg<V<=V1 V1<V<=VR VR<V<=VLOF VLOF<V<=V2 V2<V<=VFP
Tidle
Tidle θ e
’ e
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7
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s13 s14
Climb 
phase
s15
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eθ
Figure 2.13: DMM for longitudinal takeoff dynamics (see Table 2.2)
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Figure 2.14: DMM for lateral-directional takeoff dynamics (see Table 2.2)
Transitions Tlt are shown as edges in the Fig 2.14 DMM graph. Each state s′ is defined
as the quintuple [V¯ , Y¯ , Ψ¯, Υ¯,R]. V¯ , and R are defined as in DMM Alg. Y¯ represents
discretized cross track errors with y1 and y2 defined as in Fig 2.11.
Y¯ ∈ { y¯i }, i = 1,2,3 (2.20)
y¯1 = { y ∈ R | | y | ≤ | y1 | } (2.21)
y¯2 = { y ∈ R | | y1 | < | y | ≤ | y2 | } (2.22)
y¯3 = { y ∈ R | | y | > | y2 | } (2.23)
Ψ¯ represents discrete inertial heading intervals with deviation constraints ψ1,ψ2 also shown
in Fig 2.11:
Ψ¯ ∈ { ψ¯i }, i = 1,2,3 (2.24)
ψ¯1 ={ ψ ∈ [−pi,pi] | | ψ | < | ψ1 | } (2.25)
ψ¯2 ={ ψ ∈ [−pi,pi] | | ψ1 | ≤ | ψ | ≤ | ψ2 | } (2.26)
ψ¯3 ={ ψ ∈ [−pi,pi] | | ψ | > | ψ2 | } (2.27)
Υ¯ represents lateral acceleration given by
Υ¯ ∈ { g¯i }, i = 1,2 (2.28)
g¯1 = { y¨ ∈ R | | y¨ | ≤ | y¨1 | } (2.29)
g¯2 = { y¨ ∈ R | | y¨ | > | y¨1 | } (2.30)
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Directional control constraint violations often arise due to pilot induced oscillations
(PIO) [33]. If one or more lateral constraint thresholds are violated (flagged by d), FSAM
logic transfers control to the envelope-aware controller which then attempts to bring the
aircraft within nominal (low risk) bounds. If the envelope-aware controller is not able to
maintain the aircraft within the specified bounds (flagged by d′), then FSAM aborts the
takeoff.
The overall FSAM DMM for takeoff is defined by the parallel composition (i.e., con-
current execution) of both Alg and Alt. Although the two machines (Alg and Alt) have a
similar structure, they may not follow analogous transition sequences. For example, in case
of an imminent tail strike during rotation,Alg transitions from s5 θ¯→ s10
Vlo f→ s6 andAlt tran-
sitions from s′5
Vlo f→ s′6, i.e, FSAM transfers longitudinal control to the EA controller while
retaining directional control with the pilot. This notion of decoupling the longitudinal and
directional control authorities, though convenient from a system design perspective, may
or may not be welcomed or easily understood by flight crews. Analyzing the benefits of
a coupled versus decoupled FSAM formulation would require human subject evaluations
beyond the scope of this work.
2.8 Case Study
In this section we present a case study to illustrate and evaluate use of FSAM for takeoff.
The case study is based on accident data obtained from the flight data recorders.
2.8.1 Loss of Directional Control in Continental Airlines Flight 1404
The behavior and effectiveness of FSAM’s takeoff DMM were first analyzed using a case
study based on Continental Airlines FL1404 accident [33]. Due to severe crosswinds dur-
ing takeoff, the Boeing 737 veered off the side of the runway after the pilot failed to main-
tain directional control. Fig 2.16 illustrates relevant parameters extracted from the Flight
Data Recorder (FDR). After 10 seconds, the aircraft veers away from runway heading
(heading transitions from 00 to −300) when the crosswinds exceeds 40 knots. The NTSB
determined the probable cause of the accident as “The captain’s cessation of rudder input,
which was needed to maintain directional control of the airplane, about four seconds be-
fore the excursion, when the airplane encountered strong gusty crosswind that exceeded
the captain’s training and experience.” This is reflected in Fig 2.16, showing that the pilot
relaxes the rudder pedals following a large rudder input at roughly 5 seconds.
To study the behavior of FSAM DMM in response to scenarios similar to FL 1404, a
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Figure 2.15: Flight crew and FSAM functions during takeoff
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Figure 2.16: Accident data from flight data recorder
lateral runway excursion was simulated (Fig 2.17). Details about the physical models and
the controller design can be found in Appendices A-C. The results of the simulation are
shown in Fig 2.18. These plots illustrate the dynamics of an aircraft augmented with the
FSAM DMM taking off in a severe crosswind. The FSAM DMM transfers lateral control
of the aircraft from the pilot to the EA-controller when the aircraft exits the inner threshold
with respect to heading (|ψ| > |ψ1|) (see Fig 2.18). The Envelope-Aware controller is able
to steer the aircraft back within the inner thresholds. After the aircraft is stabilized on the
initial departure climb, lateral control is transferred back to the pilot. To enable a sensitivity
analysis, we also chose different thresholds and crosswind magnitudes. In each scenario,
FSAM consistently rejected the takeoff whenever possible [45].
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Figure 2.17: Simulation setup
2.9 Discussion
The takeoff FSAM DMMs were able to avoid LOC for the presented case study scenario
but are not yet complete. Although a DMM will only be capable of executing the LOC
mitigation sequences for which it has been designed, it would be possible to construct a
DMM database that identifies and reacts to a broad suite of known risk factors, e.g see Fig
2.4. Ultimately, if FSAM encounters a scenario it hasn’t been designed to handle, FSAM
must recognize this or at least ensure the crew remains in charge to handle the situation,
a capability requiring further research. Verifying that FSAM never initiates an override in
scenarios for which it was not designed will be the key to safety certification.
The DMMs illustrated in this chapter were manually constructed. This process is not
scalable to all known risks over all phases of flight. Furthermore, the full suite of FSAM
DMMs need to be collectively verified and validated to assure no unexpected interactions
between DMMs will cause inappropriate FSAM response.
2.10 Conclusion
This chapter has presented a Flight Safety Assessment and Management (FSAM) capability
that identifies and mitigates risks associated with Loss of Control (LOC). FSAM initially
warns the crew of imminent LOC risks. It overrides to an alternate recovery controller if
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Figure 2.18: Continued takeoff scenarios (case study 1)
the crew fail to mitigate the risk. FSAM is formulated as a Deterministic Moore Machine
(DMM) and applied to the takeoff phase of flight. The FSAM DMM machines are evalu-
ated on case studies motivated by real world aviation accidents and incidents. Results show
that a capable FSAM implementation can potentially avert LOC. This chapter contributes a
novel formulation to ensure takeoff flight safety using deterministic Moore machines. The
nominal sequence of states in the DMMs have a one to one correspondence with the typical
V-speed decision sequence on which a pilot is trained. Furthermore, envelopes have been
developed for the takeoff phase that simplify identification of safe and unsafe regions with
respect to translational, rotational and directional takeoff dynamics. The takeoff phase in
commercial aircraft is the only phase which remains manually flown. The work presented
in this chapter can play a significant role in ensuring manual control is safe.
For a more comprehensive safety management system, hazards associated with con-
ditions such as instrument failures, actuator failures, structural problems and other traffic
must also be recognized and handled by FSAM. FSAM DMMs must also be developed for
the other phases of flight. Each DMM will ultimately require verification prior to certifica-
tion and must be integrated into an informative crew interface display for manned transport
applications. The decision-making system described in this chapter can ultimately be ex-
tended to provide a comprehensive and verified means of avoiding LOC, the leading cause
of aviation accidents today. Further work to accommodate additional FSAM cases and
verification is described in subsequent chapters.
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CHAPTER 3
A Decision Theoretic Formulation for Flight
Safety Assessment and Management
3.1 Introduction
This chapter explores the use of decision-theoretic planning to allow override actions to
be optimized using a probabilistic model of the overall system. A reward or cost function
explicitly trades the cost of inaction with the cost of automatically switching between pilot
and (autonomous) envelope-aware control. Decision-theoretic techniques have been used
for the development and enhancement of the Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS).
Kochenderfer et al. [46,47], Temizer et al. [48] and Winder et al. [49] have used the Markov
Decision Process (MDP) and Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) to
design alerting systems that could warn the flight crew about imminent conflicts with other
aircraft and issue conflict resolution advisories.
Rules for FSAM to switch between available controllers to mitigate risk could be en-
coded as finite state machines as was described above in Chapter 2. Methods such as hybrid
automata and reachability analysis can further guide the designer in defining appropriate
switching strategies/rules [50]. Finite state machines can also be synthesized from Linear
Temporal Logic (LTL) specifications [51]. However, manually specifying a state machine
can be inefficient when the machine needs to address a broad class of scenarios. Use of a
planner [52–54] to generate rules that serve as a state machine to be executed can aid a user
in handling larger state-space sizes. The Markov Decision Process (MDP) is a compelling
planning tool because it can model uncertainty, reward and cost, and arbitrary state-space
features in an optimization framework. This chapter therefore uses an MDP to generate a
look-up table that effectively specifies switching decisions for each state of the system.
This work presents a fully-observable MDP formulation to enable FSAM to make con-
trol mode override decisions that prevent LOC scenarios. A single comprehensive MDP
formulation to address all possible interacting LOC factors is computationally intractable
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due to the complexity associated with a very large state-space. However, the full MDP
can be decomposed into several sub-level MDPs where each sub-level MDP is responsible
for preventing LOC for a specific phase of flight or specific suite of elevated risk factors.
This chapter contributes an MDP formulation to address common takeoff LOC events as-
sociated with runway excursions and improper rotations. A novel abstract representation
of the underlying state space is developed based on takeoff flight envelopes. This abstrac-
tion reduces the size of the original state-space and also promotes better understanding
of the resulting policy. This MDP formulation is extended with constraints to ensure un-
safe states are unreachable. Note that this chapter only focuses on developing an MDP
formulation that will enable selecting the appropriate control authority (i.e pilot/autopilot
versus envelope-aware) to prevent LOC. Suitable envelope-aware control, flight planning,
and guidance laws that prevent constraint violations or recover from LOC situations have
been proposed by others [55–60] and are not the focus of this dissertation.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the MDP while
Section 3.3 proposes a comprehensive FSAM MDP formulation. This full formulation
is computationally intractable, so Section 3.4 simplifies the original MDP formulation to
address a suite of takeoff LOC risk factors. Section 3.6 discusses the constrained MDP
framework. Section 3.8 applies the takeoff FSAM MDP formulation to a real-world avia-
tion incident. Sections 3.9 and 3.10 provide a discussion and conclusion, respectively.
3.2 Background
An observable MDP [61, 62] is represented as a tuple (S,A,T ,R), where S represents a
finite set of all possible discrete system states. A represents a finite set of actions that can
be executed. T : S ×A×S → [0,1] represents the transition probabilities associated with
transitions from a given state to another state when executing an action. R : S ×A→ R
represents a reward function that assigns a finite real value to each state-action pair. Actions
an ∈A for each state sn ∈ S at each decision epoch are chosen such that they maximize the
expected cumulative discounted reward function of the form
V(s0) = E
[ ∞∑
n=0
γnR(sn,an)
]
(3.1)
where sn ∈ S is the current state and an ∈ A is the action selected at the current state.
γ ∈ (0,1] is a discount factor chosen to emphasize short versus long-term rewards. A policy
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Algorithm 3.1 Value Iteration
Assign Vo(s) arbitrarily, and Vn(s) := Vo(s) + (1−γ)γ , ∀ s ∈ S
while ||Vn−Vo|| < (1−γ)γ do
for all s ∈ S do
for all a ∈A do
Va(s) :=R(s,a) +γ ∑
s′∈S
T (s,a, s′)Vn(s′)
end for
for all s ∈ S do
Vo(s) := Vn(s)
Vn(s) := max
a∈A
{
Va(s)
}
end for
end for
end while
is defined as the mapping pi where pi : S →A. The optimal policy pi∗ is given by:
pi∗(s) = argmax
a
{
Q(s,a)
}
(3.2)
Q(s,a) =R(s,a) +γ
∑
s′
T (s,a, s′)V∗(s′) (3.3)
V∗(s) is the optimal value of state s and can be obtained using algorithms such as value
iteration, policy iteration or linear programming [62].
MDPs can be used to solve a wide range of sequential decision making problems
(see [61–64] for different applications of MDPs). Encoding a sequential decision making
problem as an MDP requires specification of a suitable state S and action representation
A, transition probabilities T that describe the influence of the actions on the states and
reward function R that captures the objective of the decision problem. The conventional
algorithms that perform value or policy Iteration explicitly enumerate the states to find
the optimal policy. Consequently, these algorithms incur the curse of dimensionality and
hence do not scale well for problems with large state dimensions. Alternately, approximate
methods such as state aggregation [63], value function approximation [65], policy search
methods [66, 67], differential dynamic programming [68] and sparse sampling [69] have
been successfully used to solve problems involving continuous state-spaces or large state
dimensions.
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3.3 Markov Decision Process Formulation for FSAM
FSAM MDP state must capture all information necessary to make risk-optimal warning
and override decisions. This section describes a full set of state features that might enable
an FSAM MDP to make appropriate decisions regarding control authority. As will become
apparent, this comprehensive state model is large, motivating subsequent abstractions and
simplifications.
3.3.1 State features
State features relevant to LOC risk assessment and decision making can be broadly classi-
fied into four main categories: aircraft dynamics and control (F1), aircraft and subsystem
health (F2), human operator characteristics (F3) and environment characteristics (F4). A
description of each feature is provided below. Each state s ∈ S of the FSAM MDP formu-
lation is represented by their composition:
s = [F1,F2,F3,F4] (3.4)
3.3.1.1 Aircraft dynamics and control
F1 represents the evolution of the continuous dynamics of the aircraft and is viewed as the
composition of the following sub-features:
F1 = [F11,F12,F13,F14]
F11 = [u,v,w, p,q,r,φ,θ,ψ, x,y,z]
F12 = [δe, δa, δr, δt] (3.5)
F13 = [cg,c f ,cp, fsys]
F14 = [M¯, S¯ ]
Here F11 describes traditional aircraft physical state [70]. u,v,w describe aircraft velocity,
p,q,r are the body axis angular rates, φ,θ,ψ represent Euler angle attitude, and x,y,z denote
3-D position. F12 describes fixed-wing control inputs elevator (δe), aileron (δa), rudder
(δr), and throttle (δt). F13 describes the configuration of the aircraft in terms of flaps (c f ),
spoilers (cp) and landing gear (cg). fsys = ( fs1 , . . . , fsn) are flags that denote the on/off state
of various flight systems with potential to influence LOC risk, e.g., pitot or wing heat.
F14 specifies the control mode status. In this work, FSAM defines exactly two control
modes M¯, one representing the nominal pilot-autopilot system and another representing
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the envelope-aware controller that either an FSAM override or the pilot can activate via the
mode select switch S¯ . F11 and F12 represent continuous-valued variables, F13 and F14 take
discrete values. All F1 parameters are observable from onboard sensors.
Monitoring the aircraft’s continuous dynamic states (F11) enables prevention of aerody-
namic, structural and performance constraint violations. Violation of these constraints can
lead to catastrophic events. Monitoring continuous control inputs (F12) helps identify con-
ditions such as control surface saturation, cross-control, or inadequate thrust. Monitoring
the configuration (F13) of the aircraft with respect to the landing gear, flaps, spoilers and
various subsystems helps ensure that the aircraft is configured properly for a given phase
of flight.
3.3.1.2 Aircraft health
F2 describes aircraft and subsystem health status:
F2 = [heng,hact,hsys] (3.6)
heng = (he1 , . . . ,hen) are flags that denote engine operational state (nominal/inoperative),
hact = (ha1 , . . . ,han) denote control surface actuator status (nominal/jammed/free-floating),
and hsys = (hs1 , . . . ,hsn) denote the status (nominal/failed) of onboard support systems such
as cabin pressurization, heating, fuel pumps, power systems and anti-icing. All F2 features
are discrete and observable from sensor and health monitoring subsystems.
Aircraft performance limits are closely coupled with the aircraft’s health status. Ex-
ternal factors such as icing can also degrade airplane performance. System failures can
result in deactivation of certain features in a fly-by-wire system, such as the flight direc-
tor or envelope protection systems, which can lead to increased LOC risk particularly in
conjunction with inappropriate crew inputs.
3.3.1.3 Operator
Flight crew state can substantially increase the likelihood of inappropriate crew inputs, a
critical factor in an FSAM override decision. The following pilot state abstraction F3 is
proposed:
F3 = [F31,F32,F33] (3.7)
F31 ⊂ {CP,FO} indicates who is present in the cockpit, with Captain (CP) and First Officer
(FO) represented as an example. F32 = (hCP,hFO) where hCP,hFO ∈ {nominal,unconscious,
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f atigued} compactly classify crew health. F33 ∈ {nominal,abnormal} classifies cockpit ac-
tivity. All F3 attributes are discrete. While this work does not claim progress in translating
sensor observations to “human state estimates”, research has shown that such observers are
feasible [71].
3.3.1.4 Environment
Both flight controller and crew performance can be influenced by the environment, most
critically atmospheric conditions F4:
F4 = [ fwinds, fvisibility, ftemp, fprecip] (3.8)
where fwinds ∈ R3 represents the wind vector, fvisibility ∈ R is visibility, ftemp ∈ R is sur-
rounding air temperature, and fprecip ∈ {none,rain, snow,hail, tstorm} denotes precipitation
in various forms. fwind, fvisibility, ftemp are continuous while fprecip is discrete in this for-
mulation. Wind, visibility and temperature can be estimated from onboard sensors supple-
mented by forecasts and station reports. Precipitation and thunderstorms can be sensed via
weather radar and storm scope along with meteorological reports and forecasts accessed
via a datalink.
3.3.2 Action
FSAM is a high-level watchdog system that passively monitors the various state features
for LOC risk. If sufficient time and margin exist for the flight crew to mitigate any elevated
LOC risk factors, FSAM continues to remain passive. FSAM issues override decisions
only when switching to the envelope-aware controller would enable LOC prevention or
recovery. FSAM then returns control back to the pilot and nominal autopilot once LOC
risk is lowered to acceptable levels.
The FSAM MDP selects from two actions: NOOP (No Operation) and TOGL (Toggle).
Any time FSAM selects NOOP, the current control mode is likely to remain engaged. If
the current control mode indicates nominal pilot/autopilot authority and FSAM selects the
TOGL action, FSAM activates the envelope-aware controller. If the current control mode
is the envelope-aware controller and FSAM selects the TOGL action, authority is returned
to the nominal pilot/autopilot system. The pilot could also manually request activation of
the envelope-aware controller or request control back from the envelope-aware control via
the mode select switch S¯ .
41
3.3.3 Transition probabilities
State transition dynamics can be modeled as a Markov chain with consideration for each
FSAM MDP action (NOOP or TOGL). Because transition dynamics fundamentally evolve
as a function of current control mode M¯, one transition probability matrix is defined for
each control mode M¯. Switching between the two probability tables for M¯ = P and M¯ =
EA then occurs for each state in which the MDP selects the TOGL action. Let T¯M,M ∈
{P,EA} denote the Markov chain transition matrix under control mode M. Given the state
abstractions proposed in this work (described in the following sections), the underlying
continuous time process remains in a state sk ∈ S for some duration called the sojourn time
σ(sk). σ is modeled as an exponential distribution with parameter β(sk). Estimated values
of β(sk) and T¯M(s j|si), si, s j ∈ S can be computed from flight/simulation data.
β(sk) = E
[
1
σ(sk)
]
(3.9)
T¯M(s j|si) =
N(si, s j)∑
n
N(si, sn)
, where n = 1, . . . , |S | (3.10)
Here N(si, s j) represents the total number of transitions from state si to s j. The above
Markov chain has state-dependent sojourn times. A discrete-time Markov chain can be
transformed into an equivalent Markov chain TM whose sojourn time distributions are iden-
tical for all states through a uniformization process [62] in which the uniformized Markov
chain TM is described by:
TM(s j|si) =
 1−
1
c
(
1− T¯M(si|si))β(si) if si = s j
1
c (T¯M(s j|si)β(si)) otherwise
(3.11)
where c = max
si∈S
{1− T¯M(s j|si)β(si)} is the sojourn time distribution parameter for the new
uniformized Markov chain.
An alternate method of evaluating TM is to consider each state as the composition of
its individual state features. Consequently, the required probability distribution can be
expressed in terms of the individual state features as follows:
TM(sn+1|sn) = TM(Fn+11 ,Fn+12 ,Fn+13 ,Fn+14 |Fn1 ,Fn2 ,Fn3 ,Fn4) (3.12)
Assuming that the features at future time steps (n+ 1) depend only on the current features
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(n) and also exploiting conditional independence relations among the state features, Eqn
(3.12) can be simplified as follows:
TM(sn+1|sn) =T1(Fn+11 |Fn1 ,Fn2 ,Fn3 ,Fn4)×
T2(Fn+12 |Fn1 ,Fn2 ,Fn3 ,Fn4)×
T3(Fn+13 |Fn1 ,Fn2 ,Fn3 ,Fn4)×
T4(Fn+14 |Fn4) (3.13)
T1 represents transition dynamics of the traditional aircraft states along with discrete flight
states, while T2,T3 and T4 represent transition probabilities associated with aircraft health,
pilot state, and environment characteristics respectively. Environment state F4 is indepen-
dent of the other state features. The terms in Eqn (3.13) can be further simplified via con-
ditional independence between state sub-features. It can be ensured that the distributions
T1, . . . ,T4 have uniform sojourn times using Eqn (3.11).
3.3.4 Reward formulation
FSAM MDP reward is formulated as a cost function (negative reward) that penalizes unsafe
aircraft states but also discourages the routine selection of the toggle action. A weighted
sum reward formulation is proposed:
R(s,a) =
n∑
i=0
ηiRi (3.14)
The Ri’s penalize unsafe states and unnecessary toggle actions while ηi’s represent tunable
weighting parameters that may vary depending as a function of flight mode. For example,
the penalty for violating an airspeed or angle of attack stall constraint at high altitude can
be lower than the stall penalty at low altitude depending on the availability of recovery mar-
gins. Weighting parameters may also be learned from accident flight data and investigation
board recommendations.
A complete MDP formulation over all flight phases would be unreasonably large, par-
ticularly if continuous-valued state features are discretized over a fine grid. Instead, the
ideal MDP can be decomposed into several smaller context-appropriate MDPs. A phase-
of-flight decomposition facilitates customizing the MDP to address LOC scenarios related
to a particular phase of flight. Furthermore, state-space size can be significantly reduced
by mapping baseline state features into abstract features for a particular phase of flight as is
illustrated below for takeoff. Abstract state features are based on flight envelopes and their
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translation to a suitable reward or cost function.
3.4 FSAM MDP for Takeoff
3.4.1 State Formulation
High risk LOC scenarios such as runway overruns and improper rejected takeoffs are cap-
tured in aircraft longitudinal dynamics and runway position constraints. Events such as
improper rotations and tail strikes are associated with pitch dynamics while runway lat-
eral excursion events are associated with lateral or directional dynamics. The relevant
aircraft dynamics states considered for the takeoff MDP formulation are aircraft velocity
V =
√
u2 + v2 +w2, pitch θ, heading ψ, position x,y,z with respect to the runway, control
mode M¯, mode select switch status S¯ , throttle control input T¯ and engine health status E¯.
The state for a takeoff MDP formulation is represented as:
s ∈ S
s = [V, θ,ψ, x,y,z, T¯ , M¯, S¯ , E¯] (3.15)
The above state-space is infinite due to continuous variables such as position, airspeed,
and pitch. Knowledge of aircraft takeoff dynamics and aircraft envelopes is exploited to
combine the continuous valued state variables into abstract discrete state features.
Aircraft takeoff envelopes were analyzed with respect to translational, rotational and
lateral dynamics in Chapter 2. In a nominal takeoff, the aircraft accelerates to liftoff speed
from rest, lifts off and further accelerates to speed V2 before reaching the obstacle height at
the end of the runway. In case of an engine failure during the takeoff ground roll, a rejected
takeoff is warranted unless airspeed is too high and insufficient runway distance remains.
Rejecting versus continuing a takeoff following an engine failure was previously analyzed
in Chapter 2 and is summarized below.
The phase portrait in Fig 3.1 illustrates the evolution of the V-x dynamics under a
rejected takeoff scenario. In Fig 3.1, rejecting the takeoff at an airspeed-position state below
the blue curve leads to trajectories that decelerate and stop within the available runway
length. This would correspond to a safe rejected takeoff. Rejecting the takeoff at a state
above the blue curve results in the aircraft overrunning the remaining runway, representing
an unsafe rejected takeoff. A similar analysis can be done for the continued takeoff case
(see Fig 3.2). If an engine failure occurs at a point below the blue curve, the airplane has
sufficient airspeed to accelerate, lift off and attain V2 before reaching the obstacle height
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Figure 3.1: Rejected takeoff envelope
at the end of the runway. However, if an engine failure occurs at a point above the blue
curve, the airplane has insufficient airspeed to accelerate to V2 before the runway overrun.
Combining the curves in figures 3.1 and 3.2 yields four distinct regions shown in Fig 3.3.
Clearly a region exists where neither a rejected takeoff nor a continued takeoff is safe;
this region must be avoided at all times. One can estimate the minimum thrust required
to prevent the aircraft from entering this unsafe region. The resulting minimum thrust
trajectory is shown in Fig 3.4.
Each curve in Fig 3.4 can be described by polynomials of the form x= a¯0 + a¯1V+ a¯2V2 +
a¯3V3 with coefficients a¯0, . . . , a¯3 chosen appropriately. Let VEF denote the smallest airspeed
at which a takeoff can be continued following an engine failure at x = 0. Let V1 denote the
airspeed at the intersection of the three curves. Let XV1 denote the corresponding distance
on the runway and let Rmax denote the length of the runway. With these parameters, the
V − x state space is aggregated into 17 abstract states as shown in Fig 3.5. Note that states
15 and 16 in Fig 3.5 (a) represent runway overrun scenarios where the aircraft has crossed
the available takeoff distance with inappropriate airspeed to either takeoff or stop safely.
Envelopes for the rotational and lateral dynamics are constructed based on geometric
constraints. Increasing the pitch attitude beyond a certain pitch angle results in a tail-strike.
Thus, care must be taken to prevent tail strikes during rotation. Let θ ≥ θ∗,z ≤ h∗ denote
the condition at which a tail strike occurs where θ∗ is the tail strike pitch attitude when
the aircraft is below altitude h∗. Let θ1 = 0.2θ∗ and θ2 = 0.8θ∗. With these parameters,
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Figure 3.2: One-engine inoperative envelope
Figure 3.3: RTO and OEI envelopes - safe vs unsafe zones
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Figure 3.4: RTO and OEI envelopes - safe vs unsafe zones
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Figure 3.5: Partitions of V-X space
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Figure 3.6: Partitions of θ−H space
pitch-altitude space is aggregated as shown in Fig 3.6.
To abstract lateral-directional states, the cross track position and heading are combined
into a single feature. Let Yw represent the half width of the runway. Let Y1 = Yw,Y2 = 0.5Yw.
Let ψ0 represent the runway heading. Let ψ1 = ψ0 + 4◦ and ψ2 = ψ0 + 10◦. With these
parameters, partitions of the lateral displacement and yaw space are obtained as shown in
Fig 3.7.
Thrust control inputs for takeoff are discretized as T¯ ∈ {Tidle,Tmax}. M¯ ∈ {P,EA} denotes
the available control authorities where P denotes the Pilot and EA denotes the Envelope-
Aware controller. The engine health status takes values E¯ ∈ {EAEO,EOEI ,EAEI}where EAEO
represents “all engines operational”, EOEI represents “one engine inoperative” and EAEI
represents “all engines inoperative”.
With the compact state features described above, the initial state formulation in Eqn
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Figure 3.7: Partitions of Y −ψ space
3.15 is transformed into:
s ∈ S
s = [Q¯, P¯, L¯, M¯, δ¯t,heng]
Q¯ ∈ {q1,q2, . . . ,q16}
P¯ ∈ {p1, p2, . . . , p8}
L¯ ∈ {l1, l2, . . . , l25} (3.16)
M¯ ∈ {P,EA}
S¯ ∈ {P,EA}
δ¯t ∈ {Tidle,Tmax}
heng ∈ {EAEO,EOEI ,EAEI}
Note that Q¯ is an abstraction of aircraft velocity V and longitudinal position x. P¯ is an
abstraction of pitch attitude θ and altitude z. L¯ is an abstraction of cross track position y
and heading ψ.
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3.4.2 Action Formulation
The goal of the takeoff MDP is to select the appropriate control mode with the TOGL action
and mitigate imminent takeoff LOC risk. Thus, the actions of the takeoff MDP are
A¯ ∈ {NOOP,TOGL} (3.17)
Eqn 3.17 can be extended to include warning actions to alert the flight crew as well. For
simplicity, this work considers only the two actions shown above.
3.4.3 Reward formulation for Takeoff
In this work, an additive reward formulation is defined as in Eqn (3.14):
R(s,a) = η1R1(Q¯) +η2R2(P¯) +η3R3(L¯) +η4R4(M¯, A¯) (3.18)
Here R1(Q¯) penalizes unsafe states with respect to the translational dynamics (see Fig 3.5)
and is given by:
R1(Q¯) =
−1 i f Q¯ ∈ {q15,q16}0 otherwise (3.19)
R2(P¯) penalizes unsafe states with respect to the rotational dynamics (see Fig 3.6):
R2(P¯) =
−1 i f P¯ ∈ {p4}0 otherwise (3.20)
R3(L¯) penalizes unsafe states with respect to the lateral dynamics (see Fig 3.7):
R3(L¯) =
−1 i f L¯ ∈ {l1, l5, l6, l10, l11, l15, l16, l20, l21, l25}0 otherwise (3.21)
R4(M¯, A¯) penalizes unnecessary toggle actions to discourage frequent mode switches and
the resulting mode confusion. Staying in the envelope-aware control mode when the pilot
requests pilot mode is also penalized to encourage transfer of control authority to the pilot
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once the high-risk LOC scenario is averted.
R4(M¯, A¯) =

−1 i f M¯ = P∧ S¯ = P∧ A¯ = TOGL
−o1 i f M¯ = EA∧ S¯ = P∧ A¯ = NOOP
−o2 i f M¯ = EA∧ S¯ = EA∧ A¯ = TOGL
0 otherwise
(3.22)
where 0 ≤ o1 ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ o2 ≤ 1. η’s in Eqn (3.18) are positive scalars which emphasis
the relative importance of the individual reward terms. For this work, the reward func-
tion weights were manually tuned to ensure policies favored pilot control but did not allow
the system to violate constraints. Statistics can assist in computing reward weights. For
example, reference [2] reports that runway overruns and lateral runway excursions have
given rise to a larger number of fatal accidents than tail strike events during takeoff. Con-
sequently, for the takeoff MDP, the values of the weighting parameters on R1 and R3 are
set significantly higher than the weight on R2. The choice of the weight on R4 may be
guided by human subject experiments and pilot preferences; for this work it is assumed the
pilot will prefer to assume control whenever constraints are not otherwise violated. Meth-
ods presented in [72] can also be adapted to compute reward function parameters in future
work.
3.4.4 Transition Probabilities
The transition probabilities are obtained using Monte Carlo simulations. Monte-Carlo sim-
ulations are performed using an aircraft dynamics model for takeoff (Appendix A), an
envelope-aware controller (Appendix B.1) and a human pilot model (Appendix B.2). Dif-
ferent values of initial conditions, pilot model parameters and engine failure states are
sampled from various distributions (see Appendix B.2) to simulate nominal and anoma-
lous takeoff sequences. The transition probabilities between the MDP states described in
Eqn (3.16) are estimated as described in Eqn (3.9)-(3.11). Let TM, M ∈ {P,EA} denote the
transition probabilities for mode M. Let TNOOP denote the transition probability matrix for
a = NOOP. Let TTOGL denote the transition probability matrix for a = TOGL. The state
features in Eqn (3.16) are permuted such that TNOOP and TTOGL can be viewed as block
diagonal matrices of the form:
TNOOP =
TM=P 00 TM=EA
 (3.23)
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TTOGL =
 0 TM=EATM=P 0
 (3.24)
With the above states, actions, rewards and transition probabilities, the takeoff MDP is
optimized using value iteration.
3.5 Takeoff MDP policies
The total number of states in the takeoff MDP formulation is given by the product of sizes
of the individual state features. Thus, there are 76800 states in the above Takeoff MDP
formulation. The resulting policy is stored as a look-up table mapping an optimal action to
each state. This section constructs a Markov chain to facilitate MDP policy understanding.
Let T i represent the ith row of transition matrix T . The transition probability matrix
for the MDP policy is constructed as follows:
T ipi =
T
i
NOOP i f pi(i) = NOOP
T iTOGL i f pi(i) = TOGL
(3.25)
Transition matrix Tpi represents the Markov chain of policy pi. The probability distribution
over the states reached after n steps (χn) while starting from a given initial state distribution
χ0 and following policy pi is given by
χn = χ
T
0 T npi (3.26)
The Markov chain representing the complete policy is also difficult to visualize, so seg-
ments of the policies as used to illustrate their properties. Fig 3.8 presents a policy segment
that illustrates FSAM MDP policy response to an imminent runway excursion risk. For
ease of illustration, only transitions in M¯, δ¯T and Q¯ are shown. Each node represents a dis-
crete state (s) annotated with their corresponding features and optimal values V∗(s). Edges
represent transitions between discrete states and are labeled with the optimal action and
transition probability. The policy chooses NOOP if the pilot is in control when the aircraft
remains inside the safe takeoff envelope with sufficient margin. When the aircraft enters an
unsafe region (e.g. Q¯ = q9) with imminent runway overrun risk, the policy chooses TOGL
to transfer authority to the envelope-aware controller which then rejects the takeoff by re-
ducing thrust to idle (Tidle). Policy behavior can vary depending on the choice of weighting
factors (η) in Eqn (3.18). For example, increasing the penalty on envelope-aware states (i.e
M¯ = EA) in Eqn (3.22) can result in transfer of control back to the pilot immediately. The
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following example illustrates the trade-off between increasing the cost of NOOP versus the
cost of TOGL.
Fig 3.9 presents an FSAM MDP policy segment showing response to a tail-strike risk.
Only state transitions impacting risk level, specifically M¯, P¯ and Q¯, are shown. FSAM
overrides or toggles control authority to the envelope-aware controller when there is an im-
minent tail-strike risk (i.e. P¯ = p3). The envelope-aware control law reduces pitch attitude
to prevent tail-strike during rotation. However, due to a large penalty on the envelope-
aware controller state (i.e. M¯ = EA), control is returned to the pilot immediately as would
be the case in an automobile when anti-lock brakes or traction control systems temporarily
engage. But according to the Monte-Carlo simulations based on the underlying models
described in the Appendix, the probability of a tail-strike with the pilot in control is still
non-zero as highlighted in yellow in Fig 3.9. The tail-strike risk can be eliminated by
choosing a higher weighting factor for the R2 term relative to R4 in Eqn (3.18). This would
encourage the policy to return control back to the pilot only after the aircraft is free from
tail-strike risk.
The complete FSAM MDP policy manages elevated risks associated with runway ex-
cursions and overruns as well as potential tail-strikes by assuring inappropriate longitudi-
nal and lateral control inputs are overridden in time to avoid LOC. The full policy must
ultimately be verified to ensure unsafe states are unreachable. For the nominal MDP for-
mulation this requires manually tuning reward weighting factors and regenerating policies
to ensure that the desired behavior is obtained. This process can be cumbersome especially
if the underlying state-space is large. To overcome this difficulty, the following section
proposes an MDP formulation with constraints.
3.6 Constrained MDPs for FSAM
The goal of this section is to construct a constrained MDP [73] policy that enables FSAM
to make risk-optimal decisions in a given flight condition subject to upper bounds on the
probability of entering a LOC risk state. The CMDP policy aims to maximize the expected
cumulative discounted reward function (3.1) subjected to constraints of the form
T (s∗1|s0) ≤ p¯1
T (s∗2|s0) ≤ p¯2 (3.27)
...
T (s∗m|s0) ≤ p¯m
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Figure 3.8: Runway excursion policy
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Figure 3.9: Tail-strike policy
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Here T (s∗i |s0) is the conditional probability of entering state s∗i from a given initial state s0.
The expected value or utility of state s0 when acting according to policy pi is given by
V(s0)pi = E
[ ∞∑
n=0
λnR(sn,an)
]
s0
(3.28)
For a Markov process, Eqn (3.28) can be expressed as
V(s0) =
∑
si∈s
∑
a j∈A
∞∑
n=0
λnT (sn = si,an = a j|s0)R(sn = si,an = a j)
=
∑
si∈s
∑
a j∈A
ρ(si,a j)pis0R(sn = si,an = a j) (3.29)
Here ρ(si,a j)pis0 is defined as the occupational measure of the state-action pair (si,a j).
ρ(si,a j)pis0 :=
∞∑
n=0
λnT (sn = si,an = a j|s0) (3.30)
The occupational measure is the discounted total probability of reaching a state si and
executing an action a j as a result of starting in state so and acting according to policy pi.
The sum of the occupational measure of state ai over all possible actions a j ∈A is obtained
from Eqn (3.30) as follows
∑
a j∈A
ρ(si,a j) =
∑
a j∈A
∞∑
n=0
λnT (si,a j|s0)
= T (s0) +
∑
sx∈S
∑
ay∈A
∞∑
n=1
λn−1T (sx,ay|s0)T (si|sx,ay)
= T (s0) +
∑
sx∈S
∑
ay∈A
ρ(sx,ay)pis0T (si|sx,ay) (3.31)
Here T (s0) = 1 is the probability of starting in the initial state s0. This leads to the following
expression: ∑
a j∈A
ρ(si,a j)−
∑
sx∈S
∑
ay∈A
ρ(sx,ay)pis0T (si|sx,ay) = T (s0) (3.32)
Eqns (3.29) and (3.32) can be expressed in their respective matrix forms as follows
V =RTρ (3.33)
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(
[I I . . . I]− [T Ta1T Ta2 . . .T Tan ]
)
ρ = ξ (3.34)
Here V ∈ R|S | and R,ρ ∈ R|S×A|. I ∈ R|S |×|S | is the identity matrix and Tai ∈ R|S |×|S | is the
transition probability matrix for each action ai ∈A. ξ ∈ R|S | is the initial state distribution
with ξ(s0) = 1 and all other states ξ(si) are zeros. Using Eqn (3.33) and (3.34), the problem
of maximizing the cumulative reward (Eqn (3.1)) is formulated as a linear program (LP) as
follows
maxRTρ (3.35)
subject to the constraints
(
[I I . . . I]− [T Ta1T Ta2 . . .T Tan ]
)
ρ = ξ (3.36)
ρ ≥ 0
Note that the solution to Eqn (3.35) and (3.36) corresponds to the MDP without constraints
(Eqn (3.1)). The additional constraints imposed by Eqn (3.27) are expressed as constraints
on the occupational measures. For example, consider the constraint
T (si|s0) ≤ p¯i
The above constraint can be expressed as∑
a j∈A
T (si,a j|s0) ≤ p¯i
∞∑
n=0
λn
∑
a j∈A
T (sn = si,an = a j|s0) ≤
∞∑
n=0
λn p¯i (3.37)
∑
a j∈A
ρ(si,a j) ≤
∞∑
n=0
λn p¯i (3.38)
∑
a j∈A
ρ(si,a j) ≤ 11−λ p¯i
z¯Tρ ≤ 1
1−λ p¯i (3.39)
Here z¯ is a vector of zeros with ones in the positions corresponding to the occupational
measures of state si. Eqn (3.35), (3.36) and (3.39) comprise the LP formulation for the
constrained MDP or CMDP [73]. The optimal action for each state si is obtained from the
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occupational measures as follows
T (a j|si) =
ρ(si,a j)pis0∑
a j ρ(si,a j)pis0
(3.40)
Note that Eqn (3.40) yields a probability distribution over the actions. In this work we
select the action with the maximum probability.
3.7 CMDP for Takeoff
In this section we apply the above CMDP formulation to re-construct a resilient control
override strategy that will enable us to obtain a policy that guarantees that the probability
of entering a tail strike state remains below a selected threshold.
Without loss of generality, we impose the following probability constraint on the tail
strike state [P, p4,q7]
T ([P, p4,q7]|[P, p1,q1]) = 0 (3.41)
i.e. the probability of entering the tail strike state (p4,q7), starting from the initial state
(p1,q1), with the pilot in control (P) is zero. Eqn (3.41) can be expressed as constraints on
the occupational measures of state [P, p4,q7] as illustrated in Eqn (3.39);
z¯Tρ = 0 (3.42)
We can now solve the constrained MDP using the linear program described by Eqns (3.35)-
(3.39). The resulting policy is shown in Fig 3.10. It can be seen that the new policy has
no risk of tail strike (i.e. no (p4,q7) state). FSAM reliably overrides to prevent tail strike.
Control is then transferred back to the pilot only after the aircraft no longer has the risk of
a tail strike.
Fig 3.11 illustrates three takeoff scenarios with tail strike risk. We note here that the
pilot is modeled as a human pilot transfer function [74] and is setup to apply excessive
nose up elevator input during rotation to simulate a tail strike scenario. The red lines indi-
cate the aircraft response to the excessive rotation command without FSAM augmentation.
The constant pitch response (in red) at around 12 seconds indicates a tail strike. The blue
lines indicate the response of the aircraft with the augmentation of the FSAM policy con-
structed in Section 3.5 using the unconstrained MDP (see Fig 3.9). Here, as illustrated
previously (see Fig 3.9), FSAM overrides the pilot when it detects the excessive rotation
input at around 10 seconds, but this MDP policy reverts control back to the pilot too soon.
Subsequently, the continued application of the excessive nose up elevator input results in a
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Figure 3.10: MDP with constraints
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Figure 3.11: Tail strike scenarios with MDP and CMDP policies. No FSAM augmentation
(red), FSAM with MDP policy (blue), FSAM with CMDP policy (green)
tail strike. The green lines indicate the aircraft’s response to the MDP policy that was con-
structed using the CMDP approach described in Section 3.7. Here, FSAM reverts control
to the pilot only after any imminent tail strike risk has been eliminated (see Fig 3.10).
3.8 Case Study
On 20th, March 2009 an Airbus A340 operated by Emirates Airlines, failed to takeoff
safely from Melbourne Airport, Australia [75]. The flight crew had programmed the flight
computer with the wrong weight calculations which resulted in poor takeoff performance
due to inadequate thrust. Consequently, the aircraft overshot the runway during the initial
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Figure 3.12: Trajectory of FL 407
takeoff roll and experienced a tail strike due to over-rotation. The subsequent departure was
uneventful, and the aircraft returned to the airport for an emergency landing. The actual
weight of the aircraft was 362.9 tons but the weight entered into the flight computer was
262.9 tons. Fig 3.12 illustrates the takeoff envelopes of the aircraft for the weight that
was entered into the flight computer (262.9 tons). The dashed curve in Fig 3.12 indicates
the actual aircraft trajectory (weighing 362.9 tons) from flight recorder data. Due to the
data entry error, the aircraft began its ground roll with a thrust setting that was too low for
the higher takeoff weight, resulting in insufficient acceleration to attain liftoff speed (Vlo f )
before overshooting the runway.
Let ∆W =Wactual−Winput represent the weight entry discrepancy. The scenario ∆W < 0
poses no risk to takeoff safety since the thrust computed by the FMS would be more than
the required takeoff thrust. Consequently, the aircraft can become airborne with a takeoff
distance less than what is required. The scenario 0 ≤ ∆W ≤ W0, where W0 represents a
weight difference for which the aircraft’s acceleration still remains within the computed
takeoff performance, also poses no risk to takeoff safety. However, for ∆W > W0, the
aircraft’s acceleration would yield trajectories that violated the required performance for a
safe takeoff.
The above accident is used to illustrate the application of the policy developed using the
MDP framework described in this work. Fig 3.13 illustrates the airspeed-position response
with the MDP policy. As the accelerating aircraft enters Q = q9, an unsafe region in the
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Figure 3.13: MDP policy applied to FL407
V − x envelope, FSAM overrides the pilot with the envelope-aware controller which then
rejects the takeoff. The aircraft then decelerates and stops safely in Q = q17 well before the
runway threshold. Fig 3.14 compares the aircraft states of Flight 407 modeled from data
obtained from accident reports [75] and the simulated aircraft response to the takeoff MDP
policy developed in this paper.
Note that the MDP policy used in this work depends on the partitions of the continuous
states. The V − x envelope is partitioned into 17 regions (see Fig 3.5). The computation
of the envelope is discussed in Appendix C.1. For a given runway length and maximum
available takeoff thrust, there is a minimum aircraft weight below which the V − x envelope
can no longer be partitioned into the 17 regions as indicated in Fig 3.5. The maximum
takeoff weight that can be used for a given runway length is determined by the available
thrust. Thus, to utilize the MDP formulation described in this work, the weight input to the
flight control computer and the actual weight of the aircraft must remain within the policy’s
acceptable weight range.
3.9 Discussion
The above case study illustrates how an MDP can be constructed for a particular set of LOC
risks during takeoff. Separate FSAM MDPs can be constructed for each phase of flight as
only one phase will be active at a time. Relaxing the assumptions on the MDP formulation
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Figure 3.14: Comparison of flight trajectories of flight 407 versus simulated aircraft re-
sponse with EA-FMS
will increase complexity substantially relative to the case study presented above. Condi-
tional independence will be critical to exploit as will additional state-space abstractions.
This work exploited domain specific knowledge in the form of flight envelopes to con-
struct partitions that eliminated the complexity associated with a typical grid based dis-
cretizations. It is further possible to evaluate policies (obtained using a partition scheme)
and refine the partitions to construct less conservative policies [76, 77]. When no domain
knowledge is available, methods proposed in [78, 79] can be used to learn a suitable parti-
tion that can alleviate the curse of dimensionality.
FSAM must sufficiently capture the capabilities and limitations of the envelope-aware
controller to recognize high-risk situations needing envelope-aware control and situations
where it is best to leave the pilot in control. Interaction between pilot and FSAM is also
important to more fully characterize. Certainly if FSAM and flight crew agree on con-
63
trol mode, the decision is straightforward. FSAM override of the pilot’s designated mode,
whether toggling to envelope-aware (for recovery) or back to pilot control (following re-
covery), requires further research in human factors as well as in autonomous system devel-
opment, validation, and verification.
For the purpose of illustration, Monte-Carlo simulations used in this paper were con-
structed such that the probability of entering unsafe states was higher under pilot control.
This may not always be the case. For example, instrument malfunctions may render the
safety controller ineffective, in which case the sensor health feature can bias the MDP away
from an autonomous control mode selection. In addition to Monte-Carlo simulations, ac-
curate state transition probabilities can be constructed from flight data. Care must be taken
to model the pilot’s inputs adequately, as flight data only represents one crew input case.
Mining larger datasets, e.g., data from all of an airline’s flights over a multi-year period, to
determine statistically-significant state-space transition dynamics and probabilities.
The policies obtained from the MDP/CMDP formulations are stored in the form of
look-up tables. Verifying large look-up table policies can be computationally-intensive.
Use of model checking tools can facilitate verification of deterministic policies for large
MDPs. Note that FSAM is only an overriding mechanism. Thus, if the available control
authorities cannot mitigate a given LOC risk, the MDP policy can still result in unsafe
states.
In this work, optimal policies were constructed using a value iteration algorithm that
explicitly enumerates all states. This may be infeasible for large state-spaces. Instead, a
modified form of value iteration can be used to only enumerate states that are reachable
from a given initial state [63]. The availability of a simulation model for takeoff dynamics
makes it possible to use reinforcement learning techniques such as Temporal Difference
to solve the underlying MDP [63, 80]. The use of a Monte-Carlo tree search algorithm to
solve the ideal MDP formulation in an online fashion is explored in following chapters.
3.10 Conclusion
This chapter contributes a decision-theoretic formulation of a Flight Safety Assessment
and Management (FSAM) system that monitors each flight and activates an envelope-aware
controller under high risk conditions. A generalized suite of MDP state features and reward
formulation were proposed, and a takeoff case study was formulated in detail. Specifically,
this chapter develops a takeoff MDP capable of preventing LOC events such as runway
excursion and tail-strike and demonstrates its ability to avoid LOC on a real-world accident
case. Intuitive state-space abstractions enabled the FSAM takeoff MDP to remain compu-
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tationally tractable. A CMDP formulation eliminates the need to iteratively refine MDP
policies by imposing probabilistic constraints on high risk states.
Chapter 2 formulated FSAM as a suite of manually-constructed finite state machines
to govern control authority switching. Manually generating finite state machines can be
cumbersome if the underlying state space is large and also requires significant experience
to ensure that the override directives are chosen appropriately. This chapter has shown that
an MDP or CMDP FSAM formulation can eliminate the need to manually design finite
state machines for managing control authority switches. Furthermore, an MDP formulation
enables each policy to be optimized over uncertainties and generalized reward functions.
Despite the generality of the initial FSAM MDP formulation, this chapter makes several
assumptions about pilot models, environment, and aircraft health in the takeoff case study.
Extending the specific FSAM MDP models beyond these assumptions is essential to ensure
FSAM policies do not actually increase risk when assumptions no longer hold. Future
research will formally analyze additional scenarios over the full state-space and develop
strategies to ensure that the actions of FSAM will not jeopardize nominal operations of the
aircraft.
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CHAPTER 4
Application of FSAM to Icing Related Loss of
Control
4.1 Introduction
Icing-related LOC situations are some of the most difficult cases to model and manage.
Flight through atmospheric conditions conducive to icing can lead to accumulation of ice
on the wings, tail surfaces and fuselage. Engine icing can also cause damage and even loss
of thrust. Ice accumulation alters the shape of the airframe and disrupts airflow over the
aircraft resulting in changes to its aerodynamic properties [81]. Consequently, ice accumu-
lation increases weight and drag while decreasing lift. Wing icing also leads to a decrease
in the stall angle of attack, while ice contamination of the horizontal stabilizers can re-
sult in tail plane stall [82]. Icing can also result in blockage of the pitot probes leading to
erroneous airspeed measurements [83].
Several strategies can mitigate LOC risk due to icing. Prior to departure, de-icing fluids
can be sprayed over the airframe to hinder ice accumulation. Aircraft anti-icing (e.g., wing
heat) and de-icing (e.g., wing boot) systems can reduce or eliminate wing surface icing dur-
ing flight. Current autopilot systems are equipped with warnings and envelope protection
features that can help prevent stall [83, 84]. However, envelope protection logic is based
on the nominal performance values such as the constant critical stall angle of attack appli-
cable to clean surface conditions. With wing icing, the critical angle of attack decreases;
currently no estimate of degraded stall angle of attack is provided to the pilot or autopilot.
This renders the stall protection system ineffective for icing scenarios. Furthermore, the in-
crease in drag due to icing requires the airplane to fly at higher airspeeds to produce the lift
necessary for steady flight. Asymmetric ice accumulation can lead to upsets in roll control.
Control surface effectiveness is also reduced due to icing. To prevent icing-related LOC,
an ice protection system must first identify the changes in aerodynamics, performance and
66
control characteristics of the aircraft due to icing then ensure that both automation and crew
warning systems incorporate these changes.
FSAM has previously been developed for high-risk LOC situations in which perfor-
mance models are unchanged [85] or when a one-time performance reduction occurs [86].
This chapter focuses on developing an FSAM capability to ensure that an appropriate con-
trol authority is chosen to prevent or recover from icing, a potentially high-risk LOC sce-
nario where performance can degrade progressively in flight. FSAM constantly monitors
flight conditions to assess LOC risk, initially warning the flight crew when LOC risk ex-
ceeds a nominal threshold. If the crew does not respond with appropriate control actions
in time to assure recovery, FSAM overrides with an Envelope Aware control law from
EAFMS until the LOC risk is mitigated. FSAM is effectively a “watchdog” system pro-
viding LOC avoidance override for flight envelope protection in a general context. This
chapter presents a Markov Decision Process (MDP) formulation that supports flight en-
velope protection during in-flight icing. Novel state features are based on a state-space
abstraction that captures risk related to degradation of aircraft dynamics and controllability
as a function of exposure to icing conditions.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 provides a literature review.
Section 4.3 formulates the FSAM MDP to address in-flight icing conditions. Section 4.4
illustrates the application of MDP policies with a case study involving an aircraft experi-
encing in-flight icing. Finally, Section 4.5 provides conclusions.
4.2 Literature Review
Several researchers have investigated and developed aircraft ice protection systems. The
Smart Icing System (SIS) developed by Bragg et al [21] could sense ice accumulation
based on its effect on aircraft stability and performance [87], adapt flight control laws to
accommodate the degraded flight performance [88] and inform the crew to improve their
situational awareness [89]. Gingras et al. [20] developed the Ice Contamination Envelope
Protection (ICEPro) system. ICEPro focused exclusively on estimating degraded airplane
performance to inform the flight crew about the degraded flight envelopes via cues pre-
sented in the flight displays. Lombaerts et al. [90, 91] developed an icing-related LOC
prevention system that was conceptually similar to ICEPro and predicted envelope viola-
tions over a finite horizon.
The primary focus of all the work cited above was to develop robust identification and
control techniques that can adapt to progressive aerodynamic performance changes due to
ice accretion and thereby reduce the risk of LOC. All these systems relied on the crew to
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enter control and flight plan changes that keep the aircraft within a safe operating region
and navigate the aircraft to a safe landing or to an atmospheric volume with less or no icing.
This work uses the capabilities of the Envelope-Aware FMS as an efficient augmentation
to the conventional control authority (i.e. pilot). Consequently, this chapter contributes a
novel decision making system that assesses risk associated with the current flight condition
and selects the appropriate control authority to ensure the aircraft remains within the safe
flight envelope. FSAM operates at a higher decision making level enabling flight plan and
guidance input changes when flight envelope protection and warnings are not sufficient to
mitigate risk along the crew prescribed flight path.
4.3 FSAM MDP Formulation for In-Flight Icing
4.3.1 State formulation
The ideal MDP state formulation must encode information about aircraft dynamics and
controls, aircraft health, pilot and environment characteristics to make override decisions
and reduce LOC risk [92]. Because the full FSAM formulation would be ideally described
by a large suite of continuous and discrete variables, abstraction and decomposition are
essential to manage complexity. At the top level, the MDP can be decomposed into a
sequence of MDP formulations for the different phases of flight (i.e. takeoff, climb, cruise,
descent and landing). Furthermore, compact abstractions of aircraft performance and flight
envelopes pertinent to FSAM override decisions can be constructed to reduce state space
complexity for each phase of flight.
This work focuses on icing as the primary hazard, assuming that aircraft health, pilot
characteristics and environment features (except icing) do not pose additional risks with
respect to flight safety and override. The compact FSAM MDP state representation for
icing is defined as the tuple:
s = (V¯ , A¯, Θ¯, Φ¯, H¯, T¯ , F¯, I¯, S¯ , M¯) (4.1)
Here V¯ = {v¯1, . . . , v¯6} represents intervals of aircraft airspeed V . Each v¯i represents a par-
tition defined over controllable airspeeds in the interval [Vmax,Vmin] as illustrated in Eqn
(4.2) and Fig 4.1. v¯1 is a high risk state due to the possibility of aerodynamic stall while
v¯6 poses high structural damage risk due to high aero-structural loads. V¯ encodes infor-
mation about the proximity to airspeed envelope boundaries with ∆V = Vmax −Vmin and
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Figure 4.1: Partitions in Airspeed (left), Vertical speed (center), Thrust (right) [3–5]
0 < nv1 < nv2 < nv3 < 1.
v¯1 = {V | V < Vmin}
v¯2 = {V | 0 < V −Vmin ≤ nv1∆V}
v¯3 = {V | nv1∆V < V −Vmin ≤ nv2∆V} (4.2)
v¯4 = {V | nv2∆V < V −Vmin ≤ nv3∆V}
v¯5 = {V | nv3∆V < V −Vmin ≤ ∆V}
v¯6 = {V | V > Vmax}
The graphical representations of the state partitions in Fig 4.1 are illustrated with instru-
ments found in a typical Cessna 172 type aircraft. While values are specific to the C-172,
the partition set generalizes to any fixed-wing aircraft type. Note that nvi can be defined
based on a reachable set analysis (see references [50, 56, 86]).
A¯ = {α¯1, α¯2, α¯3} represents partitions of the adverse aerodynamic envelope boundaries
introduced by Wilborn et al. [93]. It encodes information about proximity to a stall condi-
tion. Figure 4.2 illustrates the partitions of the adverse aerodynamic envelope. Note that α¯3
represents a high risk state where aerodynamic stall is highly likely. Let X = [αm,βm] repre-
sent a vector whose components are the normalized angle of attack and sideslip angles [93].
Adverse aerodynamic envelope abstractions are formally defined as follows:
α¯1 = {X | AαX ≤ Bα1}
α¯2 = {X | (AαX ≤ Bα2) \ α¯1}
α¯3 = {X | R2 \ (AαX ≤ Bα2)}
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Figure 4.2: Adverse aerodynamic envelope partitions
where Aα,Bα1,Bα2 are defined below. nα1,α2 are positive scalars and 0 < nα1 < nα2 < 1.
1
Aα =

1 0
−1 0
0 1
0 −1
 ,Bα1 =

nα2
nα1
nα2
nα2
 ,Bα2 =

1
0
1
1

Θ¯ ∈ {θ¯1, θ¯2, θ¯3, θ¯4, θ¯5, θ¯6} is a compact representation of aircraft pitch θ, pitch rate q and
elevator control δe. Specifically, Θ¯ is a discretization of the dynamic pitch control envelope
introduced by Wilborn et al. [93]. The dynamic pitch θ′ is defined as θ+q. Θ¯ is illustrated in
Fig 4.3. Let X = [θ′, δe] represent a vector whose components are the dynamic pitch attitude
and elevator deflection [93]. Dynamic pitch control envelope abstractions are formally
defined as follows:
θ¯1 = {X | AθX ≤ Bθ1}
θ¯2 = {X | (AθX ≤ Bθ2) \ θ¯1}
θ¯3 = {X | Q1 \ θ¯2}
θ¯4 = {X | Q2 \ θ¯2}
θ¯5 = {X | Q3 \ θ¯2}
θ¯6 = {X | Q4 \ θ¯2}
where Qi, i = 1,2,3,4 denote the first, second, third and fourth quadrants in R2. Aθ,Bθ1,Bθ2
1Suitable values for nα1 ,nα2 can be defined similar to nvi .
70
are defined below:
Aθ =

1 0
−1 0
0 1
0 −1
−m1 1
m2 −1

,Bθ1 =

δemax
θmax
δemin
θmin
θmax
θmin

,Bθ2 = nθBθ1
where m1,m2 are the slopes of the envelope boundaries in Q2 and Q4 respectively (see
Figure 4.3). δemin , δemax represent elevator saturation limits while θmin, θmax represent safe
pitch attitude limits. nθ is a positive scalar and 0 < nθ < 1.2
Φ¯ ∈ {φ¯1, . . . , φ¯6} is a compact representation of aircraft roll φ, roll rate p and aileron
control δa. Dynamic roll φ′ is defined as φ+ p. Φ¯ is a discretization of the dynamic roll
control envelope as specified in Wilborn et al. [93] φ¯1, φ¯2 represent safe operating envelope
regions. The dynamic roll control envelope partitions are defined as follows:
φ¯1 = {X | AφX ≤ Bφ1}
φ¯2 = {X | (AφX ≤ Bφ2) \ φ¯1}
φ¯3 = {X | Q1 \ φ¯2}
φ¯4 = {X | Q2 \ φ¯2}
φ¯5 = {X | Q3 \ φ¯2}
φ¯6 = {X | Q4 \ φ¯2}
Aφ,Bφ1,Bφ2 are defined as follows:
Aφ =

1 0
−1 0
0 1
0 −1
−m1 1
m2 −1

,Bφ1 =

δamax
φmax
δamin
φmin
φmax
φmin

,Bφ2 = nφBφ1
where m1,m2 are the slopes of the envelope boundaries in Q2 and Q4 respectively (see
Figure 4.3). δamin , δamax represent aileron saturation limits while φmin,φmax represent safe
2A suitable value for nθ can be defined similar to nvi .
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Figure 4.3: Dynamic pitch and roll control envelope partitions
roll attitude limits. nφ is a positive scalar and 0 < nφ < 1.3
H¯ = {h¯1, . . . , h¯5} partitions the aircraft’s vertical speed as shown in Fig 4.1. Let h˙max, h˙min
denote the maximum and minimum climb rates for safe operation and let h˙0 > 0 denote an
appropriate value of climb rate close to zero. Partition intervals are defined as follows:
h¯1 = {h˙ | |h˙| < h˙0 ft/min}
h¯2 = {h˙ | h˙0 ft/min ≤ h˙ < h˙max ft/min}
h¯3 = {h˙ | h˙ ≥ h˙max ft/min}
h¯4 = {h˙ | − h˙0 ft/min ≥ h˙ > h˙min ft/min}
h¯5 = {h˙ | h˙ ≤ h˙min ft/min}
T¯ ∈ {t¯1, t¯2, t¯3, t¯4} denote partitions of the thrust control input space as shown in Fig 4.1.
Tmax denotes the maximum thrust output and 0 < nt1 < nt2 < nt3 < 1. The partitions are
defined as follows 4:
t¯1 = {T | 0 ≤ T ≤ nt1Tmax}
t¯2 = {T | nt1Tmax < T ≤ nt2Tmax}
t¯3 = {T | nt2Tmax < T ≤ nt3Tmax}
t¯4 = {T | nt3Tmax < T ≤ Tmax}
F¯ represents current flight plan information with triple (Fc,Ft,Fs) that characterizes
3A suitable value for nφ can be defined similar to nvi
4Values for nti can be chosen to denote partitions of power setting ranges corresponding to takeoff,
climb/cruise, approach and idle
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Table 4.1: Flight plan state composition
f¯1 (level,straight,slow) f¯2 (level,straight,med) f¯3 (level,straight,fast)
f¯4 (level,turn,slow) f¯5 (level,turn,med) f¯6 (level,turn,fast)
f¯7 (climb,straight,slow) f¯8 (climb,straight,med) f¯9 (climb,straight,fast)
f¯10 (climb,turn,slow) f¯11 (climb,turn,med) f¯12 (climb,turn,fast)
f¯13 (descent,straight,slow) f¯14 (descent,straight,med) f¯15 (descent,straight,fast)
f¯16 (descent,turn,slow) f¯17 (descent,turn,med) f¯18 (descent,turn,fast)
climb, turn and airspeed.
Fc ∈ {level,climb,descent}
Ft ∈ {straight,turn}
Fs ∈ {slow,med,fast}
Values ‘level’,‘climb’ and ‘descent’ are defined as longitudinal flight conditions with zero,
positive and negative climb rates, respectively. ‘Straight’ and ‘turn’ are defined as flight
conditions with zero and non-zero turn rates, respectively. ‘Slow’ is defined as the set of
flight conditions where V¯ ∈ {v¯1, v¯2}, ‘med’ includes flight states with V¯ ∈ {v¯3, v¯4} and ‘fast’
states have V¯ ∈ {v¯5, v¯6}. Thus, F¯ is abstracted into { f¯1, . . . , f¯18} as shown in Table 4.1.
I¯ encapsulates information about predicted exposure to icing conditions based on a
given flight plan and expected atmospheric (icing, wind) conditions. Let tpte be defined
as the predicted time of exposure to icing. The critical exposure time tcritical is defined
as the duration beyond which further exposure to icing is most likely to result in stall
conditions. Note that the critical exposure time depends on several factors such as icing
severity, maximum thrust available, commanded airspeed during icing conditions, usage of
deicing fluids prior to takeoff, and capacity of the anti-icing system [94]. I¯ is defined as the
tuple (npte,nice) where npte ∈ {t pte = 0, 0 < tpte < tcritical, tpte > tcritical} denotes partitions in
the predicted time of exposure and nice ∈ {0,1} where 0 denotes flight outside icing clouds
and 1 denotes that the aircraft is flying in icing conditions. I¯ is compactly represented as
{i¯0, i¯1, i¯2, i¯3, i¯4} as shown in Table 4.2. Figure 4.4 graphically illustrates these states.
M¯ ∈ {P,EA} represents the current control mode. Here P denotes that the pilot is in
control while EA indicates envelope-aware control. S¯ ∈ {Ps,EAs} represents a mode select
switch with which the pilot can request pilot control authority be maintained/restored (Ps)
or else can manually engage or maintain Envelope-Aware control (EAs).
Note that the airspeed, angle of attack, pitch and roll partitions described above are
parameterized in terms of envelope boundaries. Consequently, as these parameters are
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Table 4.2: Icing intensity state abstraction
i¯0 ( 0 < tpte < tcritical , 0 )
i¯1 ( tpte ≥ tcritical , 0 )
i¯2 ( 0 < tpte < tcritical , 1 )
i¯3 ( tpte ≥ tcritical , 1 )
i¯4 ( tpte = 0 , 0)
i0
i2
i4
[0<tpte<tcritical,1]
[tpte=0,0]
[0<tpte<tcritical,0]
i1
i3
i4
[tpte>=tcritical,0]
[tpte>=tcritical,1]
[tpte=0,0]
Figure 4.4: Abstraction for icing intensity based on available flight plan
updated by envelope estimation, these state representations capture the evolving risks due
to icing.
4.3.2 Action Set
FSAM is a high-level watchdog that passively monitors for LOC risk and overrides only
when necessary to avoid LOC. As explained in the previous chapter, there are two actions:
NOOP (No Operation) and TOGL (Toggle). FSAM remains passive by selecting NOOP.
TOGL is selected if switching control authority is necessary to mitigate risk or restore
control authority to the crew and nominal automation after LOC risk has been adequately
mitigated.
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4.3.3 Transition Probabilities
The transition probabilities can be modeled as described in Chapter 3 (see Section 3.3.3).
For a given mode, the transition probabilities are specified as follows:
TM(s j|si) = P1(V¯ j
∣∣∣ V¯i, A¯i, Θ¯i, Φ¯i, H¯i, T¯i, F¯i, I¯i, M¯) ×P2(A¯ j ∣∣∣ V¯i, A¯i, Θ¯i, Φ¯i, H¯i, T¯i, F¯i, I¯i, M¯)
×P3(Θ¯ j
∣∣∣ V¯i, A¯i, Θ¯i, Φ¯i, H¯i, T¯i, F¯i, I¯i, M¯) ×P4(Φ¯ j ∣∣∣ V¯i, A¯i, Θ¯i, Φ¯i, H¯i, T¯i, F¯i, I¯i, M¯)
×P5(H¯ j
∣∣∣ V¯i, A¯i, Θ¯i, Φ¯i, H¯i, T¯i, F¯i, I¯i, M¯) ×P6(T¯ j ∣∣∣ V¯i, A¯i, Θ¯i, Φ¯i, H¯i, T¯i, F¯i, I¯i, M¯)
×P7(F¯ j
∣∣∣V¯i, A¯i, Θ¯i, Φ¯i, H¯i, T¯i, F¯i, I¯i, M¯)× P8(I¯ j ∣∣∣ F¯i, I¯i, M¯)×P9(S¯ j ∣∣∣ S¯ i, M¯)
(4.3)
The factored representation of TM in Eqn 4.3 provides flexibility since it facilitates the
incorporation of data from several sources. Distributions P1, . . . ,P9 can be estimated via
one or more methods such as Monte Carlo sampling of physics-based models, flight data
mining and human subject experiments. With TM, the transition probability for each action
is expressed as described in Eqn 3.23-3.24, Chapter 3.
4.3.4 Reward formulation
FSAM’s goal is to ensure that the aircraft avoids states with high LOC risk while minimiz-
ing authority shifts away from pilot-designated mode S¯ . Consequently, an additive reward
R(s,a) = ∑
i
wiRi is defined where theRi’s penalize unsafe states and inconsistent authority
switches while the wi are weighting parameters.
R1 =
−1 i f V¯ ∈ {v¯1, v¯6}0 otherwise R2 =
−1 i f A¯ ∈ {α¯3}0 otherwise (4.4)
R3 =
−1 i f Θ¯ ∈ {θ¯3, θ¯4, θ¯5, θ¯6}0 otherwise R4 =
−1 i f Φ¯ ∈ {φ¯3, φ¯4, φ¯5, φ¯6}0 otherwise (4.5)
R5 =
−1 i f H¯ ∈ {h¯5}0 otherwise (4.6)
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R6 =

−o1 i f M = P∧ S¯ = Ps∧a = TOGL
−o2 i f M = P∧ S¯ = EAs∧a = NOOP
−o3 i f M = EA∧ S¯ = Ps∧a = NOOP
−o4 i f M = EA∧ S¯ = EAs∧a = TOGL
0 otherwise
(4.7)
Above, oi=1,...,4 ∈ [0,1]. Note that setting (o1,o2,o3,o4) = (1,0,1,0) only discourages EA
mode when the crew selects Ps. Persistence in envelope-aware control mode might be pe-
nalized to encourage transfer of authority to the crew once any high-risk condition prompt-
ing FSAM TOGL to M = EA is mitigated. (o1,o2,o3,o4) = (1,1,1,1) encourages the policy
to satisfy the crew’s mode select request. For the case study discussed in this work, the
following parameters are chosen: w1 = 100, w2 = 100, w3 = 50, w4 = 50, w5 = 100, w6 = 10
and o1 = o2 = o3 = o4 = 1.
4.3.5 FSAM MDP policy
To find the optimal policy for the above MDP formulation, the distributions P1, . . . ,P9 must
be estimated a priori. P1, . . . ,P7 and P9 can be estimated as described in Section 4.3.3.
Note that P8 describes the transitions in predicted exposure to icing I¯ which depend on the
current flight plan. The current flight plan can change due to air-traffic control constraints,
environmental constraints, crew preferences and on-board anomalies. Thus, estimating
transition probabilities with respect to I¯ a priori can be hard. To overcome this difficulty, we
adopt a hierarchical solution approach. First, we obtain the optimal values V∗(s) for each
state s using Value Iteration [62] assuming that the feature I¯ remains constant. Later, on-
board the aircraft, after changes to the flight plan are known, the corresponding probabilities
for I¯ are updated appropriately and Value Iteration is executed online using V∗ as the initial
guess. Since only a small portion of the transition matrix is updated online, using V∗
significantly reduces the number of iterations required to converge to the optimal solution.
5 Alternately, the values V∗ computed offline can be utilized online to choose an action at
each state according to the following rule:
pi∗(si) = argmax
a
{
Q(si,a = NOOP),Q(si,a = TOGL)
}
(4.8)
5Other online MDP algorithms such as real-time dynamic programming and asynchronous value iteration
can also be used.
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where
Q(si,a) =R(si,a) +γ
∑
sk
TM(sk|s j)V∗(sk) (4.9)
Note that Eqn (4.8) is a greedy policy that uses the transition probabilities updated online
with values V∗ computed offline. In Eqn (4.9), M ∈ {P,EA} in TM is specified by state s j.
s j = si if the policy prescribes a = NOOP in state si while M is toggled in s j relative to si
if a = TOGL. Note that if switching control authorities with TOGL results in a new flight
plan with a different predicted exposure time to icing (which can be estimated online), s j
allows for instantaneous changes in icing intensity feature values relative to si.
4.4 In-flight Icing Case Study
Consider an aircraft on approach to Buffalo Niagara International Airport6 (KBUF) Run-
way 23 as shown in Fig 4.5. The flight plan progresses nominally as follows. From Ini-
tial Approach Fix (IAF) SUSKE to BUFST the aircraft maintains steady level flight at a
medium speed (F¯ = f¯2). From BUFST onwards, the aircraft starts a straight descent at
medium speed (F¯ = f¯14). At ZADUM the aircraft starts a descending right turn (F¯ = f¯17)
toward Final Approach Fix (FAF) BIILS and then continues with a straight descent while
decelerating (F¯ = f¯13) to a nominal touchdown speed. The state transition probabilities
used in this case study are described in Appendix D. To succinctly describe and compute
transition probability distributions, this work assumes that the angle of attack, side-slip
and dynamic pitch attitude values always remain within the safe operating envelope (i.e.
A¯ = α¯1, Θ¯ = θ¯1). The mode select switch is always assumed set to request pilot authority
(i.e. S¯ = Ps). With the state transition probabilities described in Appendix D and the reward
formulation described in Section 4.3.4, the optimal policy for the MDP is obtained using
value iteration.
4.4.1 Flight without icing conditions
Consider the case where I¯ = i¯4, i.e. predicted time of exposure tpte = 0 and the aircraft
is free from icing conditions nice = 0. Suppose the aircraft is following the flight seg-
ment between SUSKE and BUFST prescribed by straight and steady level flight. For
this flight segment, consider the policy actions for MDP states s = [V¯ ,C1,M] ∈ S where
C1 = [α¯1, θ¯1, φ¯1, h¯1, t¯2, i¯4, f¯2,Ps] represents features presumed to remain constant. As an ex-
6This case study is motivated by the crash of Colgan Air Flight 3407. [95]
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Figure 4.5: Approach flight plan [source: www.airnav.com]
ample, the optimal policy action for state s1 = [V¯ = v¯3,C1,M = P] is computed by evaluating
its state-action utility:
Q(s1,NOOP) =R(s1,NOOP) +γ
∑
sk∈S
TP(sk|s1)V∗(sk) = −0.57 (4.10)
Q(s1,TOGL) =R(s1,TOGL) +γ
∑
sk∈S
TEA(sk|s2)V∗(sk) = −10.40 (4.11)
where s2 = [V¯ = v¯3,C1,M = EA]. From these calculations the optimal action in s1 is NOOP.
Table 4.3 illustrates the final state-action values for a subset of the other airspeed states.
Note that when the flight crew has control in V¯ ∈ {v¯3, v¯4}, the policy selects NOOP. When
airspeed is V¯ = v¯2, FSAM elects TOGL to M = EA because selecting NOOP results in a
very low state-action utility due to the relatively high likelihood of entering a high risk state
(V¯ = v¯1). Consequently, the policy favors TOGL when V¯ = v¯2 because the EA controller
has a higher probability of transitioning to v¯3 and zero probability of transitioning to v¯1 (see
Table D.1) hence eliminating a stall risk. Note that control is given back to the pilot when
V¯ = v¯3. The policy behavior for states s = [V¯ ,C1,M] ∈ S is summarized in Fig 4.6.
Now consider the case where the aircraft is at ZADUM and is initiating a descending
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Table 4.3: State action utilities for s = [V¯ ,C1,M]. Left M = P, Right M = EA
s ∈ S Q(s,NOOP) Q(s,TOGL)
[v¯1,P] -125.30 -112.17
[v¯2,P] -16.35 -10.85
[v¯3,P] -0.57 -10.40
[v¯4,P] -0.19 -10.19
s ∈ S Q(s,NOOP) Q(s,TOGL)
[v¯1,EA] -107.17 -125.30
[v¯2,EA] -5.85 -16.35
[v¯3,EA] -5.40 -0.57
[v¯4,EA] -5.19 -0.19
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Figure 4.6: State transition graph for the nominal no-icing case
right turn at a constant airspeed. Let C2 = [α¯1, θ¯1, h¯4, t¯2, i¯4, f¯17,Ps] describe the constant
state features during this stage. The final state-action utilities in this flight segment are
described in Table 4.4. In nominal conditions [v¯3, φ¯1,C2,P], the policy favors NOOP.
However, as the bank angle steepens [v¯3, φ¯2,C2,P], the probability of stalling the aircraft
increases (Appendix Tables D.4 and D.5) so the policy indicates a TOGL to EA. With EA
control, the probability of transitioning to a bank angle state that reduces stall risk is higher.
Control is transferred back to the pilot when a lower risk state is attained.
Note that the repeated selection of TOGL leading to mode cycles between P and EA is
discouraged by the reward termR6. However, the underlying transition probability models
do not adequately capture pilot behavior that can lead to mode cycles due to the Markov
assumptions. The following chapter explores formulations to adequately prevent mode
cycling behaviors of the policy.
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Table 4.4: State action utilities for s = [V¯ , Φ¯,C2,M]. Left M = P, Right M = EA
s ∈ S Q(s,NOOP) Q(s,TOGL)
[v¯1, φ¯1,P] -136.49 -113.08
[v¯2, φ¯1,P] -29.24 -12.72
[v¯3, φ¯1,P] -4.40 -12.72
[v¯4, φ¯1,P] -2.70 -12.17
[v¯1, φ¯2,P] -145.25 -113.08
[v¯2, φ¯2,P] -38.18 -12.72
[v¯3, φ¯2,P] -13.56 -12.72
[v¯4, φ¯2,P] -13.14 -12.17
s ∈ S Q(s,NOOP) Q(s,TOGL)
[v¯1, φ¯1,EA] -108.08 -136.49
[v¯2, φ¯1,EA] -7.72 -29.24
[v¯3, φ¯1,EA] -7.72 -4.40
[v¯4, φ¯1,EA] -7.17 -2.70
[v¯1, φ¯2,EA] -108.08 -145.25
[v¯2, φ¯2,EA] -7.72 -38.18
[v¯3, φ¯2,EA] -7.72 -13.56
[v¯4, φ¯2,EA] -7.17 -13.14
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Figure 4.7: Vertical profile of the original flight plan indicating icing conditions and the
flight plan proposed by the EA-FMS.
4.4.2 Flight with icing conditions
Consider the approach flight plan in Fig 4.5 but with icing conditions illustrated by the
shaded region in Fig 4.7. Fig 4.7 illustrates the altitude profile of the flight plan in Fig 4.5.
For this case the aircraft arrives at SUSKE in icing (nice = 1) such that the predicted time
of exposure for the current flight plan is greater than the critical exposure time tpte > tcritical,
i.e. I¯ = i¯3.
Let C3 = [α¯1, θ¯1, φ¯1, h¯1, t¯3, f¯2,Ps] denote features that remain constant during this seg-
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ment of the flight plan. The two actions in s3 = [v¯3,C3, i¯3,P] have utility:
Q(s3,NOOP) =R(s3,NOOP) +γ
∑
sk∈S
TP(sk|s3)V∗(sk) = −15.2 (4.12)
Q(s3,TOGL) =R(s3,TOGL) +γ
∑
sk∈S
TEA(sk|s4)V∗(sk) = −11.6 (4.13)
where s4 = [v¯3,C3, i¯2,P]. Selecting the higher-utility TOGL action results in an indirect
change of the expected icing intensity exposure feature from I¯ = i¯3 to I¯ = i¯2 in addition
to changing the mode feature from M = P to M = EA. The instantaneous reduction in
expected icing indicated by I¯ due to a TOGL to M = EA occurs due to an EA flight plan that
directs the aircraft out of icing conditions quickly as illustrated in Fig 4.7. Switching to the
Envelope-Aware controller within EAFMS in this case would result in a state where tpte <=
tcritical, (I¯ = i¯2) since the risk of stalling is lower than in I¯ = i¯3 (see Appendix Tables D.2 and
D.3). Following the new flight plan that has a lower time of exposure to icing minimizes the
risk of in-flight icing-induced stall. Once the aircraft is out of icing conditions, the policy
described in Section 4.4.1 applies and therefore control is handed back to the flight crew.
Note that the reward formulation in Section 4.3.4 does not explicitly penalize states where
I¯ = i¯3. However, the MDP policy is able to infer i¯3 poses high risk because continuing the
flight plan under icing conditions when I¯ = i¯3 incurs a heavy future penalty due to the higher
likelihood of stalling as shown in Table D.3. This work assumes that the flight crew adopts
the new flight plan provided by the EAFMS. Future work will focus on better integrating
nominal FMS information into FSAM to avoid mode cycling behavior.
Figures 4.8-4.10 illustrate numerical simulations of the icing case study presented above.
Fig 4.8 indicates the altitude response of the aircraft with and without FSAM augmentation.
As explained in Eqn 4.12-4.13, FSAM switches to the Envelope-Aware control law when
the flight planning module indicates the availability of a flight plan that reduces exposure
to icing conditions. When the flight crew adopts the new flight plan provided by EAFMS
or enters a safe alternative, FSAM transfers control back to the flight crew. Without FSAM
augmentation, as seen in Fig 4.10, flight through icing conditions requires increased usage
of thrust and elevator commands to maintain the required altitude and airspeed. The in-
crease in the control effort is attributed to the decreased lift and increased drag due to ice
accretion.
On February 12, 2009, Colgain Air Flight 3407 [95] encountered icing conditions on
a similar approach flight plan into KBUF. The flight crew failed to manage the aircraft’s
degrading airspeed while flying in icing conditions. Furthermore, the flight crew’s inap-
propriate response to the subsequent stick-shaker warnings eventually resulted in loss of
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Figure 4.8: Altitude, icing intensity and control mode response
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Figure 4.9: Angle of attack and airspeed response
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Figure 4.10: Control response
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control. As described in the case study above, EAFMS including FSAM would have pre-
vented the aircraft’s airspeed from decreasing below the stall speed. FSAM would also have
triggered a flight plan change based on the flight planning capabilities of the EAFMS [86]
and enabled an alternate flight plan to a safe landing that had a minimum time of exposure
to icing. Real world icing related accidents such as Colgan Air Flight 3407 and American
Eagle Flight 4184 [96] can be avoided in the future once EAFMS capabilities are infused
in cockpit automation (and unmanned aircraft automation).
4.5 Conclusions
This chapter presented a Markov Decision Process formulation for Flight Safety Assess-
ment and Management that can make control authority switching decisions to minimize or
reduce loss of control risk given icing conditions. A discrete state-space abstraction was
designed to efficiently capture pertinent information regarding aircraft dynamics, control,
and expected time of exposure to icing conditions. Abstractions of these state features were
constructed based on parameterized flight envelopes updated during progressive icing via
online estimation. Reward functions penalized states with high loss of control risk and
any control authority mode disagreeing with crew-indicated preference. Icing and no-ice
landing approach case studies were presented. Several assumptions were made to sim-
plify construction of transition probabilities. Ultimately transition probabilities and reward
weights must be constructed from data collected over simulations, in-flight testing and data
analysis, and focused pilot subject experiments.
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CHAPTER 5
Managing FSAM MDP Complexity
for Online Execution
5.1 Introduction
The optimal policy for an MDP can be obtained using algorithms such as value iteration,
policy iteration or linear programming [62] as described in Chapter 3. Such algorithms
explicitly enumerate all MDP states. The MDP formulations for FSAM described thusfar
focused on compactly representing the MDP states but used the traditional solvers. Though
abstraction enabled us to reduce the computational complexity relative to variable represen-
tation over a fine grid of values, solving the MDP can still be prohibitively expensive once
simplifying assumptions are relaxed. Consequently, this chapter explores an approximate
method to find near-optimal solutions using a sparsely sampled Monte Carlo tree search
algorithm [69]. This chapter contributes an online implementation of the FSAM MDP.
An online implementation enables incorporating changes to aircraft dynamics, health and
weather information in real-time as opposed to relying on a database of policies applica-
ble to different LOC situations constructed offline [86]. Furthermore, the sparse sampling
algorithm reduces the knowledge engineering required to compactly define the MDP state
space partitions as described in previous chapters.
5.2 Sparse Sampling for Large MDPs
Sparse sampling for large state-space MDPs was originally introduced by Kearns et al.
[69]. Given a generative model G of an MDP1, the sparse sampling algorithm executes the
following steps:
1A generative model takes as input a state-action pair (s,a) and outputs R(s,a) and state s′, where s′ is
randomly drawn from next state distribution P(s′|s,a).
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1. For each action a, the generative model computesR(s,a) and independently samples
S a of C states from next-state distribution P(s′|s,a).
2. For each state in S a, Step 1 is repeated until horizon H to construct a finite look
ahead tree (Fig 5.1).
3. The estimate of optimal value V∗(s) is given by:
Vˆ∗H(s) = maxa
{
R(s,a) +γ
1
C
∑
s′∈S a
Vˆ∗H−1(s)
}
(5.1)
Note that Eqn (5.1) computes Vˆ∗H(s) recursively from Vˆ∗0 (s) = 0.
4. The optimal action is then given by:
argmax
a
{
R(s,a) +γ 1
C
∑
s′∈S a
Vˆ∗H−1(s)
}
(5.2)
Branching factorC and horizon length H can be chosen to manage approximation error (i.e.
||V∗(s)− Vˆ∗(s)||) as described in [69]. Note that this algorithm does not require enumeration
of all MDP states. It can be applied when the MDP state-space is discrete, continuous, or
mixed. Computation time can be further reduced by independently evaluating each branch
at the root node using multi-core processors or GPUs.
5.3 Sparse Sampling Applied to FSAM
The FSAM MDP formulations described in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 3 can be solved using
the Sparse-Sampling algorithm. The original MDP formulation consisted of a factored
state representation involving various features such as aircraft dynamics, aircraft health,
flight crew and environmental characteristics. This work assumes that the aircraft health,
flight crew and environmental features remain constant and will focus only on the aircraft
dynamics features. Thus, the MDP state is given as:
s = [F11,F12,F13,F14]
F11 = [u,v,w, p,q,r,φ,θ,ψ, x,y,h]
F12 = [δe, δa, δr, δt] (5.3)
F13 = [cg,c f ,cp]
F14 = [M¯, S¯ , N¯, T¯ ]
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Figure 5.1: Sparse sampled look-ahead tree with two actions and a branching factor of
three
Here F11 describes traditional aircraft physical state [70]. u,v,w describe aircraft linear
velocity in the body frame, p,q,r are the body axis angular rates, φ,θ,ψ represent Euler
angle attitude, and x,y,h denote 3-D position relative to a ground fixed frame. F12 describes
fixed-wing control inputs elevator (δe), aileron (δa), rudder (δr), and throttle (δt). Throttle
is assumed to provide symmetric thrust to the airframe. F13 describes the configuration of
the aircraft in terms of flaps (c f ), spoilers (cp) and landing gear (cg). F14 specifies current
control mode M¯, the number of override directives previously issued N¯, and time elapsed
in the current control mode T¯ . S¯ denotes the mode select switch. F11 and F12 contain
continuous-valued variables, F13 takes discrete values. M¯, S¯ , N¯ in F14 are discrete, and T¯
is continuous. All F1 parameters are observable from onboard sensors.
Instead of specifying transition probabilities as in the previous MDP formulations, here
we specify a generative model. The generative model is a function that takes as inputs the
current state sn, action an ∈ {NOOP,TOGL} and outputs the reward R(sn,an) and the next
state sn+1 chosen according to state distribution P(sn+1|sn,an). The next state distribution
is expressed in terms of the state features as follows:
P(sn+1|sn,an) = P(Fn+111 ,Fn+112 ,Fn+113 ,Fn+114 |Fn11,Fn12,Fn13,Fn14,an) (5.4)
86
Conditional independence among state features can be exploited to simplify Eqn (5.4):
P(sn+1|sn,an) =P11(Fn+111 |Fn11,Fn12,Fn13)P12(Fn+112 |Fn+111 ,Fn12,Fn13,an)×
P13(Fn+113 |Fn13,Fn14)P14(Fn+114 |Fn14,an) (5.5)
Here, P11 represents the aircraft state transition model. Samples are drawn from P11
using a stochastic model of the aircraft dynamics:
Xn+1 = Xn +F(Xn,Un)∆t+Wn (5.6)
where F represents the equations of motion and W is a state disturbance vector with Gaus-
sian noise. ∆t is the discretization time step. A Twin-Otter aircraft model [97] is used in
Eqn (5.6). X = F11 is aircraft physical state, U = F12 represents physical control inputs.
P12 describes the control input distribution. We assume there are two control authori-
ties, a pilot/crew and an envelope-aware safety controller. Pilot control inputs are modeled
as human operator transfer functions [74] with parameters chosen according to a user-
specified distribution. The envelope-aware controller is modelled as a Linear Quadratic
Regulator (LQR) control law [98] designed by linearizing the aircraft dynamics about a
steady, level flight trim-condition at a specific airspeed (55 m/s) and altitude (2500 m) for
this study.
P13 represents transitions in aircraft configuration. For cruise flight the configuration
is constant at no flaps, gear up, no spoilers. P14 represents transitions in control mode. A
transition from one control authority to another occurs when an = TOGL.
The reward function R(sn,an) is a “cost” (negative reward) function that penalizes un-
safe aircraft states but discourages routine override directives. A weighted additive reward
function is defined:
R =
n∑
i=0
wiRi (5.7)
The Ri’s penalize unsafe states and unnecessary override actions while wi’s represent tun-
able weighting parameters that may vary depending as a function of flight condition. For
example, the penalty for violating the stall constraint at high altitude can be lower than the
stall penalty at low altitude due to the availability of ample altitude to recover. Appropriate
choice of weighting parameters may also be learned from accident flight data. The reward
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functions used in this work are discontinuous. 2
In this work, the following reward terms are proposed: R1 penalizes excursion outside
the valid airspeed envelope defined by stall speed Vmin and never-exceed speed Vmax above
which structural over-stressing can occur.
R1 =
−1 i f (V ≤ Vmin) ∨ (V ≥ Vmax)0 otherwise (5.8)
R2 imposes a penalty on out-of-envelope bank attitude, where φmin,φmax indicate accept-
able bank limits.
R2 =
−1 i f (φ ≤ φmin) ∨ (φ ≥ φmax)0 otherwise (5.9)
R3 penalizes altitude constraint violations. Factors such as filed flight plan, terrain, flight
ceiling, engine failure, and cabin de-pressurization impose altitude constraints.
R3 =
−1 i f (h ≤ hmin) ∨ (h ≥ hmax)0 otherwise (5.10)
R4 penalizes deviations from the prescribed flight plan:
R4 =
−1 i f ||X−X0|| > 0 otherwise (5.11)
Here ||X − X0|| represent position deviation from the nominal flight plan.  represents the
acceptable deviation from the nominal flight plan. X = [x,y,h] is the position of the aircraft.
To ensure override actions are not issued by FSAM unnecessarily,R5 imposes a penalty
on choosing an override action. R6 prevents repeated switching between control authorities
by imposing a penalty for an override that is inversely proportional to the duration since
2For continuous valued variables, rewards may become continuous barrier functions that prevent con-
straint violations.
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Table 5.1: Computation times with a fixed decision epoch
∆t H C = 40 C = 64 C = 80
5 (5s) 0.041s 0.176s 0.4242s
0.1 10 (10s) 0.623s 5.950s 21.636s
15 (15s) > 25s > 25s > 25s
5 (5s) 0.007s 0.033s 0.129s
0.5 10 (10s) 0.113s 1.130s 3.690s
15 (15s) 3.460s > 25s > 25s
the last override. R7 penalizes the total number of overrides.
R5 =
−1 i f (M¯ = P)∧ (a 6= NOOP)0 otherwise (5.12)
R6 =
−
1
T i f (T¯ > 0)∧ (a = TOGL)
0 otherwise
(5.13)
R7 = −N¯TOGL (5.14)
In this work, the Sparse-Sample MDP formulation is only described with respect to the
aircraft dynamics state feature. A formulation taking into account other features such as
aircraft health, pilot characteristics and environmental features are provided in [99].
We now illustrate the application of the sparse-sampling algorithm to make override de-
cisions on simple loss of control scenarios. For this illustration, 1000,1000,1000,10,5,0.8,1
were chosen as weights for the reward functions R1, . . . ,R7 respectively. A discount factor
γ of 0.7 was chosen. The numerical values for the weights and discount factor were chosen
after several trials with different values in search of the desired policy3. The parameters
required to construct the sparse look-ahead tree are branching factor C, look-ahead horizon
H and time-step (decision epoch) ∆T . Branching factor varies as a function of tree depth m
as Cm = γ2mC to reduce computation time while maintaining a good approximation of the
optimal solution [69]. Parameter values and their effects on computation time are shown in
Tables 5.1 and 5.2.
Consider a scenario where the aircraft is prohibited from flying below 2400m (i.e.
hmin = 2400m) due to terrain hazards. Suppose the pilot pushes the elevator down to ini-
tiate a dive with altitude loss. The red plot in Fig 5.2 indicates the aircraft’s response
3A desirable policy in this case prevents the aircraft from entering unsafe regions of the flight envelope
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Table 5.2: Computation times with variable decision epoch
∆t H C = 40 C = 64 C = 80
5 (15s) 0.119s 0.693s 2.455s
0.1 10 (55s) 7.239s > 25s > 25s
5 (15s) 0.018s 0.130s 0.388s
0.5 10 (55s) 1.272s 12.672s > 25s
without FSAM intervention and the blue plot indicates the response with FSAM interven-
tion. FSAM remains passive until the airplane is near the envelope boundary then overrides
the pilot to prevent attitude constraint violation. Control is restored to the pilot after the
envelope-aware controller recovers and climbs to 2500m. Note that hmin and the other pa-
rameters in R may vary depending on the flight phase, surrounding terrain, environmental
conditions and airplane performance. Thus, appropriate policies can be constructed for
different flight conditions. For example, in a landing phase MDP policy, hmin would be
defined based on the surrounding terrain and FSAM would typically not override the pilot
unless collision with surrounding terrain was imminent.
Policy behavior can be changed by tuning Eqn (5.7) weights. For example, varying
the weight on R6 controls the duration the envelope-aware controller stays active after
overriding the pilot. Similarly, the weight on R7 controls the number of overrides issued.
Thus, if the pilot behaves inappropriately by repeating the above nose-down pitch inputs
continuously, control will be eventually transferred to the envelope-aware controller and
not returned to the pilot.
Fig 5.3 illustrates a scenario where the policy prevents aerodynamic stall. FSAM over-
rides for this case when the airspeed approaches the stall speed. The envelope-aware con-
troller then increases the airspeed to prevent the stall. The optimal policy was computed on
a desktop with a 3.6 GHz, 8 core-Intel Xeon processor and 8 GB RAM. Each search tree
branch is independent so the expansion of the branches can be parallelized to reduce the
computation time (see root parallelization in [100]). In this work, the computations were
distributed across 8 cores. Table 5.1 lists the time taken to compute the sparse look-ahead
solution for different tree parameters and model complexities. ∆t denotes the discretiza-
tion time used to forward propagate the aircraft dynamics in Eqn (5.6). Thus, the decision
epoch ∆T must be an integer multiple of discretization time-step ∆t (i.e. ∆T = n∆t). Con-
sequently, the generative model needs to be forward propagated n times to reach the next
decision epoch. Table 5.1 shows results for a fixed decision epoch ∆T = 1s. As expected,
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Figure 5.2: Altitude recovery
computation time decreases as the complexity of the generative model decreases. With
a fixed decision epoch, real-time execution requires that only a short horizon be used for
the finite-look ahead search. This is sufficient to avoid LOC events with fast dynamics.
To address events such as controlled flight into terrain, a longer horizon may be preferable.
Table 5.2 illustrates results obtained using a variable decision epoch. Here ∆T =m where m
denotes the current depth in the tree. Note that with a variable decision epoch, it is possible
to increase horizon without substantial computation penalty.
5.4 Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter contributes an online decision-theoretic framework for a Flight Safety As-
sessment and Management system. A comprehensive, integrated state feature set enables
FSAM to base its decisions on system-wide information describing the aircraft (vehicle),
people, and environment. The presented list can be expanded in future work. The applied
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Figure 5.3: Stall recovery
sparse sampling algorithm develops near-optimal solutions efficiently by eliminating the
need to explicitly enumerate the state space. Though run time doesn’t depend on state-
space size, it does depend on horizon length and look-ahead tree branching factor.
The use of a linearized aircraft model to generate state distributions reduces computa-
tion times significantly in comparison to a detailed non-linear aircraft model with aerody-
namic look-up tables. The online sparse sampling algorithm supports interleaved planning
and execution which facilitates online model updates. System identification techniques can
be used to update models based on real-time flight data. Observations of pilot behavior can
be used to update the human transfer function model and predict pilot intentions.
The MDP formulation can be simplified via state and reward formulations specific to
phase of flight (takeoff, climb, cruise, descent, landing). State feature time scale separation
or sequencing can also be exploited to further decompose the MDP into several simpler
MDPs. Control authority switching might be specified with finite state machines but man-
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ually generating state machines as specified in Chapter 2, but online tuning would then not
be possible.
This work illustrated a case study focused on aircraft dynamics and controls while as-
suming remaining state features are constant. Models describing the transitions (dynamics)
of the remaining features must be developed in future work. Recognizing scenarios where
the underlying assumptions of a given MDP formulation fail is also essential to ensure
FSAM policies don’t pose new risk in perceived LOC scenarios. Future research directions
will formally analyze such scenarios and develop strategies to ensure that the actions of
FSAM will not jeopardize nominal aircraft operations.
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CHAPTER 6
Verification Guided Refinement of FSAM
6.1 Introduction
The previous chapters describe methods to construct a control mode switching strategy
for FSAM. However, for a safety critical Flight Management System augmentation such as
FSAM, it is crucial to ensure that the control mode switching strategy prevents or minimizes
the risk associated with LOC. It is also important to ensure that FSAM does not interfere
unnecessarily with nominal flight crew operations. This chapter investigates the formal
verification of FSAM.
Verification and Validation (V&V) are essential steps in the traditional V-model [101]
for systems engineering as illustrated in Fig 6.1. The system is designed, built and then
tested comprehensively to ensure that all specified system requirements are satisfied. Val-
idation asks the question “Are we building the right system?” and verification asks the
question “Are we building the system correctly per the specifications?”. This conventional
approach (Fig 6.1) can be labor-intensive and costly but has been shown an effective means
to organize system development.
Formal methods such as model checking [44] and deductive techniques [102] efficiently
augment traditional V&V [101]. Formal methods help establish the correctness of a sys-
tem design with respect to specified requirements prior to building and testing the sys-
tem. Model checking identifies violations of the specified requirement set by exhaustively
searching the state space of an abstract representation (model) of the system. Deductive
techniques such as theorem proving use mathematical arguments to prove or disprove the
correctness of the design with respect to system requirements.
Formal verification tools are gaining traction in the aerospace industry. For example,
Airbus used a model checking approach to validate the ground spoiler functionality on
the A380 aircraft [103]. Rockwell Collins used a theorem proving approach to verify the
functionality of a flight guidance system [104, 105]. Joshi et al [106] proposed a model-
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based safety analysis which extends model checking with fault trees used to analyze safety-
critical components. The idea of a sandbox controller was introduced by Bak et al [18]
where a nominal system is augmented with a safety controller and a decision module to
prevent the system from entering an unsafe state. Lygeros et al [107] used an automaton-
based method to verify their Traffic Collision Avoidance System (TCAS) conflict resolution
algorithm.
The above references focus only on the verification of the system and do not consider
the influence of the operator. A human factors approach to model checking was adopted
by Degani et al [108]. In [108] interactions between a human operator and a machine
are formally analyzed to guide the design of the interfaces between human and machine
and to develop better training manuals. Bolton et al [109] presented an approach to verify
human automation interaction using task analytical models. In [109], a task analytic model
capturing the human operator’s behavior is combined with a model of the system under
consideration and is verified using a model checking tool.
To verify safety properties of dynamical systems, several researchers have focused on
estimating the reachable states of the system and ensuring this reachable set does not con-
tain the unsafe states [110–114]. The use of backward reachable sets to verify safety of
dynamical systems has been considered by Tomlin et al. [42, 50, 115]. Prajna et al [116]
and Tobenkin et al [117] explored the use of barrier certificates that guarantee that trajecto-
ries of the dynamical system do not leave a safe set of states. The above methods typically
make assumptions on the nature of the dynamical system and are only applicable only to
systems of low dimensions. The use of probabilistic model checking techniques [118–120]
have been widely applied to verify safety properties for systems whose models are not
available analytically but are available in the form of a black box.
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This chapter contributes (i) a general approach to verify a switched control system
whose switching policy is realized by a deterministic finite state Moore machine [30] and
(ii) a model checking framework to guide the refinement and verification of FSAM system
against safety requirements specified in the Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR). Specif-
ically, a suitable representation of the underlying state space for takeoff FSAM is first
established. Next, a discrete transition system that encodes an over-approximation of the
reachable states under the available control authorities is constructed. Finally, a composi-
tion of the discrete transition system and the finite state machine specifying the switching
protocol is constructed. The composed transition system is then used to verify requirements
are always satisfied with SPIN [121], a popular model checking tool. In this chapter, sim-
plified models that can adequately capture the takeoff dynamics for verification are used.
Safety requirements for takeoff extracted from FAR Part 25 are expressed in Linear
Temporal Logic [122] to facilitate model checking. Counterexamples obtained from the
model checking process identify necessary refinements of the underlying FSAM switching
protocol.
Section 6.2 provides background on the tools necessary to perform model checking,
Section 6.3 presents the FSAM formulation for takeoff, develops a simplified dynamics
model for takeoff that facilitates verification, defines safety requirements to satisfy during
takeoff and outlines the proposed approach to model check the FSAM switching policy.
Section 6.4 describes the proposed approach for model checking and the results of veri-
fication. Section 6.5 discusses refinements to FSAM based on the results of verification,
while Section 6.6 considers validation of FSAM. Section 6.7 provides a discussion of our
verification approach while Section 6.8 presents conclusions and future extensions.
6.2 Background
Model checking is the process of ensuring that a system satisfies a set of requirements. This
section introduces the specification formalisms used in this paper to enable FSAM model
checking. The safety requirements for takeoff are expressed in Linear Temporal Logic.
Formal definitions are provided below.
6.2.1 Linear Temporal Logic
Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) is a formal specification language [44, 123] that can be used
to describe a rich class of system properties. LTL is built upon a finite set of atomic proposi-
tions Π plus logical operators ¬ (negation), ∨ (disjunction), and temporal/modal operators
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© (next), and U (until). Properties such as safety, reachability, invariance and combinations
of these can be expressed using LTL. The set of LTL formulas over a finite set of atomic
propositions Π can be inductively defined as follows: Any atomic proposition pi ∈ Π is an
LTL formula. (2) If ϕ¯ and ψ¯ are LTL formulas, then ¬ϕ¯, ©ϕ¯, ϕ¯∨ ψ¯ and ϕ¯ U ψ¯ are also
LTL formulas. Additional operators such as ∧ (conjunction), ⇒(implication), ♦ (eventu-
ally) and  (always) can also be defined. See [123, 124] for detailed discussions on LTL
syntax and semantics. This work focuses on verification of properties expressed using the
 (always) operator. A sequence of truth assignments to the atomic propositions pi ∈ Π
satisfy ϕ if ϕ is true in every position of the sequence. In this work, LTL formulas are in-
terpreted over time sampled trajectories of dynamical systems, i.e., discrete-time semantics
of LTL [125].
6.3 Problem Formulation
This section formulates the model checking problem for the FSAM Deterministic Moore
Machines (DMM) introduced in Chapter 2. An approximate dynamic model for the takeoff
phase is specified. Then, the safety requirements for the takeoff phase extracted from FAR
Part 25 are discussed. Using these three components, the model checking problem for
FSAM is formally defined and the solution strategy used in this work is outlined.
6.3.1 Longitudinal Dynamics for Takeoff
To illustrate verification of the longitudinal FSAM Deterministic Moore Machines (DMM)
(see Fig 6.2), the following simplifying assumptions are made:
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• The lateral dynamics is well behaved, i.e., there are no lateral disturbances so the
aircraft can maintain runway heading while staying on runway centerline throughout
takeoff.
• The engines, control surfaces, instruments and all subsystems function nominally.
• There is no runway incursion risk.
• The only pilot behaviors impacting FSAM decisions are related to modeled configu-
ration settings and control inputs.
• Envelope-aware control and guidance algorithms are capable of maintaining or re-
covering a safe state in any DMM where the envelope-aware controller is active.
Verification of a system like FSAM requires the consideration of human pilot behavior.
Several authors have developed models to describe human pilot behavior under different
scenarios [108,109,126]. The above assumptions support the usage of simple pilot behavior
models (human operator transfer functions [74]) in verifying the FSAM DMM.
The full nonlinear equations describing the dynamics of the aircraft during takeoff are
provided in Appendix A. The above assumptions allow this work to ignore lateral or di-
rectional dynamics. Furthermore, takeoff is decomposed into two segments: ground roll
and climb. In the ground roll segment, the aircraft accelerates down the runway while the
pitch attitude stays near constant until achieving rotation airspeed VR. At or above VR, the
pilot applies control inputs to pitch the nose of the aircraft up. When lift-off speed Vlo f is
reached, the aircraft climbs (note Vlo f > VR). Thus, the longitudinal dynamics for takeoff
can be split into segments V < Vlo f and V ≥ Vlo f :
x˙ =
v v < Vlo fvcos(γ0) v ≥ Vlo f
v˙ =
A1−B1v
2 v < Vlo f
A2−B2v2 v ≥ Vlo f
h˙ =
0 v < Vlo fvsin(γ0) v ≥ Vlo f (6.1)
q˙ =
A3q+B3ue v < VRA4q+B4ue v ≥ VR
θ˙ = q
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where x is the longitudinal position of the aircraft on the runway, v is airspeed, θ is pitch, q
is angular rate, h is altitude and γ is flight path angle. Terms A1,B1,A2.B2 are defined using
a formulation from [41]:
A1 = g
( T
W
−µ)
B1 =
g
W
(1
2
ρS re f (CDg −µCLg)
)
A2 = g
( T
W
cos(α0)− sin(γ0))
B2 =
g
W
(
1
2
ρS re fCDg)
Here T represents the takeoff thrust, W is aircraft takeoff weight, ρ is atmospheric density,
µ is wheel rolling friction coefficient, and γ0 is flight path angle after lift off. S re f is the
planform area, and CLg and CDg are the coefficients of lift and drag, respectively, including
aerodynamic ground effect and the impact of nominal takeoff flap/slat settings. Pitch dy-
namics are approximated as a piece-wise linear system defined by the pair (A3,B3) when
v < VR and (A4,B4) when v ≥ VR.
For convenience, Eqn 6.1 is represented compactly as X˙ = f (X,U). Here X ∈ X ⊆ R5
represents the state vector [x,v,h, θ,q]T , where X is a compact hyper-rectangle. U ∈Ω ⊆R
represents the elevator control input ue. {P,EA} are the available control authorities.
When off-nominal conditions are encountered during takeoff, FSAM transfers control
to the Envelope Aware (EA) safety controller that attempts LOC prevention or recovery.
The pilot and controller models used in this work are described in Appendix B.
6.3.2 Safety Requirements for the Takeoff Phase
The goal of the takeoff FSAM system is to prevent LOC during takeoff. Thus, the primary
requirement for FSAM is to ensure that the system never enters an unsafe state. A dis-
cussion of safe and unsafe states during takeoff can be found in [85]. For the purpose of
illustration, in this work the primary focus is on verifying safety requirements or proper-
ties specified in Part 25 [127] of the FARs (Airworthiness Standards: Transport Category
Aircraft). This paper verifies that the longitudinal FSAM DMM (Fig 6.2) meets the require-
ments listed in Table 6.1. Table 6.1 also provides the LTL expression for each requirement.
In Table 6.1, θng is the pitch attitude at which the nose gear first leaves the ground, θ0 is
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Table 6.1: Requirements and their LTL specifications
# Requirement LTL specification
1 During acceleration to speed
V2, the nose gear may be
raised off the ground at a
speed not less than VR. [FAR
25.111.(b)]
((θ ≥ θng)→ (V ≥ VR))
2 The pitch attitude of the
airplane must not exceed an
attitude that leads to the
minimum tail clearance
during rotation. [FAR
25.107.(e).4]
((h ≤ hlo f )→ (θ < θtail))
3 The slope of the airborne part
of the takeoff path must be
positive at each point. [FAR
25.111.(c).1]
((h > hlo f )→ (θ > θ0))
4 The airplane must reach V2
before it is 35 feet above the
takeoff surface. [FAR
25.111.(c).2]
((h ≥ hobs)→ (V ≥ V2))
the pitch attitude that provides a non-negative flight path angle 1. θtail is the pitch attitude
at which the tail contacts the ground prior to liftoff (i.e., when h ≤ hlo f ), and hobs is the
nominal obstacle clearance height, typically 35 ft for commercial aircraft [127].
6.3.3 Verification problem specification and approach
Let f (.) denote the dynamics of takeoff and let Reach( f , I)A denote the set of states reach-
able from the set of initial conditions I as governed by the switching strategy imposed by
the FSAM DMM A. Let U¯ denote the set of unsafe states identified by the requirements
(e.g., Table 6.1). The safety verification problem then reduces to checking the validity of
the following expression [113]:
Reach( f , I)A∩ U¯ = φ (6.2)
Computation of the reachable set Reach( f , I)A can be challenging especially if the
underlying dynamics f is nonlinear [114]. Several authors have developed different ap-
1Note that during takeoff, angle of attack α is positive and hence, a positive pitch attitude corresponds to
a positive flight path angle.
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proaches to compute reachable sets. The successes of these approaches are typically de-
termined by the representations used to approximate the reachable sets. In this work, a
discrete over-approximation [113, 128] of the dynamics in the form of a finite transition
system is developed with the following steps: (i) Define a set of atomic propositions over
the state-space of the dynamics. These atomic propositions are used to express the require-
ments and also constitute inputs received by the FSAM DMM. (ii) Abstract the dynamics as
a finite transition system that takes into account the behavior of the pilot and the EA con-
troller, (iii) Compose the abstraction with FSAM to obtain an over-approximation of the
closed loop behavior. To verify Eqn 6.2, an automaton-theoretic approach is used wherein
the over-approximation of the closed loop behavior and system requirements (constraints)
(Φ) are used as inputs to a model checker. The model checker searches for any violation of
requirements Φ in the state-space of the given model. If violations are detected, the model
checker returns a counterexample (a sequence of states in the given model) that illustrates
how a requirement is violated. In this work, an existing model checker, SPIN [121], is
used. The three steps of this model checking process are discussed in detail below.
6.4 Verification of Takeoff FSAM
6.4.1 State Space Abstraction
The first step to verification requires defining a set of atomic propositions for model check-
ing. These propositions above capture thresholds essential to verify requirements. The
requirements defined above are only related to airspeed (V), pitch (θ) and altitude (h),
yielding propositions, ΠV ,Πθ,ΠH . Here ΠV = {piv1, ...,piv8} is the set of propositions that
defines a discrete set of airspeed values, Πθ = {piθ1, ...,piθ5} defines a discrete set of pitch
values, and ΠH = {piH1, ...piH4} defines a discrete set of altitude values. The propositions
(shown in Table 6.2) are chosen such that they partition the state space with sufficient res-
olution to capture safe versus unsafe states “relevant to” the requirements. The airspeed
is partitioned with respect to the various V-speed constraints. The pitch and altitude states
are partitioned to capture unsafe states such as tail strikes and premature rotations2. For
example, a tail strike (a state where the tail of the aircraft strikes the runway) is identified
by the propositions indicated in Fig 6.3.
Next, an observation map H :X → 2Π maps each state X ∈X to atomic propositions in
2Π. For example, let X∗ = [x,v∗,h∗, θ∗,q] where 0≤ v∗ < Vmcg, θ1 ≤ θ∗ < θ2 and h1 ≤ h∗ < h2.
2Though this work uses a 8×5×3 partition, any proposition-preserving partition with sufficient resolution
could be used.
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Table 6.2: Atomic propositions
ΠV Πθ ΠH
piv1 := 0 ≤ v < Vmcg piθ1 := θ1 ≤ θ < θ2 piH1 := h1 ≤ h < h2
piv2 := Vmcg ≤ v < V1 piθ2 := θ2 ≤ θ < θ3 piH2 := h2 ≤ h < h3
piv3 := V1 ≤ v < Vrmin piθ3 := θ3 ≤ θ < θ4 piH3 := h3 ≤ h < h4
piv4 := Vrmin ≤ v < VR piθ4 := θ4 ≤ θ < θ5
piv5 := VR ≤ v < Vrmax piθ5 := θ5 ≤ θ < θ6
piv6 := Vrnax ≤ v < Vlo f
piv7 := Vlo f ≤ v < V2
piv8 := V2 ≤ v < V f p
}Tailstrike
:5 
:6 
h1
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Figure 6.3: Partitions that enable identification of a tail strike
In this case, H(X∗) = {piv1,piθ1,pih1}. Note that each state X ∈ X belongs to a polytope (a
hyper-rectangle) formed by the set {H−1(pivi)×H−1(piθ j)×H−1(pihk)}. Thus, the set of states
in X mapped to the same set of atomic propositions by H leads to a partition of the state
space X . A discrete state from a finite set Q := {q¯1, . . . , q¯n} is associated with each element
of this partition. As a result, the observation map induces the abstraction T¯ : X → Q that
maps each state X ∈ X into the finite set Q. The map T¯ is proposition-preserving if and
only if
T¯ (X1) = T¯ (X2)⇒H(X1) =H(X2), ∀X1,X2 ∈ X , (6.3)
Eqn 6.3 indicates that any two states belonging to the same cell satisfy the same set of
atomic propositions. Let F(T¯−1(q¯)) denote the set of X ∈ X that belong to the facets 3 of
the polytope T¯−1(q¯). In this chapter, an element q¯ ∈ Q is referred to as a cell instead of
explicitly denoting a cell as T¯−1(q¯) and ◦qi ∈ F(q¯) is referred to as the ith facet of cell q¯.
The atomic propositions in Table 6.2 are chosen such that a switch to a different control
authority dictated by FSAM always occurs at a facet of cell q¯ ∈Q. Furthermore, a transition
3A facet of a polytope of n dimensions is a face that has (n−1) dimensions.
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to an unsafe cell must pass through the facet of the unsafe cell. Hence, for the verification
of FSAM according to Eqn 6.2, it is sufficient to assure that all reachable facets from a
given initial facet do not contain any facets of unsafe cells. Thus, the goal is to find all
possible transitions between facets of all cells in Q.
6.4.2 A Discrete Representation of Reachable States
In principle, given a proposition-preserving partition and the dynamics, it is possible to
use the methods in [50, 51, 110, 111, 115, 123] to compute a discrete abstraction of the
reachable states based on system dynamics. However, it is possible to simplify construction
of the discrete abstraction by exploiting structural properties of the underlying dynamics
and requirements. For instance, the states v(t) and h(t) described by the dynamics in Eqn
6.1 are monotonically increasing functions of time in the region of interest. Furthermore,
pitch response is governed by a linear system. These dynamics do not contain invariant sets
in X . The requirements discussed in Section 6.3.2 are only invariance requirements [44].
These properties simplify construction of a discrete abstraction of the reachable states.
The method used to construct the discrete abstraction is shown in Algorithm 6.1. In-
puts include discrete state space partition Q, the takeoff dynamics model f and the two
controller formulations (P,EA) described in Appendix B. The algorithm returns a discrete
transition system B := (Q,Q0,P ,ΓB,Π,L) whose states Q represent facets of the cells in
the partition. Actions P ={P,EA} denote the two control authorities and ΓB describes the
transitions between facets under the two control authorities. The function isReach(
◦
q,k,
◦
q
′
)
returns true if for k ∈ {P,EA}, there exists t0, t1, X(t0) ∈ ◦q, X(t1) ∈ ◦q
′
such that X(t) ∈ q¯
for all t ∈ [t0, t1] where q¯ is the cell containing the two facets ◦q and ◦q
′
. The function
isReach(
◦
q,k,
◦
q
′
) can in general be evaluated using methods described in [110–112, 129]. A
description of the isReach(
◦
q,k,
◦
q
′
) function used in this work and specific numerical values
describing the state space partition can be found in Table E.1.
Each state
◦
q ∈ Q in B contains transitions induced by the pilot (P) and the envelope-
aware safety controller (EA). However, the goal of this paper is to verify transitions at each
state that are governed by FSAM. Therefore, those transitions in B that are induced by the
control authority dictated by the FSAM DMM at each discrete state
◦
q ∈Q are extracted by
constructing the composition (product) of the transition system B and FSAM DMM A.
6.4.3 Composite Transition System
The composition of the discrete transition system B := (Q,Q0,P ,ΓB,Π,L) and the FSAM
DMMA := (S,S0,Σ,Λ,T ,G) yields a new transition system C := (D,D0,P ,ΓC ,Π,L) where
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Algorithm 6.1 Algorithm to construct the discrete transition system
Inputs: state space partitions Q, dynamics f , control inputs ue(t)|P and ue(t)|EA
1. Initialize transition system B = (Q,Q0,P ,ΓB,Π,L) where
Q = {◦q | ◦q ∈ F(q),∀q ∈ Q}, Q0 ⊂Q, P ={P,EA}, Π = {ΠV ,ΠH ,ΠΘ} , ΓB = {}, L =H
2. for k in {P,EA}
3. for q¯ in Q
4. for ◦qi in F(q¯)
5. for ◦q j in F(q¯)
6. if (isReach( ◦qi,k
◦
,q j))
7. //Add transition to discrete system B if valid transition exists.
8. ΓB = ΓB ∪{( ◦qi,k, ◦q j)}
9. for q¯i in Q
10. for q¯ j in Q
11. for ◦qm in F(qi)
12. for ◦qn in F(q j)
13. if (◦qm ≡ ◦qn )
14. // Add transitions between facets that are common to adjacent cells
15. ΓB = ΓB ∪{( ◦qm,k, ◦qn)} ∀k ∈ P
16. Return B
D =Q×S , D0 =Q0×S0. Let di,d j ∈D where di = (◦q, s), d j = (◦q
′
, s′). Then, (di, p,d j) ∈ ΓC
if and only if (
◦
q, p,
◦
q
′
) ∈ ΓB and (s,σ, s′) ∈ T , where p = G(s) and σ = L(◦q
′
). In other
words, the composite transition system denotes the parallel evolution of the states in the
transition system B and FSAM DMM A. Note that in the composite transition system C,
the inputs p to discrete states
◦
q are the outputs of DMM state s. This ensures the composite
transition system C contains only those transitions in B that are governed by the control
authority selected by FSAM. This composite transition system is used for model checking
process it depicts the behavior of the aircraft during takeoff as governed by FSAM. The
goal in verification is to ensure that model C satisfies the requirements imposed on takeoff
in Section 6.3(6.3.2). Fig 6.4 illustrates this composition process.
Proposition: If the composed transition system C does not violate the specifications,
then the simplified dynamic model governed by the FSAM switching control law does not
violate the specification.
Proof: By construction, the composed transition system C contains all behaviors of the
simplified dynamics under FSAM’s switching control law. Therefore, the reachable set of
the composed system C contains the reachable set of the simplified dynamics under the
switching control law governed by FSAM.
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Figure 6.4: Composition of a transition system with a DMM
6.4.4 Model Checking
The requirements (Φ) for model checking expressed in LTL with the propositions defined
in the previous section are as follows:
Φ1 := 
(
(θ ≥ θng)→ (V ≥ VR)) =((piθ4∨piθ5)→ (piv4∨piv5∨piv6))
Φ2 := 
(
(h < hlo f )→ (θ < θtail)) =((piH1∨piH2)→ (piθ1∨piθ2∨piθ3∨piθ4)) (6.4)
Φ3 := 
(
(h ≥ hlo f )→ (θ ≥ θ0)) =(¬(piH1∨piH2)→¬piθ1)
Φ4 := 
(
(h ≥ hobs)→ (V ≥ V2)) =((piH4)→ piv6)
The composed transition system C and requirements Φ are input into the SPIN model
checker. Fig 6.5 illustrates an overview of model checking. If the model satisfies all re-
quirements, the verification is considered complete. If violations exist, analysis of each
counter example is essential to understand why requirements are violated, as well as what
changes to the logic or control laws are needed to prevent such violations. Analysis can
also distinguish counter examples that could be false positives. Most often, false positives
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Figure 6.5: Model checking process
are artifacts of the abstraction technique itself so it is possible to use these counter examples
to refine the abstractions in a manner that eliminates false positives [130].
Using the above model checking approach, requirements Φ1 and Φ2 were violated with
the baseline DMM shown in Fig 6.2. In other words, the underlying FSAM logic could not
prevent premature rotations and tail strikes.
6.5 Refinement of FSAM
As discussed above the model checker revealed that requirements Φ1 and Φ2 were violated
in C. Three causes were identified: (i) Specific pilot behaviors could result in the violation,
(ii) The EA controller could be poorly designed and/or inadequate to deal with the off-
nominal conditions (iii) The switching logic (FSAM DMM) might be incorrect/incomplete.
According to the system dynamics in (6.1), Φ1 could be violated if the pilot rotates the nose
of the aircraft in the Vmcg ≤ V < V1 airspeed range. This is due to the fact that protection
against premature rotation while in the Vmcg ≤ V < V1 airspeed range was not available in
A. Φ2 could be violated if the pilot chose to delay the rotation until after achieving Vlo f
speed was reached due to an omission of tail strike protection in A outside the airspeed
range VR ≤ V < Vlo f . After analyzing the above counterexamples, appropriate changes
to FSAM’s DMM A were made. These changes are highlighted in Fig 6.6 and were also
carried into our archival FSAM [85] DMM specification. The updated DMM protects from
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Figure 6.6: Revised FSAM DMM
tail strikes via new transitions indicated by the dashed lines. Transition (s3→ s9) prevents
a premature rotation initiated before V1 and the transition (s10→ s11) prevents a tail strike
by activating the tail strike protection EA controller if the aircraft is still on the ground
after the Vlo f airspeed. Model checking was repeated with the updated DMM, verifying
that both requirements Φ1 and Φ2 were now satisfied.
A Monte Carlo analysis was performed using the full nonlinear equations of motion
describing takeoff dynamics. Details of the Monte-Carlo simulations can be found in Ap-
pendix B.2. Fig 6.7 illustrates the aircraft responses after several Monte Carlo trials with
the original uncorrected FSAM DMM. Fig 6.7 shows many instances of tail strikes (i.e.,
θ ≥ θtail & h < hlo f ) even though the original DMM was formulated to prevent such scenar-
ios. The Monte Carlo trials with the corrected DMM exhibited no high-risk rotation or tail
strike events (Fig 6.8).
6.6 Validation
The Monte Carlo simulations discussed in the previous section confirm that the refinements
made in response to the counter examples obtained from model checking prevent the oc-
currence of tail-strikes. The model checking approach formally guarantees that the FSAM
logic is correct with respect to the specified requirements, takeoff dynamics, pilot and EA
controller models. However, verification of FSAM with respect to FAR requirements may
be insufficient to ensure safety across the spectrum of real world mission. This leads to
additional questions: are the right requirements being enforced, and is the takeoff logic
complete with respect to LOC prevention? These questions are addressed with a scenario
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Figure 6.7: Monte Carlo simulations of the takeoff phase with original FSAM DMM
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Figure 6.8: Monte Carlo simulations of the takeoff phase with revised FSAM DMM
aimed to provoke careful thought about generalized requirements.
Consider a scenario in which a general aviation (GA) aircraft executes a soft field take-
off, e.g from a grass strip after a recent rain 4. The goal of a soft-field takeoff is to minimize
the load on the nose gear and become airborne as soon as possible. Soft-field takeoff oper-
ating procedures require maintaining a nose up attitude during the initial ground roll. This
enables the airplane to become airborne prematurely. The airplane then accelerates while
in ground effect until the required climb speed is achieved. In this scenario, requirement
Φ1 may not help the pilot establish a safe takeoff, particularly if FSAM and the EA con-
troller were not analyzed with consideration of the soft field takeoff. The transition s3→ s9
according to the revised DMM in Fig 6.6 would then potentially prevent the pilot from
maintaining acceptable nose wheel loading. This may result in the nose gear digging into
4GA is covered in a separate FAR section, but tail strike is still an issue
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the soft-field, increasing the rolling friction and potentially leading to runway excursion
or even tipover in an extreme case. With a short as well as soft field, failing to efficiently
become airborne may also lead to poor climb performance or runway excursion.
The FSAM DMM has been revised (see Fig 6.6) to ensure satisfaction of the FAR re-
quirement Φ1, but it may not be valid with respect to a GA aircraft performing a soft field
takeoff. Typically, a conflict identified during validation can be addressed by modifying
the initial requirements to accommodate the conflicting operational needs or, if possible,
by modifying the design of a system to address the conflict. Thus, it is essential to modify
the requirement Φ1 according to runway type and also modify the design of A by adding
states and transitions that account for soft field takeoffs. An FSAM DMM for a soft field
takeoff would allow early rotation while preventing a tail-strike. It would also prevent ex-
cessive nose down control inputs to minimize load on the nose wheel. It is worth noting that
FAR requirement Φ1 is not complete with respect to different takeoff strategies such as the
cited soft field takeoff example. This example illustrates the importance of applying each
requirement in exactly those contexts where it is actually required. As this example illus-
trates, the FSAM verification process must always take into account pertinent operational
requirements in addition to baseline FARs.
6.7 Discussion
This chapter proposed a model checking framework to verify and (manually) refine, when
necessary, the design of an FSAM system against safety requirements. Pilot behavior was
encoded using an uncertain transfer function model and an envelope-aware controller was
used for the autopilot mode. Simplified equations for takeoff dynamics were used to con-
struct an over-approximation on which model checking was performed. The simplified
dynamics presented in this work adequately captures events such as premature rotation, tail
strikes and runway overruns. Also, this model leverages the underlying structural proper-
ties such as monotonicity and linearity required to construct the discrete transition system.
The process of constructing the discrete transition system that describes the reachable
facets for each controller (P and EA) separately and then merging them according to the
switching strategy imposed by FSAM promotes understanding of how each controller af-
fects the nominal system. This enables a comprehensive analysis of counter examples
obtained from the model checker which in turn facilitates identifying necessary changes
to underlying DMM logic. It also leads to incremental changes in the design. Note that
other anomalous or exceptional conditions (wind, loading, performance, system failure
etc.) must also be considered in the requirements and DMM for a comprehensive takeoff
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DMM capability. Achieving truly complete knowledge of behaviors remains a challenge
for system designers as well as both automation and human crews.
In this work, the discrete states in the transition systems abstractly represented facets
of the cells in the state space partition. Algorithm 6.1 explicitly enumerates all cells in
the state-space partition and checks for transitions between facets of a given cell. This can
become tedious especially if there are a large number of cells in the state space partition.
However, it is possible to only check the transitions between facets of cells that are reach-
able from a given initial cell. It is also possible to consider an abstraction which directly
represents the cells instead of the cell facets. In this case, it is sufficient to check the transi-
tions between cells instead of facets. This in turn would speed up construction of discrete
transition system B. However, this type of abstract representation yielded many counter
examples during model checking, due to nondeterminism induced in the abstract model,
that were determined to be false positives.
It is also possible to automate the FSAM logic refinement process using tools such
as CEGAR (see [130] and references therein). However, automating refinement risks a
final DMM result that is not physically-intuitive or readable. For a manually-constructed
DMM, the DMM design team needs to also verify that modifications are consistent with
user interface needs.
The full aircraft takeoff dynamics model described in [45, 85] is a higher order non-
linear model that combines a traditional aircraft dynamics model with the landing gear (oleo
strut and wheel) dynamics and facilitates modeling the aircraft’s response to differential
braking inputs and nose wheel steering inputs during takeoff. In principle, it is possible
to consider more complex non-linear dynamics within the proposed framework and use
methods described in [50, 110–113, 129, 131] within Algorithm 6.1.
6.8 Conclusions
This work contributes a model checking framework that enables formal verification of man-
ually constructed DMM formulations and applies this method to the takeoff FSAM system.
The switched system is verified via three main steps: (i) Select an abstract representa-
tion of the underlying state space, (ii) Construct a discrete transition system which over-
approximates the reachable states under the various control authorities, (iii) Compose the
discrete transition system and the switching logic represented as a DMM. This verification
procedure is applied to an FSAM DMM for takeoff based on FAR Part 25 safety require-
ments. Simplifying assumptions enable leveraging existing algorithms to perform reacha-
bility analysis and model checking. Model checking results were also cross-validated with
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a Monte Carlo analysis using full non-linear dynamics to eliminate false positives. This
work has also illustrated that model checking can be used to guide/help a system engineer
to refine the system design in addition to proving correctness of the system.
For a comprehensive verification of FSAM, one must consider different scenarios such
as rejected takeoffs, engine failure scenarios, and crosswind conditions. In such cases, the
simplified models described in this work must be replaced by models that can adequately
capture the behaviors of interest for verification. Abstractions should also consider other
state variables such as heading, longitudinal and cross track position to capture safe versus
unsafe states. It is important to recognize that FSAM only activates when safety is verifi-
able, so unhandled cases will result in a need for appropriate crew response. Selecting the
right set of requirements plays a crucial role in validating the system. To facilitate verifica-
tion of FSAM against complex scenarios, work is underway to develop a statistical model
checking framework that makes use of Monte Carlo simulations to establish probabilistic
guarantees on requirement satisfaction. The use of formal methods reduces the need to
run extensive flight tests to study the behavior of the overall system. However, a number
of factors such as pilot interfaces and acceptance must still be considered. Although work
remains, the deterministic models presented in this work are verifiable and thus ultimately
certifiable using current regulation practices.
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CHAPTER 7
Temporal Logic Falsification via Guided
Monte-Carlo Search
7.1 Introduction
The pilot and nominal autopilot, envelope-aware controller, and FSAM can be collectively
viewed as a hybrid control system. Verifying the correctness of this hybrid system with re-
spect to formal requirements using conventional model checking approaches described in
the previous chapter can be tedious because it is hard to explicitly specify a pilot model that
captures all possible behaviors. Additionally the aircraft dynamics are generally non-linear,
aerodynamic parameters are uncertain and subject to changes due to varying environmental
conditions, and the envelope-aware controller adapts over time to changing aircraft dynam-
ics.
Another method for verifying the FSAM switching protocol is the notion of “falsifying”
system requirements. Instead of explicitly searching for traces that violate system require-
ments in a discrete abstraction as in the previous chapter, one can search for sequences of
inputs yielding trajectories that violate system requirements. Searching for possible pilot
inputs that violate system constraints is a convenient method to verify requirements given
that an explicit model of pilot behavior is hard to obtain. A straightforward way to accom-
plish this is via randomized testing, i.e. Monte Carlo simulations. The underlying system
can be considered a black box that maps input signals to output signals. The inputs can
then be chosen from a suitable distribution to yield output signals that violate system re-
quirements. Such randomized testing can address the concerns listed above but can require
a large number of trials to identify a falsifying trajectory. The key to finding falsifying
trajectories quickly and efficiently is to sample from a distribution that yields falsifying
system behaviors with high probability.
This chapter focuses on the use of a rare-event simulation technique called the cross-
entropy method [132, 133] to guide the search for pilot behaviors that can falsify specified
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requirements. The falsifying trajectories can then be analyzed to aid the refinement of the
FSAM switching protocol which is either specified by finite state machines or via an MDP
policy.
7.2 Preliminaries
7.2.1 Robustness
To falsify a given requirement, we would like to find trajectories of the system that are
close to violating the given requirements. In other words, we would like to determine the
robustness of trajectories with respect to requirement violations. In this context, robustness
is defined as follows:
Let y ∈ Y be a point and let S ⊂ Y be a set defined by system requirements. Here, the set
S could denote unsafe states that must be avoided at all times. Let d be a distance metric
on Y . Then, the signed distance from the point y to the set S is given as:
Distd(y,S) =
−inf
{
d(y,y′) | y′ ∈ S
}
if y /∈ S
inf
{
d(y,y′) | y′ ∈ Y\S
}
if y ∈ S
(7.1)
Robustness of a trajectory parameterized by an initial condition ~x0 and a parameter ~v is
defined as
R(~x0,~v) = inf
{
Distd(y,S) | y ∈ ~y : [0, t f ]→ Y
}
(7.2)
If the robustness value is zero, then the smallest perturbation of the trajectory may result in
the trajectory violating the requirement. Negative robustness values indicate requirement
violation.
7.2.2 Cross Entropy Method
This section first provides a summary of the cross entropy method for falsifying temporal
properties and then outlines the algorithm used for FSAM [132, 133]. As described pre-
viously, we would like to sample inputs from a distribution Ω that generates trajectories
minimizing robustness. A suitable representation for Ω that satisfies the above criteria is
given below:
Ω(~x0,~v) =
1
W
e−kR(~x0,~v) (7.3)
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where W normalizes the total mass of the distribution. Note that R is unknown for a given
~x0 and ~v a priori and hence it is not possible to sample from Eqn 7.3. Alternately, one
can start from a family of distributions P (parameterized by ) and find an  that yields a
distribution close to Ω.
The similarity between distributions is defined by Kullback-Liebler (KL) divergence
[133]: Let p() and q() denote two distributions over some set of support S , such that ∀x ∈ S ,
p(x) 6= 0,q(x) 6= 0. Then, the KL divergence is given by:
D(p,q) = Ep
[
log
p(x)
q(x)
]
=
∫
x∈S
log
p(x)
q(x)
p(x)dx (7.4)
whereEp denotes the expectation with respect to distribution p. Note thatD(p,q) 6=D(q, p).
In this work, we seek the  that minimizes D(Ω,P). This process is called tilting. Let w
denote the tuple (~x0,~v).
 = argmin

D(Ω,P) (7.5)
= argmin

{ ∫
log
Ω(w)
P(w)
Ω(w)dw
}
(7.6)
= argmin

{
−
∫
Ω(w) logP(w)dw
}
(7.7)
Note that the integral term in Eqn 7.7 denotes EΩ[logP]. Evaluating this term requires
knowledge of R(~x0,~v). Furthermore, empirical evaluations require samples from unknown
distribution Ω. To overcome this difficulty, EΩ[logP] can be evaluated using samples from
a known distribution using importance sampling [133]. Thus, Eqn 7.7 becomes
 = argmin

{
−
∫
Ω(w)
P∗(w)
P∗(w) logP(w)dw
}
(7.8)
= argmax

{
EP∗
[
Ω(w)
P∗(w)
logP(w)
]}
(7.9)
Here P∗ is a known distribution from which samples of (~x0,~v) can be drawn. Thus, the
expectation in Eqn 7.9 can now be evaluated empirically as follows:
 = argmax

{
1
m
m∑
i=1
γi logP(w)
}
(7.10)
where γi =
Ω(wi)
P∗(wi) is the likelihood ratio. The selection of the importance sampling dis-
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tribution P∗ and the algorithm for evaluating Eqn 7.10 is outlined below. The following
algorithm is referred to as the variance minimization algorithm [133].
• Draw N samples of (~x0,~v) from a distribution defined by the current parameter set n
(i.e. P∗ = Pn).
• For each sample propagate system dynamics according to (~x0,~v) and compute R(~x0,~v).
Note, ~x0 defines the initial condition and ~v denotes the control parameters required
to generate a trajectory. Let (~x0,~v)0, . . . , (~x0,~v)N be the samples sorted in descending
order of their Ω values.
• Choose the top m samples.
• The old distribution is ‘tilted’ to obtain a new distribution by minimizing the KL
divergence:
n+1 = argmax

{
1
m
m∑
i=1
γi logP(w)
}
(7.11)
Note that γi =
Ω(wi)
Pn (wi)
can be evaluated for each sample up to some fixed but known
positive scaling factor W.
• Repeat the above steps until a suitable convergence criteria is satisfied. This work
uses the average robustness across all simulations as the convergence criteria.
If we assume that the distribution P is Gaussian and  = (µ,σ2) denotes the mean and
variance of the distribution respectively, then the required  = (µ,σ2) in Eqn 7.11 is given
by [133]:
µˆ =
∑m
i=1γiwi∑m
i=1γi
(7.12)
σˆ2 =
∑m
i=1γi(wi− µˆ)2∑m
i=1γi
(7.13)
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7.3 Application to FSAM
Consider the following description of the Flight Safety Assessment and Management (FSAM)
problem.
xk+1 = F(xk,uk) (7.14)
uk =
u
p
k i f ck = p
uak i f ck = a
(7.15)
ck = G(xk,upk ,uak) (7.16)
Above, x ∈Rn describes the system state, u ∈Rm is a control input, uk ∈Rm denotes the
control inputs where up,ua describes the control input of the pilot and the safety controller
respectively, c ∈ {p,a} describes the control authority, F describes the evolution of the
continuous states, and G describes a strategy to select the control mode such that loss of
control situations are mitigated.
The goal is to find the sequence of pilot inputs upk ,k = 1, . . . ,n that leads to LOC situ-
ations. In other words, given a strategy G to select the current control authority ck, what
sequence of pilot inputs up result in trajectories with low robustness? In this work we focus
on using the cross-entropy based random sampling technique to find an input sequence that
can falsify a given requirement.
7.4 Falsification of Requirements for the Takeoff FSAM
System
Let F in Eqn 7.14 denote aircraft takeoff dynamics. A complete description of the non-
linear aircraft dynamics for takeoff and the envelope-aware control laws can be found in
Appendix A-B. G in Eqn 7.16 denotes the switching strategy imposed by FSAM. Let [0, t f ]
denote the duration of the takeoff phase. Our goal is to find the sequence of pilot inputs
{u0,u1, . . . ,un|uk ∈Rm} that can lead to requirement falsification under the original FSAM
DMM formulation illustrated in Fig 6.2.
Let U denote the set of all possible input sequences. Sampling a sequence of inputs
from U arbitrarily may require a large number of trials, especially if the sequence length
n is very large, to find a falsifying trajectory. This process is therefore inefficient. In this
work, we choose a parametric representation for U that can capture a wide range of pilot
behaviors. The resulting parameter space has fewer dimensions than U ; hence it is easier to
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sample from a suitable distribution that yields falsifying trajectories with high probability.
The pilot’s control surface deflection and throttle commands are represented as a PD
control law:
δe = kpe(θ− θre f ) + kde θ˙ (7.17)
δa = kpa(φ−φre f ) + kda φ˙ (7.18)
δr = kpr(ψ−ψre f ) + kdr ψ˙ (7.19)
δt = τre fTmax (7.20)
where δe, δa, δr represent the control surface deflections of the elevator, aileron and rudder,
respectively. δt denotes the thrust input where tre f ∈ [0,1] is the reference thrust command
and Tmax is the maximum thrust available. We assume symmetric thrust is applied by a
multi-engine aircraft in this formulation. θre f ,φre f ,ψre f , τre f denote the pitch, roll, heading
and thrust reference commands that the pilot follows while executing the takeoff sequence.
The kpi ,kdi values represent proportional and derivative gains for each control effector i ∈
{e,a,r}. To model a wide range of behaviors using Eqns 7.17-7.20 the reference commands
are chosen as follows.
The takeoff sequence from [0, t f ] is divided into N disjoint sub-intervals: [0, t1), [t1, t2),
. . . , [tN−1, t f ). For each sub-interval, the reference commands are drawn from a Gaussian
distribution. In this work, the takeoff interval is 3 sub-intervals. For example, the pitch
reference command is sampled as follows
θre f =

θ1 t ∈ [0, t1)
θ2 t ∈ [t1, t2)
θ3 t ∈ [t2, t f )
(7.21)
where θi ∼N (µi,σ2i ). The pilot’s pitch control inputs for takeoff are characterized by a total
of 6 parameters. The ailerons, rudder and thrust reference commands can be parameterized
in a similar fashion.
We first illustrate the robustness of the original Moore machine formulation for FSAM
with respect to the tail strike requirement: (h < h0 → θ < θ0). This requirement must
be satisfied to prevent tail strikes during takeoff. Robustness of trajectories are defined
with respect to the unsafe set defined by the region where θ > θ∗ and h < h∗. Here θ∗,h∗
represent the pitch attitude and altitude at which tail strikes can occur. We first start with
the initial distribution shown in Fig 7.1-(a). Then using the cross-entropy method described
above, we search for the distribution which reduces the robustness of the trajectories with
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Figure 7.1: (a) Initial pitch distributions (b) Pitch distributions after 6 iterations of the cross
entropy method.
respect to the specified requirement. Fig 7.2 (a) summarizes the performance of the cross-
entropy method across several iterations. Each iteration consists of 1000 Monte Carlo trials.
Fig 7.2-(a) illustrates the average robustness for each iteration and their corresponding
standard deviations. Fig 7.1-(b) illustrates the final distributions on the pitch reference
commands at the end of 6 iterations of the cross entropy method. Fig 7.2-(b) illustrates
the falsifying trajectories in the θ−H space. The dashed red lines denote the tail strike
constraint. Note that toward the end of the takeoff phase, high pitch reference commands
are sampled resulting in trajectories with tail strikes during rotation.
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Figure 7.2: (a) Average robustness, (b) Falsifying trajectories obtained from the final pitch
distributions
The falsifying trajectories in Fig 7.2-(b) were due to a missing transition (also identified
in Chapter 6) in the original Moore machine formulation for FSAM. After incorporating
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the missing transition, the cross-entropy analysis was performed again. Fig 7.3-(a) illus-
trates the average robustness across several iterations of the cross-entropy method with the
revised DMM formulation. The trajectories drawn from this new distribution are shown
in Fig 7.3-(b). The cross-entropy formulation considered in this work independently sam-
ples the parameters describing the pilot model. It is also possible to sample the parameters
taking into consideration the correlation between parameters (see [132] for more details).
1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0
Iterations
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Ro
bu
st
ne
ss
2 4 6 8 10 12 14
Pitch (deg)
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2.0
Al
tit
ud
e 
(m
)
Tail strike constraint
Figure 7.3: (a) Average robustness, (b) Falsifying trajectories obtained from the final dis-
tribution
Next we illustrate the robustness of the revised Moore machine formulation to runway
overrun constraints expressed in LTL as follows: ((V ≥ V2)∧ (x ≥ Rmax)→ (h > hobs)).
The unsafe set is described by the region V < V2, x > Rmax,h < hobs where V2 represents the
takeoff safety V-speed, Rmax represents the available runway length and hobs represents the
runway obstacle height (see dashed lines in Fig 7.5-(b)). Fig 7.4-(a) illustrates the initial
distribution on the thrust reference command. Fig 7.4-(b) illustrates the final falsifying
distributions obtained from the cross-entropy method. The average robustness values across
several iterations of the cross-entropy method are illustrated in Fig 7.5-(a) while Fig 7.5-(b)
illustrates trajectories that overshoot the runway and hence violate the given requirement.
Note that in the beginning of the takeoff sequence, the reference thrust command is sampled
from the takeoff thrust range. Midway through the takeoff roll, past the decision point, the
takeoff is rejected so that the ensuing trajectory result in runway overruns. The violation
of the runway overrun constraint is attributed to the inappropriate modulation of throttle
δt inputs during the ground roll. Recall that the FSAM DMMs were formulated under the
following assumptions: (i) pilot would not exhibit inappropriate behavior and (ii) at least
one engine will function properly. Consequently, it is not surprising that the current DMM
formulation violates the given requirement.
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Figure 7.4: (a) Initial distribution (b) Final distribution after 7th iteration of cross entropy
method
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7.5 Discussion
The cross-entropy examples presented in this chapter divided the takeoff duration into three
intervals and searched for the reference commands θ1,2,3 and τ1,2,3 corresponding to each
time interval. In future work, other parameters such as the duration of each interval and
the proportional and derivative pilot control model gains can also be included as search
parameters in the cross-entropy framework. The number and duration of the takeoff time
interval set can also be varied to capture specific pilot behaviors.
In several examples, the variance of the parameter distributions converged to zero. In
these cases, instead of searching for a distribution over trajectory parameters, one can treat
the problem deterministically and directly search for the reference command values that
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yield trajectories with low robustness using numerical methods (e.g. shooting methods).
Identification of such cases might reduce computation time in future case studies.
7.6 Conclusions
The cross entropy method presented in this chapter guided Monte Carlo trials to sample
from distributions that yield trajectories most likely to violate system requirements. Con-
ventional model checking techniques only verify that execution traces satisfy a given re-
quirement. Analysis of robustness provides more information about system proximity to
a constraint boundary. Monte Carlo-based requirement falsification was performed on the
full nonlinear takeoff dynamics model with the concurrent execution of the two FSAM
DMM formulations (i.e. longitudinal and lateral DMMs).
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CHAPTER 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
This thesis introduced the Flight Safety Assessment and Management (FSAM) system.
FSAM monitors flight conditions for loss of control risk and makes control authority
switching decisions that mitigate risk. FSAM switches between a nominal crew-directed
FMS and the Envelope-Aware Flight Management System (EAFMS) capable of adapting
to anomalies and recovering from loss of control situations. Two main approaches were
explored in this work to formulate FSAM. The first approach relied on manually engi-
neered switching protocols for FSAM as Deterministic Moore Machines (DMM). The sec-
ond approach relied on formulating FSAM as a Markov Decision Process (MDP). Finally,
methods to verify FSAM state machines and MDP policies were presented.
The contributions of this work are: (i) takeoff envelopes to aid control mode switch-
ing decisions, (ii) a DMM formulation to address common takeoff related LOC scenarios,
(iii) takeoff-specific and in-flight icing-specific MDP formulations, (iv) an online imple-
mentation for FSAM MDP, (v) verification methods to ensure FSAM satisfies safety re-
quirements, and (vi) evaluations of FSAM showing it could have prevented the accidents
occuring in several real world case studies.
The innovations of this work are: (i) a control authority switching mechanism that is
generalizable across a suite of loss of control (LOC) scenarios, (ii) takeoff DMM formula-
tions based on V-speed transitions that manage state space complexity, improve readability
and promote flight crew understanding, (iii) a compact abstraction for MDP states enabling
tractable solutions, (iv) constrained MDP formulations to eliminate manual tuning of poli-
cies, and (v) a compositional approach to verify FSAM DMMs.
The DMM and MDP FSAM formulations presented in this work have pros and cons.
Finite state machines require a system designer to directly define the states where control
mode overrides should occur based on knowledge of reachable or recoverable set bound-
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aries defining thresholds that trigger control mode transitions. Altering transitions in finite
state machines to accommodate reachable set boundaries and flight crew preferences is
straightforward thus a pro of the DMM. Precise control over the transition timings is also
straightforward with timed automata extensions. However, while the finite state machines
offer a computationally tractable and verifiable means of realizing FSAM, engineers must
manually envision and create DMM states and transitions for all possible exception events
and all possible exception event combinations when constructing control mode switching
machines.
In contrast, the decision theoretic approach using MDPs doesn’t require the system
designer to reason directly about control mode overrides. Instead, the key focus of the MDP
approach is on selecting a suitable representation for the MDP states and actions, defining
a reward function that encodes the desired goals, and computing transition probabilities.
Domain knowledge can be exploited to compactly represent the MDP states to enable a
tractable solution. The optimal policy prescribes the control mode switching decision in
each MDP state. However, the obtained policy is only as good as the underlying transition
probability models, reward and state formulations, and in this work, substantial tuning of
weights was typically required to obtain desirable and safe policies.
Verification is crucial to ensure control mode switching strategies defined by either
DMM or MDP FSAM realizations do not violate critical safety requirements. Refinements
to the DMM/MDP formulations can be guided by verification. Verifying FSAM with re-
spect to safety and operational requirements ensures an FSAM capabilities are applicable
across the wide spectrum of missions and LOC risk scenarios.
8.2 Future Work
An ideal FSAM formulation should be capable of making risk mitigating control author-
ity or mode selections under any loss of control situation. An FSAM module applicable
to a set of elevated takeoff risks was primarily considered in this work, along with a spe-
cific extension to in-flight icing. General FSAM modules applicable to other phases of
flight (i.e. climb, cruise, approach and landing) are required to ensure LOC prevention
and recovery across the entire flight regime. The progression of flight phases motivates
the need for efficient algorithms to safely enable transition between the FSAM modules.
Within each phase, further decomposition based on an elevated set of risk factors (e.g en-
gine failure, actuator failure, cabin de-pressurization) must be considered. A hierarchical
suite of DMMs/MDPs applicable under specific LOC scenarios can be indexed as a (small)
database online based on phase of flight and the specific elevated LOC risks actually ob-
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served. The database approach requires a verified matching algorithm to efficiently select
the appropriate DMM or MDP policy.
The development of FSAM in this work was simplified by several assumptions. Impos-
ing assumptions on FSAM reduces system complexity which in turn facilitates verification.
However, for real world applications, algorithms must be developed to recognize scenarios
where the underlying assumptions are violated so that no FSAM database policy is appli-
cable. An initial implementation of FSAM must recognize situations in which it has no
applicable DMM/MDP solution, in which case FSAM would simply remain passive (no
FSAM overrides are issued). Of course the crew could still activate adaptive EAFMS capa-
bilities in such scenarios. This approach has been adopted by industry to-date with specific
LOC prevention capabilities (e.g. envelope protection, Traffic Collision Avoidance, Run-
way Overrun Protection, Ground Collision Avoidance systems) that deactivate in situations
where their correct operation is no longer assured.
To achieve a generalized FSAM capability across the suite of envisioned loss of control
situations, assumptions must be relaxed. For example, actuators and sensors might fail
during takeoff. A fully-functional takeoff FSAM would at least incorporate rules to manage
single sensor system failures along with power system and control surface failures that
might occur during takeoff. Further, the MDP formulations in this work assumed complete
observability of the underlying states. In practice, the state feature estimates are subject
to uncertainty, and sensor failures might render states normally considered observable as
unobservable. Extending the MDP to a Partially Observable Markov Decision Process
(POMDP) formulation can help make decisions amidst uncertainty in state estimates at the
cost of additional computational complexity.
While a more general formulation was envisioned, the actual FSAM DMM and MDP
realizations in this work focused on control authority decisions based on aircraft dynamics,
control effector, and limited system health state features. This constraint allowed transi-
tion probabilities of the aircraft dynamics states to be estimated using physics-based Monte
Carlo simulations. A comprehensive MDP formulation requires incorporating other state
features such as vehicle health, flight crew and environment characteristics. Adequately
capturing the effect of state features such as vehicle health, crew behavior and weather
phenomena can be difficult with physics based models. In future work, suitable transition
models may be constructed by mining long-term flight data. Targeted human subject exper-
iments and more comprehensive environment data and models must also be incorporated.
Another challenge facing the MDP FSAM implementation was in selecting appropri-
ate reward function objective weights. In future work, sensitivities of MDP policies to the
underlying transition and reward function models must be characterized to understand the
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robustness of the MDP policies to modeling errors. This dissertation has proposed DMM
and MDP FSAM formulations along with tradeoffs between the two strategies. However,
FSAM formulations to-date have been based on either the DMM or the MDP. Future work
should consider mixed strategies where control mode switching is defined by a combination
of DMMs and MDP policies to exploit the benefits of both approaches. Well-characterized
LOC risk scenarios with manageable state-space complexity might be best handled with in-
tuitive DMMs, whereas scenarios with complex interdependencies between state functions
or scenarios where statistics might even adapt in real-time would be better accommodated
with the MDP formulation.
This work used real-world aviation accidents supplemented by Monte Carlo simula-
tions as case studies to evaluate FSAM state machines and MDP policies. NTSB accident
and airline data must be mined in future work to assure FSAM either handles or remains
passive across the suite of accident and exception scenarios previously encountered and
documented. Another important avenue of research is the design of appropriate interfaces
and warnings that communicate to the pilot the decisions made by FSAM. Though verifi-
cation and validation techniques serve as an efficient augmentation to flight tests, human
in the loop experiments will be necessary to understand how a typical flight crew would
interact and react to override decisions made by FSAM. These human subject experiments
and flight crew preferences can in turn be used to refine the FSAM formulations.
In summary, the Flight Safety Assessment and Management system introduced in this
dissertation can mitigate loss of control risk which in turn will reduce risk of incidents
and accidents. As autonomy and authority questions continue to emerge in manned and
unmanned aviation, the FSAM foundation laid by this dissertation will inform the com-
munity regarding the control authority management and switching decisions essential to
address in the coming decade and beyond.
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APPENDIX A
Aircraft Takeoff Dynamics
This section describes aircraft dynamics for takeoff. Modeling ground roll dynamics of
the aircraft requires knowledge of the reaction forces and moments exerted by the ground
on the airframe [134] as well as aerodynamic forces that become significant as airspeed
progressively increases during the takeoff roll.
Aircraft landing gear is modeled as a spring-mass-damper system for each assembly
[135–137]. Based on knowledge of inertial position and velocity of the center of gravity
(CG) and attitude of the aircraft, one can estimate the compression and rate of compression
of the oleo struts and then compute the normal forces and moments exerted by the ground
on the airframe.
Assuming that the three struts are exactly vertical, the normal force Fz exerted by the
ground on the aircraft (expressed in the inertial frame) is given by
Fzi = −Kizi−Ciz˙i i = Nw,Lw,Rw (A.1)
Ki and Ci are the spring constants and the damping coefficients of the nose, left and
right oleo struts of the landing gear. z and z˙ are the compression and rate of compression of
the oleo struts expressed in the inertial frame. Nw, Lw and Rw represent the nose, left and
right wheels. The gear model is shown in Fig A.1.
The wheels experience friction due to contact between the tire and runway surface.
Longitudinal forces acting on the wheels are due to the longitudinal slip and the normal
forces experienced by the wheels. The longitudinal slip ratio is given by [137]:
σs =
Vx−ωR0
Vx
(A.2)
where Vx is the translational speed of the wheel in the longitudinal direction, ω is an-
gular speed of the wheel, and R0 is wheel radius including tire.
Coefficient of friction µ is related to the longitudinal slip ratio σs of the wheels by the
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Figure A.1: Tri-cycle landing gear configuration
empirical formula known as the “magic formula” [137, 138].
µ = D¯sin(C¯ tan−1(B¯σs)) (A.3)
Here B¯,C¯ and D¯ are constants pertaining to the runway surface type. The longitudinal
frictional forces Fx exerted by the ground on the wheel are given by:
Fxi = µiFzi i = Nw,Lw,Rw (A.4)
The wheels also experience side force Fy due to lateral slip of the wheels. Lateral slip
ratio (αs) is given by:
αsi = tan
−1
(Vyi
Vxi
)
, i = Lw,Rw (A.5)
αsNw = −δsteer + tan−1
(VyNw
VxNw
)
(A.6)
where Vx,Vy are the translational and lateral wheel speeds given by
Vx = u− rly (A.7)
Vy = v+ rlx (A.8)
Here (u,v) are the (x,y) components of aircraft velocity in the body frame, respectively.
lyi and lxi are distances of the wheels from the CG as shown in Fig A.1. r is the yaw
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angular rate. δsteer is the nose wheel steering angle. Note that Vx,Vy are obtained using the
Transport theorem and the fact that the pitch and roll angular rates are negligible during the
takeoff ground roll. The side force Fy is given by [135, 136]
Fyi =
2Fymaxiαsoptiαsi
α2sopti
+α2si
, i = Nw,Lw,Rw (A.9)
Here Fymax is the maximum attainable side force at the optimal slip angle αopt. Fymax
and αopt are experimentally-derived parameters. In this work, we use the side force model
given in [135, 136]:
FymaxNw = −3.53×10−6F2zNw + 8.33×10−1FzNw (A.10)
FymaxLw,Rw = −7.39×10−7F2zLw,Rw + 5.11×10−1FzLw,Rw (A.11)
αsoptN = 3.52×10−9F2zNw + 2.8×10−5FzNw + 13.8 (A.12)
αsoptL,R = 1.34×10−10F2zLw,Rw + 1.06×10−5FzLw,Rw + 6.72 (A.13)
The net ground reaction force components Fx, Fy and Fz can be computed as shown in
Equations (A.1),(A.4) and (A.9). The moments Mx,My,Mz due to the reaction forces can
be obtained by taking the product of the reaction forces and the respective moment arms
about the aircraft center of gravity.
The net ground reaction forces and moments are transformed into the aircraft body
frame. The transformed forces and moments can then be added to the conventional six
degree of freedom aircraft equations of motion [70] to obtain the complete nonlinear set
of equations that simulate the takeoff phase of flight. The takeoff equations of motion
(expressed in body frame) are given by:
• Translational Momentum
m(u˙− vr+wq) = − (sinθ)mg− (cosβ)(cosα)D
+ (sinα)L+ (cosφT )FT +Fxgear (A.14)
m(v˙+ur−wp) = (sinφ)(cosθ)mg− (sinβ)D+Fygear (A.15)
m(w˙−uq+ vp) = (cosφ)(cosθ)mg− (cosβ)(sinα)D
− (cosα)L− (sinφT )FT +Fzgear (A.16)
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• Rotational Momentum
Ixx p˙+ (Izz− Iyy)qr− Ixz(r˙+ pq) =Laero +Lthrust +Lgear (A.17)
Iyyq˙+ (Ixx− Izz)pr+ Ixz(p2− r2) =Maero +Mthrust +Mgear (A.18)
Izzr˙+ (Iyy− Ixx)pq+ Ixz(qr− p˙) =Naero +Nthrust +Ngear (A.19)
• Wheel Dynamics
IwN ω˙N =FxNRwheelN +τrollN (A.20)
IwLω˙L =FxLRwheelL +τrollL +τbrakeL (A.21)
IwRω˙R =FxRRwheelR +τrollR +τbrakeR (A.22)
Here u,v and w represent the translational velocity in the aircraft body frame, p,q and
r are body frame angular rates. φ,θ and ψ are the roll, pitch and yaw angles, L, D are
total lift and drag respectively, FT is the total thrust force, and φT represents the angle, the
thrust vector makes with the longitudinal axis. Li,Mi and Ni are the roll, pitch and yaw
moments where i = aero, i = thrust, i = gear represent moments induced by aerodynamic,
thrust and gear forces respectively. Ixx, Iyy, Izz and Ixz are the moments of inertia of the
aircraft, Iw =
mwR2wheel
2 is the moment of inertia of the wheel where mw is the wheel mass
and Rwheel is the radius of the wheel. τroll = µrFzRwheel is the rolling resistance moment.
µr is the rolling resistance coefficient. τbrake = cbδB is the braking torque produced on the
wheels due to the application of brakes δB. cb is a scaling parameter chosen to convert the
brake input δB to braking torque τbrake. Eqns (A.20)-(A.22) model the effect of differential
braking during the ground roll [134].
The numerical values for the various aircraft parameters are listed in Table A.1. The
aerodynamic forces and moments in Eqns (A.14)-(A.19) are obtained from the NASA
Generic Transport Model (GTM) [97]. The landing gear parameters are chosen to ensure
that the spring mass damper model shown in Eqn (A.1) has sufficient damping characteris-
tics. The friction parameters in Eqn (A.3) correspond to a dry tarmac runway.
129
Symbol Parameter Value
m Aircraft mass 45420 Kg
Ixx, Iyy Moments of inertia 2.262e6,3.172e6 Kgm2
Izz, Ixz Moments of inertia 3.337e6,−1.5e3 Kgm2
S re f Planform area 122.4 m2
b¯ Wing span 34.10 m
c¯ Chord length 4.194 m
KLW ,KRW Left,Right oleo stiffness 2e5 Nm
−1
KNW Nose oleo stiffness 4e4 Nm
−1
CLW ,CRW Left,Right oleo damping coefficients 1.5e
5 Nsm−1
CNW Nose oleo damping coefficient 5e4 Nm
−1
lxN Landing gear offsets from CG (Fig A.1) 10 m
lxL , lxR Landing gear offsets from CG (Fig A.1) 2.932 m
lyL , lyR Landing gear offsets from CG (Fig A.1) −3.795,3.795 m
B¯,C¯, D¯ Magic formula parameters 10,1.9,1
FT Maximum thrust available (Twin engines) 150 kN
µr,µb,mw,Rwheel,cb Wheel parameters 2e−3,0.2,87kg,0.6m,8e3
θ∗,h∗ Tail strike pitch attitude, altitude 11◦,0.5m
θ1, θ2 Pitch reference commands 10◦,8◦
CLmax ,CLg ,CDg Lift and drag coefficients 1.60,0.46,0.02
Cmq ,Cmδe Pitching moment coefficients −44.43,−1.785
Cnr ,Cnδr Yawing moment coefficients −0.405,−0.129
Table A.1: Numerical paramters
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APPENDIX B
Controllers
B.1 Envelope-Aware Control Law
In this work, the translational, rotational and directional dynamics are controlled indepen-
dently by PD control laws. The pitch attitude control law is given by Eqn B.1:
δe = Kpe(θre f − θ) +Kde θ˙ (B.1)
θre f =

0 i f (V < Vr)
θ1 i f (V ≥ Vr)
θ2 i f (V ≥ Vr)∧ (θ ≤ θ∗)∧ (h < h∗)
(B.2)
θre f = 0 enables the aircraft to accelerate with zero pitch until the rotation airspeed Vr is
reached. A positive pitch attitude θ1 enables the airplane to rotate and climb when the
rotation speed is reached. θ2 < θ∗ inhibits over-rotation thus reducing the risk due to a
tail-strike.
The thrust input δT = Tmax is used when continuing takeoff is safe whereas δT = 0
is used to reject the takeoff when continuing takeoff is no longer safe. A discussion of
safe versus unsafe states for different engine operating conditions (i.e. All engines opera-
tional/one engine inoperational) is provided in the next section.
The roll attitude control law is chosen to hold a zero bank angle φre f = 0 during the
takeoff:
δa = Kpa(φre f − φ˙) +Kda φ˙ (B.3)
The directional control law is chosen as shown in Eqn B.5 enabling the aircraft to track the
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runway center-line.
δr = Kpr(ψre f − ψ˙) +Kdr ψ˙ (B.4)
ψre f = Kpyy (B.5)
The brake inputs are modeled as follows:
δBl =
sat(Kby) i f y > 00 i f y = 0 (B.6)
δBr =
sat(Kby) i f y < 00 i f y = 0 (B.7)
where sat denotes the saturation function. The use of differential braking (Eqn B.6-B.7)
enables the controller to counteract cross wind forces especially while the rudder is inef-
fective at low airspeeds. Fig B.1 illustrates the aircraft’s lateral response (cross track error)
to a constant crosswind of 16 knots under different scenarios. From Fig B.1, it can be
seen that the aircraft veers off the runway due to the crosswind when no control input is
applied. With braking input alone (right brake input of 800 Nm), the aircraft can maintain
runway centerline at low airspeeds. At higher airspeeds, braking does not provide sufficient
cornering forces to counteract the crosswind. The rudder input alone is ineffective at low
airspeeds, however as the airspeed increases, the rudder’s effectiveness increases to provide
sufficient yawing moment to return to the runway centerline. When rudder and braking are
both used to maintain the runway centerline, the aircraft can be controlled with very small
deviations from centerline.
B.2 Pilot Model
The pilot’s elevator δe and rudder δr inputs are modeled as shown below, while the aileron
input is assumed to be zero. Note that this work assumes that the pilot’s control column
and rudder inputs are translated directly to control surface deflections (direct law [11]).
δe =
kpe
(
θre f1 − θ(t−τ)
)
+ kde θ˙ i f (V ≥ Vr)
kpe
(
θre f2 − θ(t−τ)
)
+ kde θ˙ i f (V < Vr)
(B.8)
δr = kpr
(
ψre f −ψ(t−τ))+ kdr ψ˙
ψre f = kYy
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Figure B.1: Comparison of aircraft lateral response with braking and rudder control inputs
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Eqn (B.8) represents a simple human operator model [74, 139] that treats the pilot as a
proportional-derivative feedback law with time delay. Elevator input is modeled such that
the pilot increases aircraft pitch attitude after rotation speed is reached. The rudder input is
modeled such that the pilot tries to track the runway center-line. Here kp is a proportional
feedback gain, kd is a derivative gain, and τ is the time delay. θ(t−τ) represents the inherent
lag in pilot response due to time taken for perception of and reaction to external stimuli and
neuro-muscular interactions [74]. θre f1 is the appropriate pitch reference attitude during
rotation. θre f2 is the reference pitch attitude before rotation (ideally zero). θre f − θ(t− τ) is
the error in tracking the appropriate rotation attitude (θre f ). Vr denotes the rotation airspeed
perceived by the pilot, ideally VR. The rudder control law enables center-line tracking.
Eqn (B.8) represents a typical pilot behavior during takeoff. Although nominal values
for θre f and Vr could be specified, actual parameter values such as kpe , kde , and τ will be
pilot-dependent. For example, it is rare for any two pilots to have the same response time
thus τ varies between pilots [74]. The delay τ can also be influenced by other factors such
as time of day and runway conditions. Parameter values are also different for each takeoff
due to pilot input and environmental differences. For this work, θre f , Vr, kp, kd and τ
are uniformly sampled from bounded intervals [θre fmin , θre fmax], [Vrmin ,Vrmax], [kpmin ,Kpmax],
[Kdmin ,Kdmax] and [τmin, τmax] respectively. The numerical values for these parameters are
listed in Table A.1.
The pilot’s throttle control input is modeled as a function of engines’ operational state.
The engines can be all operational (EAEO), one engine can be in-operative EOEI or all
engines can be inoperative EAEI . For each takeoff sequence, the operational state of the
engine E ∈ {EAEO,EOEI ,EAEI} is sampled according to a specified distribution called as
the engine failure distribution. If the sampled engine status denotes one or more engine
failure(s), then an engine failure is simulated by initializing the aircraft with all engines
operational EAEO and then triggering the engine failure event EOEI or EAEI at time t f ail ∈
[0, t f ] by setting the thrust in the failed engines to zero. Note that [0, t f ] denotes the takeoff
time interval and t f ail is sampled uniformly within this time interval.
For a nominal takeoff sequence where all engines are operations EAEO, the pilot sets
the takeoff thrust. However, when an anomaly such as an engine failure occurs, we assume
that the pilot executes either the appropriate actions (safely reject or continue takeoff) or
inappropriate actions according to a specified distribution. A discussion of safe and unsafe
behaviors in any given region is discussed in Section 2.6 of Chapter 2 and in Appendix C
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APPENDIX C
Takeoff Envelopes
C.1 Translational Envelopes
To simplify the analysis of the translational takeoff envelopes, the non-linear aircraft equa-
tions of motion described above are simplified as described in [41]. Let (x,y) represent the
longitudinal and lateral runway directions respectively, with (0,0) the ground roll initiation
point on the runway centerline. Let V represent the airspeed, Vw represent the wind speed
and Vlo f represent the lift off airspeed. The simplified equations that describe takeoff and
rejected takeoff dynamics are:
x˙ = (V ±Vw)cos(γ) (C.1)
V˙ =
A1−B1V
2 V < Vlo f
A2−B2V2 V ≥ Vlo f
(C.2)
where A1,A2,B1,B2 are defined as
A1 = g
( T
W
−µ) (C.3)
B1 =
g
W
(1
2
ρS re f (CDg −µCLg)
)
(C.4)
A2 = g
( T
W
− sin(γ)) (C.5)
B2 =
g
W
(
1
2
ρS re fCDg) (C.6)
Here T represents the takeoff thrust with all engines operational, W represents the aircraft’s
takeoff weight, ρ represents the atmospheric density, µ represents the rolling friction coef-
ficient. µb is the braking friction coefficient for RTO and, γ is the flight path angle. We
assume γ = 0 when V ≤ Vlo f and γ = γ0 (γ0 > 0) when V > Vlo f . α represents the angle
of attack, S re f is the planform area, and CLg and CDg are the coefficients of lift and drag,
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respectively, including ground effects and nominal flaps/slat settings for takeoff. Note that
Eqn C.1 accounts for the wind speed as well and hence the ground speed is given as V −Vw
for a head wind and V +Vw for a tail wind.
For a continued takeoff with one-engine in-operational, the airspeed dynamics is given
as
V˙ =
A3−B3V
2 i f V < Vlo f
A4−B4V2 i f V ≥ Vlo f
(C.7)
where A3,B3,A4,B4 are defined as
A3 = g
(ηTmax
W
−µ) (C.8)
B3 =
g
W
(1
2
ρS re f (CDg −µCLg)
)
(C.9)
A4 = g
(ηTmax
W
− sin(γ)) (C.10)
B4 =
g
W
(
1
2
ρS re fCDg) (C.11)
Tmax represents the maximum available thrust output from all the engines. η represents the
thrust reduction due to a single engine failure (η = 0.5 for twin engine aircraft and η = 0.75
for aircraft with four engines). For rejected takeoff, the airspeed dynamics is given by:
V˙ = A5−B5V2 i f V > 0 (C.12)
where A5, B5 are defined as
A5 = g
(−µb) (C.13)
B5 =
g
W
(1
2
ρS re f (CDg −µrCLg)
)
(C.14)
From Eqn C.1-C.2, the distance traveled S from V = Va to V = Vb is obtained as
S (Va,Vb)) =
∫ Vb
Va
(V ±Vw)cos(γ)
Ai−BiV2 dV (C.15)
where Ai,Bi are chosen appropriately for the given takeoff sequence as defined in Eqn
C.2-C.14.
Unsafe states with respect to V − x are derived by imposing the following constraints
on the translational dynamics: For continued takeoff: (1) The aircraft must be airborne
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on a limited runway length Rmax with the available thrust T ≤ Tmax, (2) The aircraft must
clear an obstacle height hobs at an airspeed not less than V2 [127]. (3) In case of a rejected
takeoff, the aircraft must be able to stop within the available runway. The above constraints
lead to the following non-linear program that can be used to find the initial conditions that
give rise to trajectories that partition the state-space with respect to safe versus unsafe states
as shown in figures 2.6-2.8.
min T (C.16)
subject to the following constraints:
S 1 = Rmax (C.17)
S 2 +S 3 = Rmax (C.18)
S 4 = S 5 (C.19)
S 6 = S 5 (C.20)
S 3 tan(γ) ≥ hobs (C.21)
V1 ≤ Vlo f (C.22)
T < Tmax (C.23)
S i, i = 1 . . .6 are defined as
S 1 = S (Vab0,∓Vw) S 4 = S (Ve f0,V1) (C.24)
S 2 = S (Ve f0,Vlo f ) S 5 = S (Vab0,V1) (C.25)
S 3 = S (Vlo f ,V2) S 6 = S (∓Vw,V1) (C.26)
where V2 represents the required airspeed when clearing the obstacle height hobs at Rmax
and is assumed given. Ve f0 represents the minimum airspeed required to safely continue
takeoff. Vab0 represents the maximum airspeed that the aircraft should posses to reject a
takeoff safely. The above non-linear program is solved to find V1,Ve f0,Vab0,T which lead
to the takeoff envelopes shown in Fig C.1.
C.1.1 Rotational envelopes
For rotational dynamics, the constraints θ < θ∗,h < h∗ prevent tail-strike scenario which
can be encountered during the initial rotation to become airborne. Thus, the set of all initial
conditions that lead to a tail-strike scenario must be avoided to eliminate any loss of control
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Figure C.1: Translational envelopes
risk due to a tail-strike. To estimate this set, we first we simplify Eqn A.18 to study the
rotational dynamics when h < h∗ as follows.
θ˙ = q (C.27)
q˙ =
1
2Iyy
ρV2∗S re f c¯(Cmqq+Cmδeδe) (C.28)
Where Cmq ,Cmδe represent the pitch moment coefficients. δe ∈ [−25◦,25] is chosen as
defined in Eqn B.1. V∗ is the airpseed at which the unsafe set is to be computed. The
set of all initial conditions for Eqn C.27-C.28 that can result in state trajectories that lead
to tail trike scenarios is estimated using the level set tool box [140].
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C.1.2 Directional envelopes
For directional dynamics, the constraint |y| < y0 prevents the aircraft from veering off the
side of the runway. The directional dynamics are simplified as follows:
ψ˙ = r (C.29)
r˙ =
1
2Izz
ρV2∗S re f b¯(Cnrr+Cnδrδr) (C.30)
y˙ = V∗sin(ψ) (C.31)
Where Cnr ,Cnδr represent the yawing moment coefficients. δr ∈ [−25◦,25] is chosen as
defined in Eqn B.5. V∗ is the airpseed at which the unsafe set is to be computed. Using Eqn
C.29-C.31, the set of all initial conditions that lead to constraint violation are estimated
using the level set tool box [140].
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APPENDIX D
MDP Formulation to Prevent In-Flight Icing
Related Loss of Control
D.1 State Transition Probabilities
Consider the flight segment from SUSKE and BUFST. As indicated in Fig 4.5 and Fig 4.7,
this segment requires the flight crew to maintain 5500 ft. Ideally, to express state transition
probabilities in this scenario, one would require probability distributions conditioned on
flight plan features of all speed ranges. However, for ease of illustration, this work only
considers distributions conditioned on f¯2 (i.e. a level-flight condition at medium airspeed).
Furthermore, this work only considers cases where the aircraft flies straight and level at
a cruise power setting while maintaining angle of attack, side-slip, pitch and roll attitude
within the safe operating envelopes i.e. A¯ = α¯1, Θ¯ = θ¯1, Φ¯ = φ¯1, H¯ = h¯1, T¯ = t¯3. Conditioned
on these state features, the state transition probabilities for the airspeed states under pilot
authority (M = P) and Envelope-Aware automation authority (M = EA) are indicated in
Tables D.1-D.3. Table D.1 lists the airspeed transition probabilities when the aircraft is
free from icing conditions (i.e. I¯ ∈ {i0, i1, i4}). Table D.2 lists transition probabilities for
I¯ = i¯2 and Table D.3 lists the transition probabilities for I¯ = i¯3. Note that with the pilot
in control M = P, the probability of entering a high-risk airspeed state V¯ = v1 and stalling
increases with adverse icing conditions. However, under envelope-aware control authority
M = EA, the probability of entering a stall state is low. Better performance when M = EA
is attributed to the combined EA-FMS capabilities to identify changes in dynamics, adapt
controllers to these changes, estimate degraded flight envelopes and construct and follow
flight plans that respect degraded envelope constraints.
Consider the flight segment from ZADUM to BIILS where the aircraft is in a de-
scending right turn. This case considers only distributions conditioned on f¯17 (i.e. a
descending turn at medium airspeed) and assumes the following states remain constant:
A¯ = α¯1, Θ¯ = θ¯1, H¯ = h¯4, T¯ = t¯2. For this segment, both bank angle and airspeed state are
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assumed likely to change. State transition probabilities for bank angle transitions under
pilot M = P and Envelope-Aware control M = EA are indicated in Table D.4 while Table
D.5 indicate distributions for airspeed states when Φ¯ = φ¯3. These distributions assume that
I¯ = i¯0. Note that the probability of stalling increases when the bank angle is steep Φ¯ = φ¯3.
This is attributed to the fact that during steep turns the stall speed increases [70].
D.2 Optimal Values
The optimal values are generated using Value Iteration [62] with the reward formulation,
weighting factors and transition probabilities discussed in Chapter 4. A discount factor
λ = 0.7 was used. These optimal values are used in the computation of the optimal policies
illustrated in Section 4.4.
Table D.1: Distribution P1(v¯ j | v¯i, α¯1, θ¯1, φ¯1,2, h¯1, t¯3, i¯0,1,4, f¯2,Ps,M). Left M = P, Right M =
EA
v¯1 v¯2 v¯3 v¯4
v¯1 0.6 0.4 0.0 0.0
v¯2 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.0
v¯3 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.4
v¯4 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5
v¯1 v¯2 v¯3 v¯4
v¯1 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
v¯2 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.0
v¯3 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.4
v¯4 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5
Table D.2: DistributionP1(v¯ j | v¯i, α¯1, θ¯1, φ¯1,2, h¯1, t¯3, i¯2, f¯2,Ps,M). Left M = P, Right M = EA
v¯1 v¯2 v¯3 v¯4
v¯1 0.7 0.3 0.0 0.0
v¯2 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.0
v¯3 0.0 0.2 0.5 0.3
v¯4 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5
v¯1 v¯2 v¯3 v¯4
v¯1 0.1 0.9 0.0 0.0
v¯2 0.0 0.3 0.7 0.0
v¯3 0.0 0.1 0.5 0.4
v¯4 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.5
Table D.3: DistributionP1(v¯ j | v¯i, α¯1, θ¯1, φ¯1,2, h¯1, t¯3, i¯3, f¯2,Ps,M). Left M = P, Right M = EA
v¯1 v¯2 v¯3 v¯4
v¯1 0.98 0.02 0.00 0.00
v¯2 0.85 0.15 0.00 0.00
v¯3 0.00 0.90 0.10 0.00
v¯4 0.00 0.00 0.90 0.10
v¯1 v¯2 v¯3 v¯4
v¯1 0.4 0.6 0.0 0.0
v¯2 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.0
v¯3 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.0
v¯4 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.4
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Table D.4: Distribution P4(φ¯ j | φ¯i, v¯1,2,3,4, α¯1, θ¯1, h¯4, t¯2, i¯4, f¯17,Ps,M). Left M = P, Right
M = EA
φ¯1 φ¯2 φ¯3
φ¯1 0.80 0.20 0.00
φ¯2 0.20 0.30 0.50
φ¯3 0.00 0.01 0.99
φ¯1 φ¯2 φ¯3
φ¯1 1.0 0.0 0.0
φ¯2 1.0 0.0 0.0
φ¯3 0.0 1.0 0.0
Table D.5: Distribution P1(v¯ j | v¯i, α¯1, θ¯1, φ¯3, h¯4, t¯2, i¯4, f¯17,Ps,M). Left M = P, Right M = EA
v¯1 v¯2 v¯3 v¯4
v¯1 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.0
v¯2 0.7 0.2 0.1 0.0
v¯3 0.0 0.8 0.2 0.0
v¯4 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
v¯1 v¯2 v¯3 v¯4
v¯1 0.0 1.0 0.0 0.0
v¯2 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.0
v¯3 0.0 0.6 0.4 0.0
v¯4 0.0 0.0 1.0 0.0
Table D.6: Distributions P7 and P8 for M ∈ {P,EA}
f¯2 f¯17
f¯2 0.5 0.5
f¯17 0.5 0.5
i¯2 i¯3 i¯4
i¯2 1.0 0.0 0.0
i¯3 0.0 1.0 0.0
i¯4 0.0 0.0 1.0
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APPENDIX E
Reachability algorithm for FSAM verification
E.1 Reachability Analysis
Algorithm E.1 describes the isReach() function used by Algorithm 6.1. It takes as inputs
two facets
◦
q and
◦
q′ of a cell and returns true if under the current control authority pk there
exists a trajectory starting from
◦
q and ending in
◦
q′ while remaining within the cell contain-
ing the two facets. The main idea in Algorithm E.1 is to exploit the fact that the airspeed
and altitude (in Eqn 6.1) monotonically increase with time (in the region of interest) and
the pitch dynamics is piece-wise affine, therefore it is enough to propagate the extreme
points of the facet. Algorithm E.1 propagates the initial condition X¯0 = [x0,v0,h0, θ0,q0]
obtained from each vertex of facet
◦
q, until the ensuing trajectory leaves the cell, to deter-
mine if facet
◦
q′ is reachable from ◦q. 1 Since this work considers discrete-time semantics
of LTL, state propagation is performed using the discrete-time version of the system dy-
namics in Eqn 6.1. f¯ in Algorithm E.1 denotes the discrete-time equivalent of f . Each
vertex of facet
◦
q provides initial conditions for airspeed (v0), pitch (θ0) and altitude (h0).
The longitudinal position (x0) is initialized at zero since the requirements considered in
this paper do not impose restrictions on x. If v < Vr, the pitch rate q0 is initialized at zero.
This is because the pitch remains constant until rotation and therefore the pitch rate is zero.
However, for v ≥ Vr, q0 ∈ {qmin,qmax}. Here qmin and qmax denote the minimum and max-
imum attainable pitch rate during takeoff. V(◦q) ⊂ R5 denotes the set of initial conditions
for a facet
◦
q. Note that since the pilot model described by Eqn B.8 consists of the pa-
rameters θre f ,Vr,Kp,Kd, τ whose values are assumed to lie within bounded intervals, each
initial condition for pk = P is propagated for all possible extreme values of the parame-
ters, i.e, Kp ∈ {Kpmin ,Kpmax},Kd ∈ {Kdmin ,Kdmax}, θre f ∈ {θre fmin , θre fmax},Vr ∈ {Vrmin ,Vrmax} and
1To be more precise, one can propagate δ expansions of facets because a time-sampled trajectory might
not intersect the facet but will be within some δ-neighborhood of it, where δ can be inferred from the sampling
time and the Lipschitz constant of the dynamics [125].
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τ ∈ {τmin, τmax}. For pk = EA, the controller parameters are known exactly and hence each
initial condition is propagated only once. K(pk,X) denotes the set of controller parameters
for the given control authority pk that are used to construct the control law. Uη denotes
the controller input constructed according to Appendix B.2 (when pk = P) or Appendix
B.1 (when pk = EA) using the parameters η = (θre f ,Vr,Kp,Kd, τ). Note that Algorithm
E.1 requires the initialization of the delay term in the pilot control mode described by Eqn
B.8. This is achieved by reversing the dynamics and estimating upper and lower bounds on
θ[n−m] for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
Algorithm E.1 isReach() function
function isReach(◦q, pk,
◦
q′)
1. for X¯0 in V(◦q)
2. X = X¯0
3. for η in K(pk,X)
4. q¯i := q¯ j := F−1(◦q)
5. while q¯ j = q¯i
6. X′ := f¯ (X,Uη)
7. q¯ j := T¯ (X′)
8. X′ := X
9. if q¯ j 6= q¯i
10. if
◦
q′ ∈ F(q¯i)∩F(q¯ j)
11. return TRUE
12. return FALSE
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Table E.1: Numerical parameters
Parameters Values
m,S re f , Iyy 45420 kg, 122.4 m2, 0.3172e7 kgm2
ρ, c¯ 1.225 kgm−3 ,4.19m
α0,γ0,Tmax 0◦,8◦,300kN
CLg ,CDg ,µ 1.2,0.05,0.1
Cmq ,Cmue −44.43,−1.785
A3,B3 (Cmq ,Cmue)× 12IyyρV2mcgS re f c¯
A4,B4 (Cmq ,Cmue)× 12IyyρV2RS re f c¯
K¯1, K¯3, K¯5, K¯7 −3
K¯2, K¯4, K¯6, K¯8 0.1
θPR, θTS , θng, θtail,hTS ,hlo f 3◦,9◦,3◦,10◦,0.9m,2.5m
(θre fmin , θre fmax), (Vrmin ,Vrmax) (7
◦,13◦), (50,70)ms−1
(Kpmin ,Kpmax), (τmin, τmax) (−5,−1), (0,0.1)s
Vmcg,V1,VR,Vlo f ,V2,V f p 10,47,55,66,67.5,80 (ms−1)
θ1, θ2, θ3, θ4, θ5, θ6 −2◦,3◦,5◦,8◦,9◦,15◦
h1,h2,h3,h4 −5,1,2.5,15 (m)
Number of Monte Carlo trials 1000
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